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INTRODUCTION
Ioannis Armakolas, Agon Demjaha, Arolda Elbasani,  
Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers
Currently in its twelfth year of independence, and despite significant steps 
forward in many policy areas, Kosovo continues to struggle with a number of 
policy challenges, both domestic and international. This book offers in depth 
analyses on a number of these policy challenges, attempting to make a contri-
bution to both scholarly analysis and policy thinking on the domestic and ex-
ternal influences and determinants to Kosovo’s statehood. The book is divided 
in three parts or pillars of analysis, each corresponding to one of the key policy 
areas and sources of challenges to Kosovo’s statehood. Part I tackles issues of 
civil society and civic mobilization. As a response to social phenomena and 
political problems, and in juxtaposition with top down perspectives and elite 
level solutions, the three chapters in this part dissect grassroot agency and its 
role in some of the important political developments and policy areas in Koso-
vo in the last thirty years. Part II turns attention to issues of identity and oth-
erness. The chapters in this part investigate instances and situations whereby 
Kosovar identity, whether in more formal and institutionalised forms or as a 
lived experience, encounters the ethnic and national other. The chapters in 
this part offer in depth and nuanced analyses that challenge conventional, and 
at times stereotypical, understandings of these encounters and their implica-
tions and consequences for Kosovo’s statehood and national identity-building. 
Finally, Part III focuses more on the external challenges of Kosovo’s statehood 
by analysing various aspects of Pristina’s relations with the EU and European 
non-recognisers. Here again the policy challenges for Kosovo are significant 
and tend to become even more complicated due to the institutional and polit-
ical realities of the EU as well as the non-recognisers’ own domestic problems 
and dilemmas. In what follows, we present briefly the conceptual and analyt-
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ical issues of the three parts of the book as well as offer a brief introduction to 
each of the chapters in this volume. 
Part I: Social Actors and Social Movements –  
Bottom-up Mobilizations
Participation and inclusion of the citizenry in the governing processes is often 
seen as the panacea to the many problems plaguing new states and democ-
racies. From organizing against authoritarian tendencies, to offering policy 
solutions and to promoting new alternatives, the organized citizenry plays a 
crucial role in fermenting political and institutional change. The organized 
civil society, by scrutinizing the work of their institutions and elected repre-
sentatives, also helps to disclose problems of governance and hold their power 
holders to task for their deeds. Hence, an active civil society helps to further 
democratic processes, safeguard institutions and improve trends of gover-
nance while linking formal institutions and social interests that make modern 
societies. 
Whether shaking up institutional status quo, enabling vertical accountabili-
ty or bridging governance and society, civil society is a necessary element of 
democratic politics. Its role is all the more important in hybrid regimes which 
suffer from weak institutions, hierarchical political organizations, patronage 
style of governance and widespread corruption. Yet, the input of civil society 
in the socio-political processes is neither automatic nor certain. In order to 
perform its functions, organized citizenry requires necessary conditions to 
mobilize, capacities to provide alternatives and lobby for change and a certain 
independence from specific politics and interests. Therefore, when, how and 
to what extent civil society may become a force to reckon with remains an 
open question in need of empirical investigation. 
Kosovo has been the scene of various forms of social mobilization during its 
eventful transformation from an Autonomous Province in the context of the 
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Socialist Yugoslavia, and through Milošević’s authoritarianism and war, to an 
international-run entity and later an independent state. As such, it offers a 
rich laboratory for investigating the role of civil mobilization under different 
political regimes and through various moments of transition. The cluster of 
chapters in Part I explores the conditions under which, but also the extent to 
which, civil society has become a transformative power in the specific  Koso-
var context.  
Nedim Hogić’s chapter explores the input of social mobilization in the battle 
against corruption by focusing on the adoption of the whistleblower legisla-
tion during the period 2011-18. The analysis juxtaposes the role of top-down 
institutional incentives and bottom-up policy impulses in order to highlight 
whether and how civil mobilization makes a change in the quality of relevant 
legislation and the prospects of its implementation. Accordingly, the first 
whistleblower legislation adopted hastily by the Kosovo legislature back in 
2011 had many inconsistencies and vague provisions to be applicable. It was 
the activity of few NGOs focused on the issue of whistleblowers protection 
that highlighted the weakness of the 2011 legislative framework and demon-
strated that nothing was being done to protect emerging cases of whistleblow-
ers. Additionally, organized NGOs progressively lobbied for legislative changes 
and prepared their own proposal. Finally, it was the alliance between local 
NGOs and international structures, particularly EU and the Council of Europe, 
that helped to place the legal amendments in the political agenda. The amend-
ments that provide for civil society participation in the legislative process have 
helped to improve the law but also embody the new legislation in a net of so-
cial safeguards necessary to trace the future implementation of the law. 
Ervjola Selenica’s chapter investigates evolving policies to stem threats of 
radicalisation and violent extremism, with a focus on mechanisms that tar-
get youth, education and the local communities. The author suggests that in 
the Kosovo context, one can notice Islamization of those lacking identity, a 
process which between marginalization and nihilism leads to radicalization. 
Hence, law enforcement measures are increasingly complemented with so-
19
INTRODUCTION
cietal measures aimed at addressing broader issues of social integration, po-
larisation and cohesion. Most policy measures are outlined, led, sponsored 
and managed by the international community but target the empowerment 
of civil society able to offer expertise, suggest policy solutions and deliver 
services. The author finds that the broader side-effects of those internation-
al-led efforts is the promotion of  donor-dependent project-focused and ben-
efit-seeking civil society that has little to do with the society or the functions 
of truly independent social actors. To paraphrase one of the local researchers 
working on the topic, the field has been transformed into ‘business’ driven 
by ‘profit’. Those findings call for further research on the role and limits of a 
donor-dependent and profit-oriented civil society, a new and still unexplored 
trend across the Balkans and other similar cases of international intervention. 
Finally, Shkëlzen Gashi’s chapter provides a nuanced empirical account of the 
rise of a wide social and political movement that later morphed into a paral-
lel governing system defying the oppressive state apparatus of the Milošević 
era. The chapter shows that increasing political repression provided the glue 
that merged separate cases of social protest and dissidence into a powerful 
movement including citizens from different walks of life. Finally, it was the 
leadership of Ibrahim Rugova and his ideas of peaceful resistance that provid-
ed a set of common goals, a framework of mobilization and the infrastructure 
of an organized formal political structure. Rugova’s ideals and political orga-
nization, however, proved insufficient to reach the goal of independence. It 
was the competing movement, the Kosovo Liberation Army, and its use of the 
armed struggle, that drew the attention of the international community and 
achieved the final goal of independence. Still, one can also argue that the inter-
national popularity of Kosovo’s cause and the ample international support it 
received in the path of independence derives to a large extent from the model 
of civil disobedience that Rugova propagated. 
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Part II: Experiences, Performances and Representations of 
Self and Other
Who, or what, are the drivers and spoilers of societal reform and change? In 
liberal peace- and state-building projects, the aspired change is towards dem-
ocratic and inclusive societies. In the case of post-conflict Kosovo and its peo-
ple, as in the wider Western Balkans, bridging interethnic divisions at social 
and political levels has remained at the top of the international agenda, argu-
ably sometimes overlooking factors that can underpin societal divisions and 
structures of exclusion, other than the ethnic. While this section remains in 
the field of studying social agency, as introduced in the preceding section, it 
shifts the focus away from organised civil society actors and their mobilisa-
tion and towards the interplay between wider systems, on the one hand, and 
individual actors on the other. The former would include formal institutions, 
social and cultural forms of organisation, legal and policy frameworks at local, 
national or geo-political level and the latter politicians and ordinary citizens. 
The question of whether individual people, by their actions and behaviour, 
can drive structural change or, alternatively, whether external, pre-exist-
ing structures such as wider institutional, social or cultural (including po-
litical-cultural) frameworks shape people’s behaviour, has a long history in 
the social sciences. Prominently subsumed under the ‘structure and agency 
debate’, this theoretical paradigm has been criticised, repeatedly, for its di-
chotomous presumptions. In political science, for example, ‘structure’ has 
sometimes been equated with ‘top-down’ and, conversely, ‘agency’ with ‘bot-
tom-up’, perspectives. However, the individual agency of leading political rep-
resentatives of a system might have just as important an impact on chances 
for reform and socio-political changes as entrenched structures at grass-roots’ 
level, e.g. cultural belief systems, might have on stagnation. 
Equally, a dichotomous approach can lend itself to political positioning and 
reductionist views of wider social and political realities. For example, analysts 
who emphasise individual ‘agency’ as a catalyst for change might overlook 
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structural constraints deriving, typically, from social inequality in terms of 
power, resources, class or prejudice in ways that can profoundly impede any 
individual’s scope for autonomy and choice (whether a hierarchical social or-
der applies or not). If, then, such individuals are held responsible for a fate 
over which they have little control, such tendencies easily align with neo-lib-
eral political agendas. Conversely, if pre-existing ‘structures’ of such a kind are 
seen as paramount in their impact on people’s scope for improving their lives, 
a theoretical perspective usually associated with Marxist sociology, individ-
uals’ capacities for unsettling an unsatisfactory status quo via their actions, 
might be overlooked. Last, but not least, exclusively structuralist approaches 
risk essentialising cultures and societies, for their emphasis on supposed static 
frameworks as shaping people’s attitudes and behaviour. In the case of the 
Western Balkans, for example, this has been notoriously evident in writings 
that evoke ‘ancient hatred theories’ as an ahistorical framework which would 
seem to forfeit any chances of peaceful coexistence between groups of differ-
ent ethnic heritage. 
Sociologist Anthony Giddens, when introducing ‘structuration theory’ in the 
mid-1980s, highlighted the need for a dialectic focus on the interplay between 
‘structure’ and ‘agency’ in seeking to identify the factors that enable or hin-
der social and cultural change. For the contributors to this section, implicit 
questions remain as to the location and relation of ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ in 
the case studies under scrutiny. Their studies respond to the following ques-
tions, more or less explicitly: what is the scope for Serb citizens at grassroots 
level in Kosovo to resist and subvert pervasive structural constraints experi-
enced through both horizontal (social) encounters and hierarchical (political) 
structures of dividing the citizenry, as experienced in everyday life? (Trupia) 
What factors allow a liberal-benevolent process of reform – driven by powerful 
international actors – to mutate into one that effectively consolidates the (cul-
tural, social and political) structures it set out to transform? (Picciano) How 
do individual actors negotiate transnationally competing structures of loyalty, 
identification and prejudice? (Drosopulos) And, what happens if subversive 
agency arises from within the ‘structures’ of power themselves, such as when 
22
INTRODUCTION
the highest powerholders suspend, manipulate or abuse pre-existing national 
and international, institutional structures according to their partisan interests 
?(Tadić) 
Trupia’s chapter leads us directly into the micro-perspectives of ordinary Serb 
villagers, their everyday experiences and their agency in dealing with two mu-
tually competing and incompatible, ethnicised citizenship regimes, respec-
tively imposed by both Belgrade and Prishtina. Epistemologically aware of the 
power of the prevailing discourse, he deliberately undercuts any ethnicised 
categorisations by asking the villagers for their concept of ‘good personhood’ 
in social interactions. The stories thus elicited allow Trupia to explore their 
strategies of navigating their local identity in response to the conflicting, he-
gemonic structuring of citizenship in Kosovo (‘structure’, here, as embodied 
in discourse, ideology, state administration and institutions). The villagers’ 
responses are refreshingly pragmatic and, on occasions, outright brave. How-
ever, they reveal not only much human potential in resisting dividing forces 
and building unexpected social bridges, but also the power of (sometimes very 
localised) socio-economic dependencies in perpetuating segregation and di-
visions. Interestingly, the dividing lines that emerge are internal to Kosovo 
Serbs as either fostering or rejecting, in either benefiting or losing out from, 
ethno-nationalist agitations. There might be limits to the representativeness 
of these villagers’ specific experiences, practices and attitudes for the Serb 
population in Kosovo at large, given the (anonymised) Village’s distinct topo-
graphical situatedness and its partial embeddedness with an Albanian-dom-
inated economy surrounding it. Yet, the original method employed and the 
resulting findings – such as regarding contingencies of attitudes and the het-
erogeneity of people who are usually viewed through an ethnicised, homo-
genising lens only – offers the potential for wider methodological, empirical 
and theoretical applications.
Picciano’s chapter contributes to challenging the structure/agency dichotomy 
if imagined only as a ‘top-down’ versus ‘bottom-up’ process. She focusses on 
the agency of powerful foreign and local actors in Kosovo’s educational reform 
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process and its unexpected outcomes of consolidating pre-existing structures 
of segregation, which she locates at grassroots level. Her study traces how the 
internationally-driven endeavours of liberal education-building in post-con-
flict Kosovo, explicitly aimed at inclusivity and integration, de facto ended up 
in a parallel, ethnic system of education at all levels. Furthermore, the partial 
privatisation of the sector, in particular, allowed corruption to flourish, a side 
effect further distorting any Kosovo student’s chances for a quality education. 
Picciano’s analysis of the unsuccessful reform process reveals some unexpect-
ed complicities between actors, from the most local to international levels, in 
reproducing pre-existing, religious and, hence, cultural structures of ethnic 
affiliation. Her documentation of the post-conflict process of reform negotia-
tions emerges as ridden by conflict as much as by rational and pragmatic com-
promise at the interface between foreign and local aims and concerns, forfeit-
ing any chances for a true structural change of the educational system. While 
the involved domestic actors, at all levels, are shown to have successfully in-
strumentalised their reference groups’ historical and cultural identifications 
and loyalties in this process, international actors are shown to have helped to 
effectively institutionalise segregation in an attempt to rescue multi-ethnic-
ity, albeit less than meaningful in social reality. The resulting consolidation 
of educational segregation and the creation of, de facto, exclusionary, hybrid 
institutions, emerges as much as an outcome of agency (or the lack of agency) 
as of structure in terms of power, policy frameworks, and prevailing culture at 
all levels.
Drosopulos’s chapter shifts our attention again to the level of individual 
agency at a micro-level, here of young people vis-à-vis conflicting cultural 
structures of perceptions, values, norms and expectations in transnational 
situations. Torn between expectations from home and opportunities abroad, 
Kosovo students of various ethnic backgrounds, who study at university in 
Thessaloniki, often find themselves identified with outdated stereotypes in 
either nationalist or ethnicist terms. This study not only reveals the everyday 
nationalism and, frequently, ignorance hidden in such expectations and as-
sumptions which these students are exposed to, both from home and abroad 
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(including upon their return to Kosovo). This contribution’s micro-sociological 
view on the numerous interviewed actors’ presentation of Self, their every-
day negotiation of stereotypes and constructions of identity, reveal a range of 
adaptive performances and strategies as well as, in fact, these students’ poten-
tial for building better relations between the two countries as ‘cultural ambas-
sadors’. Strategies and presentations of Self documented in this Greek location 
include, on the one hand, students either distancing themselves from a histo-
ry of war and violence alone (if associated with Kosovo) or from a stereotypical 
association with crime (if identified via their Albanian ethnicity) as well as a 
diplomatic shifting of emphases on identity features suggesting commonal-
ity, where opportune and to avoid misplaced distrust (e.g. because of differ-
ent religious background). On the other, there can be withdrawal into one’s 
own group or avoidance or disruption of cross-national contacts, including 
of love relationships, where these various pressures defeat alternative choic-
es. As Drosopulos suggests, the hold of these structures of perceptions over 
a respondent’s freedom of choice, respectively, correlates with the individ-
ual respondent’s specific socio-economic (including family) and geographic 
background in Kosovo and his or her dependency on these. Overall, her study 
concludes in a call for more intercultural exchange, as only sufficient opportu-
nities to get to know each other can break the perpetuation of stereotypes and 
associated nationalist attitudes and fears.
Finally, Tadić’s chapter follows a presidentially-initiated process of public con-
sultations in Serbia since summer 2017, known as ‘internal dialogue’, which set 
out to achieve national consensus at societal level over the contested question 
of normalising relations with Kosovo. Arguably these consultations could have 
served as an example of how political and societal agency, by circumventing 
existing structures, might reveal creative potentials that could lead to inno-
vative solutions. Even though initiated from the top down, they were deliber-
ately set outside the EU-facilitated ‘normalisation’ talks at the bilateral level 
as well as outside any national, institutional frameworks such as, for example, 
the parliament. However, Tadic’s study reveals that exactly the opposite was 
the case. It offers a paradigmatic case study of the need to differentiate the na-
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ture of structural constraints when analysing potentials for change, and how 
it is often those constraints that are not immediately visible, which can have 
the most detrimental impact on progress. For example, she documents how 
participants perceived the discussion culture created as an autocratic perfor-
mance of power which forfeited open and critical debate, rather than facilitat-
ing inclusivity and participation. She also describes the general lack of clarity 
regarding the dialogue’s purpose and accountability and the ambiguous forms 
of documentations which lend themselves to contradictory interpretations 
of supposed agreements, making them impossible to implement; as well as 
the deliberate ignoring of the EU’s policy framework for integration. ‘Struc-
ture’, here as a form of autocratic culture resulting from political agency at top 
national level, is selectively constructed, ignored or used and put to the ser-
vice of governmental power which invokes, tightens or loosens its constraints 
according to political partisan interests. Not surprisingly, the resulting lack 
of any structural predictability – such as through agreed participatory proce-
dures and rules of both debate and aspired outcomes – in the end simply repro-
duced and reaffirmed the political deadlock over the normalisation of bilateral 
relations between Serbia and Kosovo, rather than generating any new avenues 
towards a solution. 
The contributions to this section thus take very different perspectives when 
analysed through the theoretical lens of the structure/agency debate; yet they 
all delve into the interplay between both perspectives at stake. They inspire 
fresh thinking as to the definition of this theoretical couple, and where ‘struc-
ture’ and ‘agency’ might be located, substantiated or emerge, sometimes un-
expectedly, in opening up or hindering opportunities for change on a general, 
theoretical level. They also arrive at some unexpected, specific insights into 
the, often-overlooked, drivers and spoilers of societal, political, and attitudi-
nal changes in both Kosovo and the wider region.
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Part III: Complex Relations with the EU  
and the Role of Non-Recognisers 
This part of the book brings together four papers that analyse the complex re-
lations between Kosovo and the EU, with special focus on the role of non-rec-
ognisers in these relations. The role of EU institutions has been very important 
during the first phases of the international civil administration since the Union 
was in charge of the pillar IV for reconstruction and Economic Development 
under the auspices of the international administration. Actually, since the end 
of the Kosovo war in 1999, the EU has been one of the leading international 
actors in Kosovo, involved in “almost all aspects of governance in the country” 
(Papadimitriou, Petrov and Greiçevci 2007, 220). However, Kosovo’s relations 
with the EU have been quite complex and complicated since unilateral dec-
laration of independence in 2008. The European Council has one day after 
Kosovo declared independence stated that member states would decide in ac-
cordance with national practice and international law on the issue of Kosovo 
and their relations with the new country. As a result, five out of 28 EU mem-
ber states have still not recognized Kosovo’s statehood, which in addition to 
putting a strain on the common foreign policy of the EU, has from the outset 
convoluted Kosovo’s relations with the Union. Currently, Kosovo is consid-
erably lagging behind the rest of the region, as the last country to sign the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement, and the only one in the Western Bal-
kans without visa liberalisation. Despite the various EU and member states’ 
actors present in Kosovo, the issue of recognition/non-recognition among the 
EU member remains as one of the major obstacles to ensure the coherence of 
the EU’s foreign policy regarding Kosovo (Mutluer 2018, 161). Due to the lack 
of consensus among member states regarding Kosovo’s independence, the EU 
decided to take a status-neutral position that has seriously hampered the EU 
integration process of the country (Rrahmani 2018). The EU’s inability to deal 
with Kosovo as an independent state has seriously undermined the standing 
of its state-building policies. Kosovo’s Stabilisation and Association Process 
has been arduous and complicated, reinforcing the sense that Kosovo is being 
treated differently to other EU aspirants (Mutluer 2018, 200).
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The EU has also been criticized for ignoring the Western Balkans’ slide towards 
authoritarianism by prioritizing stability over democracy (Balkans in Europe 
Policy Advisory Group 2017). The EU’s internal problems, the mixed migration 
crisis of 2015 and the growing influence of Russia have led to the EU signifi-
cantly limiting its criticism of the Balkan ruling elites’ undemocratic practic-
es, and continuinh its cooperation with them in order to limit migration and 
maintain those countries within the Euro-Atlantic sphere of influence (Szpala 
2018). By offering external support for the sake of the false promise of stabili-
ty, the EU has contributed to creation of so-called ‘stabilitocracies’ across the 
region: regimes that have considerable shortcomings in terms of democratic 
governance, yet enjoy external legitimacy for offering some supposed stability. 
In Kosovo, the EU and other external actors greatly ignored domestic short-
comings in the domain of the rule of law and the fight against corruption in 
exchange for cooperation in the dialogue with Belgrade (Bieber 2018). Such 
EU-facilitated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia has also highlighted var-
ious problems stemming from the EU internal disunity regarding Kosovo’s 
status. The persistence of the non-recognizers has undoubtedly undermined 
the EU’s ability to act more decisively vis-à-vis both Belgrade and Pristina by 
forcing it to speak with a more muffled voice (Mutluer 2018, 159). The dialogue 
has continuously suffered from ambiguities and inconsistencies, both in terms 
of its overall aim as well as in terms of implementation of already signed agree-
ments. Moreover, one could argue that the dialogue has damaged the process 
of the recognition of Kosovo’s independence since it has given an excuse to 
five EU and other non-recognising countries to postpone such decision until 
the dialogue is concluded (Demjaha 2018). 
Due to the disagreement over Kosovo’s status, Pristina’s European integration 
is basically blocked since the Council cannot authorise further progress of the 
county towards EU regardless of the fulfilment of the accession criteria. Thus, 
currently visa liberalisation is the only ‘carrot’ the EU can offer to Kosovo au-
thorities as an incentive to stay on a constructive path (Juzová 2019). In July 
2018, the European Commission announced that Pristina has fulfilled the re-
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maining two conditions – its Parliament ratified the border demarcation with 
Montenegro and the country worked on improving its track record of orga-
nized crime and corruption cases – and recommended once again to the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council to introduce the visa-free regime for Kosovo 
(European Commission 2018). The EU’s failure to deliver on its promise even 
after Kosovo had fulfilled the extensive list of conditions has further eroded its 
credibility among Kosovo citizens and political elites. This was clearly demon-
strated in November 2018 when Kosovo introduced 100% trade tariffs on goods 
from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina despite strong criticism from the EU 
and US officials. The EU and its leaders were suddenly rendered powerless due 
to their primary leverage – visa liberalisation – losing credibility as a realistic 
prospect for Kosovo (Juzová 2019). The fact that months after their introduc-
tion, the tariffs are still in place, despite recommendations and even pressure 
from Brussels to revoke them, is a warning signal in this direction.
The first two chapters of this part of the book deal specifically with Kosovo’s 
cumbersome visa liberalisation process. They bring together comprehensive 
and objective analysis of Kosovo’s path towards visa-free regime by providing 
additional and important insights on the topic. Manu’s chapter seeks to ex-
amine how the inter-institutional architecture and division of competences 
between EU institutions influence the EU’s decision-making process inrela-
tion to Kosovo’s visa liberalisation. The chapter points out that since five EU 
member states have not yet recognized Kosovo as an independent state, the 
EU Council discussion on Kosovo is characterized by the so-called ‘construc-
tive ambiguity’, meaning that the EU deliberately uses an ambiguous language 
on a sensitive issue in order to advance political purposes. However, Manu 
concludes that in terms of the visa liberalisation, the five non-recognizers 
were not the only obstacle. She asserts that the visa-free regime for Kosovo 
was delayed mainly due to the intricacies of EU decision- and policy-making, 
and its direct connection to migration and asylum-related concerns of the EU 
member states. The current political climate in the EU, with numerous con-
cerns related to migration, has prompted scepticism among other EU mem-
ber states towards further EU enlargement, thus hindering the advancement 
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of the Western Balkans countries towards full integration. By the same logic, 
such concerns of member states regarding the state of anti-corruption reforms 
and the large number of asylum applications have blocked Kosovo’s visa lib-
eralisation, despite the European Commission’s confirmation that Kosovo has 
fulfilled the technical criteria enshrined in the visa liberalisation Roadmap.
The chapter by Nechev and Nikolovski examines the application of the EU con-
ditionality policy regarding the visa liberalisation process with Kosovo. The 
chapter also explores the similarities and differences in the EU approach as 
well as the policy instruments and tools applied in the process in comparison 
to the other Western Balkan countries. The analysis shown that while the poli-
cy conditionality applied and the mechanisms used in the case of Kosovo have 
followed a pattern of visa liberalisation similar to other countries of the region, 
in order to take into account the specificities of the country the EU needed to 
introduce a tailor-made Roadmap for Kosovo. Due to this complex reality re-
lated to the status of Kosovo vis-à-vis the European Union, Kosovo was able to 
fulfil the visa liberalisation criteria only after six years, while other countries in 
the region needed approximately 2-3 years. Moreover, the chapter shows that 
due to the increased level of precision and detailness of the documents, the 
number of criteria given to Kosovo exceeds by double the number of require-
ments provided to the other Western Balkan countries. While in terms of con-
tent, Kosovo is required to implement the same reforms as other countries, the 
chapter concludes that the possibility to amend the criteria in the Roadmap 
provided to Kosovo directly influences the determinacy and credibility of the 
EU approach related to the visa liberalisation process for Kosovo. 
To complete the picture on complex relations between Kosovo and the EU, the 
two other chapters in this section bring interesting insights about perspectives 
on Kosovo from the two non-recognizing countries – Spain and Romania. Vila 
Sarriá’s chapter explores the reasons behind the non-recognition of Kosovo 
by Spain, and at the same time examines the role that the case of Kosovo has 
played in Catalonia’s quest for self-determination. Instead of addressing dif-
ferences between Catalonia and Kosovo’s path for self-determination, and ar-
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guing whether Catalonia does or does not have a right to secede, the chapter 
tries to explain the role that Kosovo played in legitimising the Catalan quest for 
independence. The empirical analysis identifies the internal power struggle 
of Spain as the most important reason for the non-recognition of Kosovo, al-
though other reasons, such as the adherence to international law and the fear 
that recognition of Kosovo might potentially create a precedent for the Basque 
Country and Catalonia, also played a decisive role. The author suggests that 
Kosovo played a significant role in the Catalan process of self-determination 
due to Catalan elites’ increased interest in the process that led to Pristina’s 
independence. The chapter concludes that two major events have shaped the 
Catalan interest in Kosovo. Firstly, the declaration of independence since it left 
the door open for the potential creation of new states in Europe. Secondly, the 
ICJ Decision, as it signalled to Catalan separatists that declarations of indepen-
dence were no longer considered a breach of international law, and therefore, 
could potentially be replicated elsewhere.
Damian’s chapter attempts to answer the question: what is the current posi-
tion of Romanian political parties and which narratives are dominant when it 
comes to the Romania-Kosovo relations? In doing so, the author contributes 
to filling a gap in understanding the attitudes of the Romanian political parties 
concerning Kosovo and also to assessing how recently-established parties po-
sition themselves with regard to this topic. The analysis shows that the entire 
political spectrum in Romania, be those the mainstream parties or the new po-
litical parties, shares a common view regarding the policy of non-recognition 
towards Kosovo. While such position embraces a legalist approach according 
to which independence of Kosovo represents a breach of international law, 
meanwhile alternative narratives have been promoted, portraying Kosovo as 
a presumably dangerous precedent. Namely, a parallel was drawn between 
Kosovo’s independence and the fear of secession of Székely Land in Romania, 
the status of the breakaway region of Transnistria in Moldova, and, after 2014, 
the illegal annexation of Crimea. In addition, the almost mythologized rela-
tionship between Romania and Serbia has created an environment with very 
few opportunities for any in-depth debates on Kosovo. The chapter concludes 
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that for Romanian political parties an agreement between Belgrade and Pristi-
na must precede any change of the policy of non-recognition towards Kosovo. 
In this way, the political parties are able to maintain a predictable behaviour, 
which is deemed important in the international arena, and are not required to 
create new narratives that would explain to the public their change of position 
towards recognition.
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In post-war Kosovo, the battle against corruption has been the target of abun-
dant international support, myriads of external projects and experts as well as 
many legal initiatives and institutional reshuffling. Most such initiatives have 
failed to take root and make a change on the ground. We assume that fighting 
corruption requires not just a set of elaborate legal measures, but also mo-
bilization of an active civil society able to provide alternatives and monitor 
institutional packages. We assess how the top-down institutional solutions 
and the more bottom-up collective action influence the battle against corrup-
tion by focusing in the process of regulation of whistleblowing since the first 
adoption of the law in 2011. The analysis suggests that institutional design 
and legal solutions to battle corruption need to be complemented by active 
societal mobilization to deliver results. Specifically, the initial institutional de-
sign regarding whistleblowers that took primacy as ‘weapon of choice’ didn’t 
result in better protection or more cases of whistelblowers. Instead, what was 
crucial was the mobilization of the civil society organizations, which improved 
the efficiency, raised public awareness concerning the relevance and aligned 
with international institutions in order to obtain technical support for the im-
provement of the initial legal framework.
I
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Corruption has been the buzzword of international and local efforts to re-
build post-war Kosovo. Ever since the establishment of UN Mission in Koso-
vo (UNMiK) in 1999 the issue has been in the spotlight of both international 
statebuilders, citizens and politicians. The issue has gained steam with the 
creation of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) and 
the signing of a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) between EU 
and Kosovo in 2016. In the case of Balkan enlargements, the EU has developed 
elaborate criteria regarding rule of law priorities as a must for target countries, 
including Kosovo, to advance in the institutional ladder of accession (Nozar 
2012; Elbasani 2019). 
Yet, corruption has survived dense international support, myriads of external 
missions, projects and experts as well as many legal initiatives and institution-
al reshuffling undertaken in the field. International indexes demonstrate little 
actual progress of rule of law in general and corruption in particular, while 
continuously singling out Kosovo as the country with the lowest scores of rule 
of law in the Balkans (Freedom House 2018). Citizens themselves typically 
see corruption as one of the main societal problems in the country (Lëvizja 
FOL 2015). Why have institutional efforts to tackle corruption failed to deliver 
measurable progress on the ground? When and how do institutional initiatives 
take root in the domestic context where they are transposed? We assume that 
institutional arrangements that focus on twisting formal incentives for cor-
rupt behaviour are a necessary but insufficient toolbox to deal with the issue. 
Fighting corruption requires not just a set of elaborate legal measures but also 
societal demand for and engagement of an active civil society able to suggest 
alternatives, promote its versions and safeguard the implementation.  Ulti-
mately, it is the social mobilization against corruption that explain why and 
when institutional measures take root in specific social and political contexts. 
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This chapter analyses how institutional incentives and social mobilization strat-
egies play out to explain the process of regulation of whistleblowing, including 
development of legislation and its implementation since the initial adoption in 
2011. Focus on this particular measure in the battle against corruption allows 
us to assess the role of different approaches and relevant actors both social, 
governmental and international. Empirically, we use primary and secondary 
sources. Primary sources consist of semi-structured interviews with leading 
representatives of Kosovo’s NGOs and legal experts as well as personal observa-
tion. Secondary sources include reports, reviews and findings available in the 
academic literature and in archives of international organizations, domestic in-
stitutions and local nongovernmental organizations.
The paper is organized in four sections. Section one identifies explanatory ap-
proaches in the fight against corruption: principal – agent and collective action 
theories. The next sections analyse how the identified factors play out in the 
introduction, implementation and evolution of whistleblower legislation in 
Kosovo. Section two outlines the features of relevant legislation adopted in 
2011 and the broad political context within which this happened. Section three 
explores the actions of civil society organizations and other international and 
governmental actors on improving and raising awareness of the law.  Section 
four examines the new legal solutions adopted in 2018. Finally, the paper offers 
a conclusion and discussion of the findings. 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES  
TO FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION:  
THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
The failure or success in the fight against corruption is usually analysed through 
two competing lenses: the principal-agent model and the collective action one. 
In the principal-agent model, the principal is a benevolent actor which controls 
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the agents that exercise the authority to govern (Mungiu-Pippidi 2013). For ex-
ample, the principal can be a minister of a government while agents are officials 
in the ministry. Or, the population of a country can be understood as a principal 
while all government officials are agents of this collectively understood ‘prin-
cipal’. In the context of international intervention, key international actors en-
dowed with governing competences can also take over the role of leading princi-
pal in the fight against corruption. If the agents misuse public authority in order 
to promote private gains, then actions which would limit their incentives to do 
so represent the core of legal reforms needed to curb corruption (Rose-Acker-
man 2006). For example, legal and institutional reforms which lead to a more in-
dependent judiciary or criminal penalties for charges of corruption are common 
anticorruption measures resting on an assumption that in order to reduce cor-
ruption one should reduce the formal incentives to engage in corruption (Klit-
gaard 1988; Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013). If the principal institutions 
don’t fulfil their task a review of their work and a possible change of personnel 
through democratic accountability mechanisms will lead to improved results or 
design of new institutions. Very often, such constraining institutional measures 
have a too narrow focus on regulating and monitoring corruption tainted trans-
actions, and that once they come into light.
Proponents of collective action approach see the fight against corruption as a 
more holistic task because they believe that corruption is a wider societal prob-
lem and that its success depends on the societal context, including capacities of 
mobilization. For example, Rothstein notes that a wider societal change (which 
he calls ‘the big bang’) is a necessary precondition for the institutional reforms 
to work, thus viewing institutional efforts without such a backdrop as incre-
mental and only worsening the situation (Rothstein 2011). Uslaner claims that 
in societies with high inequality, the ‘inequality trap’ hollows social capital and 
solidarity leading to higher rates of corruption (Uslaner 2008). In this vision, 
corruptive practices are understood as either a societal norm or as path of deal-
ing with one’s needs. This is why they focus on social capital- and trust-building 
measures and the broader effects that other transformative processes have on 
society. In general, proponents of this theory believe that “people will act cor-
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ruptly as long as they expect that most other people will also behave corruptly” 
(Ledeneva, Bratu and Koekker 2017). Which of the two models is used in a par-
ticular setting determines the measures that are deployed and often the actual 
output in the fight against corruption. 
The two approaches are interlinked. Corruption can be understood as both 
principal agent and collective action problem (Stephenson 2017; Marquette and 
Peiffer 2015). This is because most policy developments in the fight against cor-
ruption involve the role of a governmental body and the reaction of citizens to 
its actions as well as wider societal changes that may result from a particular 
policy. This is why this research seeks to analyse whether whistleblower protec-
tion can be better understood by analysing the institutional tasks or a broader 
change involving the activity society in which the whistleblowers operate.
The growing literature on the problem of corruption in Kosovo points at the 
existence of both institutional and societal or contextual factors: Kosovo’s 
unfinished statehood (Elbasani 2018), its violent past (Belloni 2012), the slow 
transition towards a modern economic system, the failure of international do-
nor coordination (Venner 2016), interplay of local actors and the international 
presence (Uberti 2014; Tadić and Elbasani 2018) incompetence and corruption 
of international statebuilders (Capussela 2015), and lack of social capital (Ante 
2008), to mention a few. Corruption in general is seemingly deeply engrained in 
Kosovo’s society (Duli 2014), although one can notice  significant societal mo-
bilization against it too (Luci 2016). To be sure in the case of Kosovo most policy 
solutions have been designed or strongly influenced by the international pres-
ence according to specific international templates to deal with post-war polities. 
Yet, the weakness of domestic political agency has emerged as key explanation 
to the failure of statebuilding efforts and good governance, especially since 
Kosovo de facto independent statehood and subsequent transfer of most gov-
erning tasks to local authorities in 2007. Institutionalization and even more so 
implementation of anti-corruption initiatives be it financing of political parties, 
freedom of access to information, judicial independence, government hiring, 
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public procurement, bribery of public officials and servants are all tainted by ac-
tive political resistance, informality and illicit strategies of controlling the range 
of anti-corruption institutions (Đorđević and Fazliu 2019). More often than not, 
civil society actors had at best an indirect input in the process of reform via 
producing valuable knowledge and solutions apt to the social context (Phillips 
2018; Qehaja and Prezelj 2017). Generally, in anticorruption literature, an active 
civil society is assigned the role of social accountability mechanism, which in-
cludes articulating local demand for clean hand politics, denouncing corruption 
affairs, lobbying for specific policies and taking their politicians to task for their 
abuses (ERCAS 2014).  In their comparative research of Croatia and Albania’s 
EU accession process, for example, Elbasani and Šabić have demonstrated how 
Croatian NGOs have played an ubiquitous role in the Croatia’s fulfilment on EU 
criteria on rule of law and good governance (Elbasani and Šabić 2017). This ex-
ample, as well as examples from other former EU candidates and now EU mem-
ber states (Beblavy 2009; Pippidi 2004) show the importance of wider societal 
involvement in checking and safeguarding anticorruption reforms. 
Whistleblower legislation and its enforcement is perhaps the best example of 
how institutional and social mobilization approaches play out and interact to 
explain the fight against corruption in practice. While the quality of legislation 
and institutions is essential for the ensuring legal protection of the whistleblow-
ers it is the social context in which their revelations occur that makes those in-
stitutional measures work or not. By revealing immoral, illegal or criminal acts 
of those in power whistleblowers act as the conscience of a society. They are 
blamed and harassed where corruption is socially accepted as a way of doing 
things; they are alternatively praised and rewarded where society is mobilized 
against corruption. Because of their denouncing crucial abuses, whistleblowers 
however are generally retaliated against by the government and suffer tremen-
dous mental pain and a loss of standing in a society (Fotaki, Kenny and Scriver 
2015). Willingness of the society to protect them, but also to act on their reve-
lations, is essential for establishment of a system in which people are willing to 
report hidden wrongdoings of important powerholders. Therefore, their pro-
tection requires specific laws protecting their rights. Even more importantly, it 
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requires an active society, advocating for their rights, participating in legislative 
changes, scrutinizing government’s options and mobilizing for realization of 
legislation in practice. 
In general, whistleblower regulation represents a first formal step to regulate, 
secure and protect the safety and well-being of those who reveal illegal, illegit-
imate and immoral practices that their employers or other organizations com-
mit (Micela and Near 1992). These individuals, risk jobs, status and well-being 
of themselves and their family members in order to stand up to a much more 
powerful structure enshrined in corporate executives, government officials or 
those involved with organized crime. Following enactment of Whistleblow-
er Protection Act in United States in 1989 whistleblower legislation swept the 
world with 35 jurisdictions now regulating specific whistleblower protection 
measures (International Bar Association 2018). The United Nations’ Convention 
against Corruption (UNCAC) while not explicitly ordering enactment of legis-
lation protecting the whistleblowers, recommends countries to adopt whis-
tleblower protecting measures. The EU has no specific acquis regarding protec-
tion of whistleblowers, but it has adopted a recent directive on the issue and it 
has encouraged the legal process in Kosovo, especially in the context of EULEX 
investigation of high level corruption cases.
The campaign to frame whistleblower protection as an act protected by the free-
dom of expression in order to ensure better legal protection for exposing certain 
information which is under way has gained traction with the ruling of European 
Court of Human Rights in Guja v. Moldova case. Some of the biggest leaks exposed 
in the last few years such as the Panama Papers show the rise of so-called ‘digital 
whistleblowing’ where the whistleblower remains anonymous. This time around 
the focus is on the technology that allows for gathering or processing of informa-
tion relevant to public interest and the rights of journalists to publish this data. 
Still, the existence of whistleblower protection legislation itself seem to explain 
little in terms of activation of whistleblower cases. For example, in Slovakia 
and in Belgium a specific whistleblower legislation has been in place for three 
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years and five years respectively, yet no whistleblowers have used it (Blueprint 
for Free Speech 2018b). Similarly, when the legislation was first enacted in the 
United States and the United Kingdom, its impact remained questionable. Only 
subsequent amendments and enactment of new legislation that offered the 
stimulus to whistleblowers enabled a change in corporate culture. But this was 
a process that lasted for fifteen years in the United States. In Great Britain, the 
country considered a European leader in the field of whistleblower protection, 
debates concerning the impact of such legislation persist even to date. By con-
trast, in Serbia the law has yielded 443 cases of application since its adoption 
three years ago. Hence, the jury is out on which specific institutional measures 
and what format of collective mobilization encourage the effective protection 
of whisteblowers. 
THE INITIAL AD HOC AND VAGUE  
LEGAL INITIATIVES FOR PROTECTION  
OF WHISTLEBLOWERS
In Kosovo, the Law on Protection of Informants has been adopted in 2011, earlier 
than in any other jurisdiction in the Western Balkans.1 Prior to this, whistleblower 
protection was regulated by the corporate code of ethics as envisaged by the Law 
on Publicly Owned Enterprises (Kosovo Assembly 2008). At the time of the adop-
tion of Law on Informants, Kosovo was one of the few European countries that 
already had some legal provisions dealing specifically with whistleblowers and 
their protection. Also, in most of the countries which enacted the law, its passage 
was preceded by a concerted effort led by NGOs, political attention or internation-
al pressure. In Kosovo, some international NGOs that analysed Kosovo legislation 
advocated for inclusion of whistleblower protection, but there was no concerted 
campaign to lobby the UNMIK or the government (Article 19 2003). Attention, be 
it through political pressure or the international activity, usually the main driver 
of the reform (Duli and Dodbiba 2015), was not focused on this law too.
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One possible explanation as to why the law made it in the parliamentary agenda 
was that emerging cases of whistleblowing gained wide press coverage among 
the domestic and international outlets. This was not just because of the wide-
spread corruption that went unreported, but because the first important cases of 
whistleblowing had an international dimension and impact. These were the cas-
es in which professionals working for international organizations in Kosovo blew 
the whistle on what they saw as corrupt practices within these institutions. In 
2007, James Wassestrom, an UN official reported suspicions of corruption among 
UN staff only to be detained and fired by UNMIK (Wall Street Journal 2008). Ma-
ria Bamieh, a prosecutor working for EULEX on anticorruption cases, was fired 
and arguably had her rights violated if one considers European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) precedents concerning whistleblower protection (Kusari 2015). In-
formants who were acting as possible witnesses in war crimes cases related to 
influential Kosovo politicians were also reported to have been intimidated and 
scared of testifying (Council of Europe 2010)
Still, the new law and the rights it enabled didn’t enforce a better protection. In 2012, 
the Kosovo Anti-Corruption Agency envisaged a public awareness campaign in or-
der to promote the law to public and private sector employees based on the suggest-
ed findings that “public administration   still   lacks   proper   internal   channel   to 
allow whistleblowers’ reporting, without fear for retaliation” (Kosovo Anti-Corrup-
tion Agency 2012). An analysis conducted by local NGO Lëvizja FOL in 2013 demon-
strated that public sector employees certainly had a poor level of understanding 
of the law and its provisions showing that the campaign was not launched at all or 
that it has failed in its objectives. The reasons for this were not just a failure of public 
awareness campaign but also a lack of actual provisions in the law obliging the pub-
lic employer to establish a procedure for whistleblowers within the organization. 
Indeed, the Law on Informants contained many problematic provisions. The very 
name of the law was unusual. The word ‘informant’ suggests the conduct of the 
whistleblowers themselves is problematic and it echoes the label of a ‘snitch’. 
Such connotations did not resonate well with the population and recalled Mi-
losevic tactics of relying on informants to extend his power in Kosovo (Regional 
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Anticorruption Initiative 2017). This was not a specific Kosovo problem; the name 
whistleblowers was allegedly coined in the early 70s by US activist Ralph Nader 
precisely in order to avoid the stigma that the word ‘informant’ carried out. Most 
problematically, the law used vague language in designating an official person/
institutional mechanism authorized to deal with complaints or reports filed by 
whistleblowers. In article 2.1.5. the law stipulated that a person may be authorized 
by the employer to receive complaints and information from whistleblowers. This 
crucial intervention in the language of the law, which was not in the adopted draft, 
but found it way in the official text of the law meant that there is no obligation 
for a public employer to designate such a person.2 The vague article introduces a 
completely new practice, but leaves the details of implementation to the good will 
of individual public employers. Hence, it is unreasonable to expect that individ-
ual public entities will strive to implement it without direct pressure from above. 
The absence of any internal awareness raising campaign regarding law’s existence 
made the law a useless piece of letter (Lëvizja FOL 2013).       
Various local NGOs, media reports and analysis criticized the law upon its pas-
sage. Beyond the name issue and vague articles on implementation, the main 
critiques addressed the lack of comprehensive protection offered to whis-
tleblowers. The provisions of the law do not explicitly state sanctions for those 
retaliating against whistleblowers. Nor do they allow whistleblowers reporting 
outside of the official channels (Lëvizja FOL 2013). Under the law, the only pro-
tected action includes reporting of the wrongdoings through official channels 
which are not well defined. In practice, this means that if an official is denied 
protection his or her only recourse is the court procedure. This puts the poten-
tial whistleblower in a precarious position; he or she is to await the outcome 
of court proceedings while enjoying no protection until the court proceedings 
are over, a process that may take several years to end. Not all features of the 
law were negative. For example, the law did not make a distinction between 
an employee of an organization or an ordinary citizen allowing anyone to make 
a disclosure, a broad approach not followed in all jurisdictions (Transparency 
International 2018). The law also widely defined possible retaliatory measures 
against which an employee was protected.         
47
NEDIM HOGIĆ
REPAIRING THE ELUSIVE LAW:  
THE ROLE OF THE NGOS
Lëvizja FOL was among the first NGOs involved in assessing and promoting the 
application of 2011 law. Back in 2013, thanks to the financial support of US Em-
bassy, Lëvizja FOL carried out a project to identify and raise awareness regard-
ing the law provisions among public sector employees. Yet, they did not limit 
its activities to legal analysis. The organization also actively sought information 
concerning the details of (non) implementation of the law and prepared several 
policy briefs concerning the lack of knowledge and execution of the law by pub-
lic authorities (Lëvizja FOL 2013). 
Although Lëvizja FOL was financially supported by the US Embassy in Koso-
vo in preparation of this report, general technical assistance of foreign donors 
was neither focused nor well-coordinated on the issue of whistleblowers legis-
lation. An analysis of the technical support projects related to implementation 
of strategic documents on anticorruption finds no reference to whistleblowers 
protection (UNDP 2012; OSCE 2006), which attest to lack of coordination with 
providers of technical assistance but also a lack of relevance attributed to the 
law. Reports from this period merely indicate the existence of the law as such 
(State Department 2013). EULEX’s Compact Progress reports, a monitoring tool 
used to asses various aspects of functionality of the rule of law in Kosovo, also 
make no reference to the Law on Informants or whistleblowers protection as 
such (EULEX 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017). In fact, it is only after the passage 
of the law and the campaign led by civil society organizations that the lack of 
implementation of provisions of this law were picked up by EU Country Reports 
and made a modest appearance in technical assistance projects (UNDP 2015). 
Even then, international organizations and actors involved in Kosovo shared 
little interest in the implementation of the Law in the context of wider anti-cor-
ruption programs. 
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The social context, however, was quite favourable to the law. A study by the Re-
gional Co-operation Council has shown that Kosovo’s population is more favorable 
to whistleblowers and holds more belief in these practices than citizens of any oth-
er South East European country (Regional Cooperation Council 2017). Media has 
often reported on the issue, but tends to problematize social support by portraying 
whistleblowers as victims of their own courage (Kosovo 2.0 2017; Prishtina Insight 
2016) that are frequently intimidated by those  they reported against. 
The unfolding of several cases shows mixed social support and mobilization on 
behalf of the issue and most importantly the weakness of the legal measures to 
actually protect its subjects. In the case of Murat Mehmeti, a tax official who ex-
posed the existence of network of shell companies which help tax evasion, the 
investigations were stalled without results (Balkan Insight 2016). For his cour-
age, Mehmeti was awarded with the Civic Courage award by Lëvizja FOL. Ab-
dullah Thaci, a bank lender who has exposed misuse of public funds by a school 
director in the city of Prizren, by contrast, has been sentenced to six months in 
prison with his sentence being converted to a 5000 € fine because of exposing 
bank secrecy (Blueprint for Free Speech 2018). Abdullah Thaci’s case was com-
plex and deserves further attention because of its institutional implications. He 
reported the corruption not to bank officials, but to a representative of a local 
branch of Vetëvendosje political party, which filed a criminal charge in court 
against the director of the school. Under the scope of the Law on Informants, the 
whistleblowers are not exempt from possible criminal prosecution and even if 
the Criminal Code provides protection for those who expose confidential busi-
ness data in order to report criminal activity this exception was not noted by the 
court that found Abdullah Thaci guilty. The judgment of the first instance court 
in Prizren was prima facie wrong but due to Thaci’s guilty plea in exchange for a 
reduced sentence the case never got its legal epilogue. It also appears that Thaci 
did not have proper legal representation.3 However, the case received significant 
media attention (Kusari 2015). Kosovo Democratic Institute organized a march 
supporting Thaci and a number of media outlets produced articles sympathizing 
with him.    
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In August 2015, an open letter entitled ‘Public institutions should stop intimida-
tion of whistleblowers’ signed by representatives of NGOs and activists was sent 
to the highest institutions in the country including the President of the Repub-
lic and the Speaker of the Parliament. Highlighting the case of Abdullah Thaci as 
well as that of two employees of the public broadcasting corporation RTK, who 
were removed and then returned to their positions, the signatories demanded 
standards of whistleblower protection in line with the ECHR judgment in Guja 
v. Moldova, a precedent in which ECHR first addressed the criteria for whis-
tleblower protection.4 They also demanded an increase in application of the law 
by the public institutions including courts and a creation of the new law within a 
twelve months deadline. Kosovo President Atifete Jahjaga responded to this let-
ter by urging the country’s judicial officials to pay more attention to protection 
of whistleblowers (Gashi 2016). Even if the judicial officials have acknowledged 
this warning they were unable to do so. Namely, not a single employee of Koso-
vo’s institutions has used the reporting mechanisms under 2011 law in order to 
either report a wrongdoing or protect his or her rights.5 Therefore, there were no 
cases in which the law was actually applied.6 The reasons for this could lie not 
only in a poor awareness campaign that the government conducted among its em-
ployees,7 but also in the overall climate of socially acceptable and socially rooted 
corruption that still exists in Kosovo to date. While the awareness of widespread 
corrupt practices by the citizens was high and while fight against corruption was 
widely used as a rhetorical tool in political campaigns, lack of evidence towards 
any meaningful progress of implementation of whistleblowing legislation meant 
that the institutional and legal changes met the hard reality of deeply entrenched 
corruption and abuse of office (Coelho 2018). 
The NGO community too was not involved systematically or powerfully enough 
to demand specific changes to the Law on Informants. Although a series of cas-
es were promoted in public there was no clear advocacy campaign aiming at 
this piece of legislation. This can be explained through lack of a specific orga-
nization dedicated to freedom of speech but also a feeling that the government 
is unresponsive towards demands for legislative changes.8 As an issue which 
represents an intersection between fight against misuse of public office and 
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freedom of speech whistleblowing was not a primary concern of any particular 
organization. A similar trend appears across the Southeast Europe; while anti-
corruption is in the focus of many organizations of civil society, whistleblowing 
requires either dedicated organizations or broad coalitions in order to be effec-
tively pushed to the agenda of the government or the public. The organizations 
that dealt with inadequacies of whistleblower cases and the Law on Informants 
in Kosovo have not attempted to turn the issue into a wider case of mobiliza-
tion within the country or into a cross-country mobilization campaign involving 
other regional partners. As Phillips demonstrates in his research on CSOs oper-
ating in the field of security studies, civil society organizations in Kosovo have 
the capacity to act as an epistemic community9 and to inform stakeholders of 
their recommendations but they fell short of  the capacity for broader societal 
mobilization (Philipps 2018). This mobilization is usually the terrain of political 
parties, which have a long way to go in order to establish fruitful cooperation 
with civil society organizations on issues of common interest. 
Only in 2016, Lëvizja FOL presented its own amendments to the Law on Infor-
mants (Lëvizja FOL 2016). Related activities focused on attending sessions of the 
parliamentary committees and influencing the MPs in order to change the law 
(KFOS 2018). Most MPs, however, invested little in the matter also because they 
have committed to another important piece of the anticorruption legal frame-
work, the Law on Declaration of Assets, discussed at around the same time.10 
Yet, this time around, international actors pressured more forcefully govern-
mental actors to  improve the legal framework on whistleblowing. The pressure 
grew as the 2016 EU country report mentioned the problem of the Law on Infor-
mants for the first time since its adoption in 2011 (European Commission 2016). 
Parallel to this development, the issue of whistleblower protection gained trac-
tion also at the European level with the adoption of an EU-wide Directive on the 
protection of persons reporting on breaches of EU law, which elevated the issue 
after the eruption of series of scandals, such as Dieselgate, Lux Leaks and Pana-
ma Papers. The Council of Europe, which had enacted a series of recommenda-
tions for protection of whistleblowers in 2014, identified a young Kosovo citizen 
as the leading European expert to produce an analysis of law. In the 2011 – 2015 
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period, the Council of Europe’s office in Kosovo focused only on the recommen-
dations of its own body, the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO), and 
did not feature whistleblower protection.11 But following the aforementioned 
elevation of this issue at the European and international level and also contacts 
with local NGOs they too embarked on the issue.   
The combination of an increased relevance of whistleblower protection in EU 
member states, donor assistance, willingness to recognize the relevance of lo-
cal expertise and the activity  of the local NGOs pushed the Ministry of Justice 
to make necessary amendments to the Law on Informants. The Minister of Jus-
tice, Abelard Tahiri, pledged that changes were soon underway during an event 
marking the Anti-Corruption Day in December 2017 (Council of Europe 2017). 
Afterwards, the Ministry of Justice moved to create a working group in charge of 
revising the whistleblower law. 
Political promises to tackle the issue, however, did not shift government’s gen-
eral reluctance to recognize the importance of whistleblowers or attempts to 
sell related institutional packages that pay lip service to international standards 
and social pressure. This was clear in the case of Bujar Ejupi, the former deputy 
director of the Air Service Navigation Agency of Kosovo. Ejupi blew the whis-
tle on breaches of the public private partnership contract between the Turkish 
owned company LIMAK and Kosovo government regarding the management of 
Prishtina airport. Breaches of the contract concerned the safety of the airport 
and the level of investments made by LIMAK leading to Kosovo government 
losing more than 14.5 million euros (Xharra 2018). Ejupi notified his superiors, 
the Kosovo government, the Anti-Corruption Agency, the police and the office 
of the prosecutor of his findings. He was consequently fired from his position of 
deputy director. After receiving no legal protection or political support regard-
ing his claims, he publicly exposed the information disclosed to his superiors to 
no reaction from the government.        
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THE NEWLY AMENDED LEGISLATION
On 2 and 3 May 2018, the Working Group tasked with producing the draft law on 
whistleblower protection held its first meeting in Pristina (Council of Europe 2018). 
The meeting reflected close collaboration between various international govern-
mental and civil society actors. Supported by Council of Europe’s Project against 
Economic Crime, the Working Group comprised members from many public insti-
tutions, including the courts, nongovernmental organizations prominent in public 
campaigning for changes to the law and journalists. While the Ministry of Justice 
was together with the Council of Europe’s office in Prishtina the co-organizer of the 
meetings, NGOs assumed a pivotal role in drafting the revisions of the law.12 
Given the collaborative and open mode of drafting, local experts considered the 
law as “one of the best pieces of legislation covering this field in Europe”.13 The 
praise certainly indicates a certain degree of local ownership and pride in the 
quality of legislation. The law also represents a stark departure from the vague 
clauses of the previous one. Modelled after the Irish and Serbian law, which are 
considered to be among the best pieces of legislation in Europe (Transparency 
International 2018), the revised law addressed one of the main shortcomings of 
the previous legislation: the creation of safe internal channels for whistleblow-
ers reporting. Specifically, the revised law follows a three tier approach to whis-
tleblowing, first featured in the UK Public Interest Disclosure Act (Vandekerck-
hove and Phillips 2016). This approach enables whistleblowers – with certain 
limitations – to choose among internal, external (meaning reporting to a public 
institution) and public channels of communicating the information in their pos-
session. Additionally, the law envisages that each public institution employing 
more than 30 people and each private institution employing more than 80 must 
have a person designated to receive potential reports of whistleblowers.14 If the 
whistleblower has reasons to believe that the designated person will not handle 
requests properly, he or she may report directly to the manager. In any case, in-
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ternal whistleblowing procedures must be started immediately within receipt of 
the information that the whistleblower is providing and must be closed within 
45 days. External whistleblowing concerns cases when a whistleblower reports 
to the Anti-Corruption Agency. He or she may do this when related reporting 
is focused against the manager of an institution, or when a sense of urgency is 
justified by the need to prevent irreparable damage happening to them or to 
public interest. Both guarantees of various channels of reporting and measures 
prohibiting retaliation are a cornerstone of new whistleblower protection law. 
At the same time, this approach lowers the probability that the organization in 
which the whistleblower works suffers consequences as a result of whistleblow-
ing. All acts that are detrimental to the whistleblower and can be understood 
as a measure of retaliation shall be considered null. Any damages arising out of 
these acts shall give grounds for compensation to the whistleblower. 
The law also facilitates the process of investigation that falls under whistleblower 
protection. The standard of evidence for court cases initiated by the whistleblow-
ers is different than an ordinary burden of proof standard before the courts. The 
evidence provided only need to prove the likelihood that an action was directed 
as a retaliation against them; the burden of proof is on the employer to prove that 
the action was not retaliatory in its nature.  The law also provides for monitoring 
and evaluation of its implementation by assigning the Anti-Corruption Agency 
the responsibility of preparing annual reports concerning its implementation 
(Draft Law 2018). Accordingly, the Agency will now handle the cases while be-
ing institutionally responsible for whistleblower protection. Coupled with the 
detailed provisions for external channels of reporting, those facilities of inves-
tigation and central management of cases allow for a wide span of institutional 
protections for reporting individuals,  a stark departure from the previous law. 
The right to a compensation for losses and damage incurred as a result of whis-
tleblowing is also made integral part of the revised law (Draft Law 2018), although 
a more detailed norm regarding particular circumstances of damages arising out of 
retaliation to the whistleblower should have been used as the rarity of these cases 
appearing before the courts might lead to a confusion for the courts adjudicating 
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the compensation. Finally, the revised law contains an atypical provision stating 
that, with regards to the private sector, it will enter into force in one year’s time.15 
This suggests that the drafters were careful not to impose obligations that cannot 
be implemented immediately upon the law’s entry into force but rather demand 
efforts for preparation. If taken seriously, the provisions of the law will open a win-
dow of opportunity for collaboration between the NGOs and the private sector re-
garding also the implementation of the law. 
Still, the experts were sceptical about the long term commitment of the govern-
ment as far as implementation is concerned.16 In general, NGO experts do not 
feel that the attitude of the government towards corruption has changed, thus 
risking that the law will become another piece of legislation that pays only lip 
service to the battle against corruption (Elbasani 2019). There are two specific 
risks that could arise during the implementation of the law. First is the capacity 
and willingness of the Anti-Corruption Agency to perform its duties conferred 
by the law to monitor, receive reports, and produce implementation reports. 
In terms of capacity, it seems that the Agency is well equipped and will receive 
further technical assistance in order to conduct these tasks. The second issues 
that might arise concerns the willingness of Ministry of Justice to adopt neces-
sary bylaws that determine the exact terms of internal administrative procedure 
initiated when internal whistleblowing occurs. The reluctance of the Ministry to 
do so cannot stop the implementation of the law, but may hinder its application, 
at least in the short run. Ultimately, it is the effectiveness of the two institutions 
in performing their duties and the activities of the civil society to report on those 
issues that will determine the application of the law in practice.
CONCLUSIONS
The fight against corruption in Kosovo has so far relied more on principal – agent 
understanding of the fight corruption. This is why institutional design and legis-
lation took primacy as ‘weapons of choice’ in the fight against corruption. In the 
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seven years of application of the Law on Informants, the entire impact of the law 
can be summarized as mobilizing the civil society organizations in improving its 
efficiency, raising public awareness concerning its relevance and liasing with in-
ternational institutions in order to obtain technical support for its improvement. 
The law itself has led neither to better standards of protection of employees or to 
more cases of whistleblowing. The cases of whistleblowers alarming the public on 
wrongdoings of companies and public institutions resulted more from citizens’ 
courage, but they remained largely unsupported by government institutions.
The Law on Informants is a typical case of a legal implant that has failed to pro-
duce substantive change to the way that the system functions. Yet, it is atypical 
because unlike other legal implants it was not imposed from the above and it 
received very little if any technical and lobbyist support from the international 
statebuilding efforts. Rather, it is the unintended consequence of the law – the 
mobilization of civil society - that lead to drafting of a new law which is, as we 
have demonstrated above, an adequate legal framework for protection of the 
rights of whistleblowers. The rise of investigative journalism in Kosovo to prom-
inence, but also globally, is also a factor to which an increase of relevance of the 
law can be attributed. 
Surely, Kosovo as a post-conflict society and a case of unfinished nationhood is a 
fertile ground for corruption (Belloni 2012). But, blaming the lack of progress on 
political will,  politically crafted institutions or the post conflict context does not 
paint the whole picture of why and when anti-corruption measures work. This 
research demonstrates that the institutional design of anticorruption measures 
and top-down efforts to impose legal solutions need to be complemented by ac-
tive societal mobilization to deliver results. Government’s readiness to work on 
a whole new piece of legislation is commendable, but as evidenced by the case 
of Eyupi, does not automatically ensure results.
In general, the quality of anticorruption legislation and related institutional 
packages have little to no relevance in the face of an unfavourable institutional 
and societal context that characterises transitional countries. The interaction 
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among civil society, international organizations and government actors that 
would serve to improve, monitor and safeguard those initiatives tends also to be 
poor. Civil society seems to have no trust in political party representatives or the 
government and vice versa. Despite being financed to, inter alia, establish closer 
ties with MPs in order to amend the Law on Informants through parliamenta-
ry procedure, NGOs have failed to achieve this. Instead, they forged alliances 
with international organizations, in this case the EU and the Council of Europe, 
to contribute their expert knowledge and revise the institutional framework. 
While the synergy between international and civil society actors has produced 
legislation of impressive quality, it is not a guarantee for good implementation. 
What is certain is that the presence of more information regarding corruption 
would hardly surprise any Kosovo citizens. The awareness of corruption among 
them is high (Lëvizja FOL 2016) and they perceive the government as “weak 
and undemocratic” (International Republican Institute 2017).  What they yearn 
to see is accountability (Luci 2016) and without a wider societal mobilization 
this is unlikely to happen. Given the NGOs’ ownership of the (new) law, one can 
hope that such initiatives will be safeguarded and extended to further bottom 
up anticorruption policies. 
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ENDNOTES
1  In Bosnia and Herzegovina the law was adopted in 2013, in Montenegro and Serbia in 
2014, in Albania and Macedonia in 2016. See Regional Anticorruption Initiative 2017. Pro-
tecting Whistleblowers in South East Europe, A review of Policies, Cases and Initiatives.
2  Interview with Flutura Kusari, 23 September 2018.
3  Interview Elbasan Racaj, Prishtina, 21 September 2018.
4   Strictly legally speaking, it is unclear whether Thaci would have received protection 
under the Guja v. Moldova precedent. Namely, one of the criteria for whistleblower pro-
tection is also that the person acts in good faith. It is unclear whether Thaci’s submission 
of documents alleging illegal actions by the school principal to the political party and 
not, for example, to the media, would be considered as an act done in good faith. In any 
circumstance his prosecution was illegal, but it is unclear whether disciplinary actions 
taken by his employer would also be considered illegal. 
5  Interview with Flutura Kusari, 23 September 2018; Interview with Elbasan Racaj, Prishti-
na, 21 September 2018.
6  This, however, does not mean that there is an absolute unwillingness of Kosovo’s public 
employees to report misuses of office or coruption. In a survey conducted by Lëvizja FOL 
in 2016, 12 out of 160 surveyed employees have reported corruption or misuse of office 
to their superiors or the prosecutors out of which three have suffered consequences for 
their actions. 
7  According to Lëvizja FOL reports and an interview with its representative, only 15% of 
the employees were aware of the existence of the law.
8  Interview with Edmond Dunga, Prishtina, 22 September 2018.
9  While the collective effort that various local CSOs have put into changes to the Law on 
Informants is without a doubt it seems appropriate to pinpoint the role that Flutura 
Kusari, as one of the leading new European researchers has played in researching the 
whistleblower cases, advocating for the changes to the law and finally development of 
new legal solutions. 
10  Interview with Elbasan Racaj, Prishtina, 21 September 2018.
11  Interview with Flutura Kusari, 23 September 2018.
12  Interview with Edmond Dunga, Prishtina, 22 September 2018. 
13  Interview with Flutura Kusari, 23 September 2018.
14  In those employing less than this number the complaints will be filed directly with the 
manager/director. 
15  For the public sector, the law is to be applied as it is usual, eight days upon its publica-
tion in the official gazette of Kosovo.
16  Interview Edmond Dunga, Prishtina, 22 September 2018.
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Countering terrorism and preventing radicalization and violent extremism 
have taken center-stage in donors’ and governmental policy agendas in the 
region more broadly and in Kosovo in particular. International donors, national 
governments and civil societies in the Western Balkans increasingly empha-
sise the risk of youth radicalization and at the same time they are seeking 
new strategies for counter-radicalization that would prevent the young from 
slipping into violent and extremist paths. More broadly, youth, education and 
local communities have become crucial entry points for securitized responses 
against the challenges and threats of terrorism and radicalization. This chap-
ter aims to critically analyse counter-radicalization and countering violent 
extremism discourses and practices and reflect upon their implications and 
effects for a number of Kosovo societal sectors and actors such as youth, edu-
cation and local communities. While many research and policy initiatives have 
focused on drivers, causes and mechanisms to counter violent extremism and 
radicalization, there has been no critical analysis of their societal effects. In 
this regard, this study has both theoretical and policy-making relevance as 
it tries to fill this research gap, while also reflecting on dilemmas of current 
strategies and projects as well as providing insights for future policy initiatives 
in Kosovo. 
C
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INTRODUCTION
Since the London and Madrid bombings, the EU agenda on counter-radical-
ization has become substantial and ambitious (de Goede and Simon 2012, 
315). With the Syrian war, which has seen an increased participation of foreign 
fighters from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, the question of jihadism, and 
thus the fight against radicalization and terrorism, has assumed a central fo-
cus within international donors and local governments’ actions in the Western 
Balkans more broadly and in Kosovo more specifically. More recently, youth 
radicalization has gained attention and raised concerns following intelligence 
reports on young European foreign fighters going to or returning from Syria.1
This chapter aims to critically analyse the societal effects of counter-radical-
ization and countering violent extremism (CVE) in Kosovo. More specifically, 
the analysis seeks to map the governance of counter-radicalization and CVE 
and how youth, education, and Muslim authorities and communities are in-
corporated into and affected by strategies, policies and narratives of count-
er-radicalization and CVE. The main research question is: How are count-
er-radicalization and countering violent extremism (CVE) discourses and 
practices affecting social sectors and actors in post-independence Kosovo? 
Other sub-research questions structuring the empirical analysis have inves-
tigated: the threat of radicalization and violent extremism and how they are 
defined by different stakeholders and within discourses, policies and projects; 
the governance and focus of CVE and counter-radicalization policies and proj-
ects; and the ways in which the role and functions of youth, education and 
local communities have been (re)defined by strategies and policies of CVE and 
de-radicalization. 
The chapter is based on a qualitative methodology relying both on the review 
of primary and secondary sources, textual analysis of strategic documents of 
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both international organisations and national governments, and semi-struc-
tured interviews with representatives of civil society, international officials 
and representatives of Kosovo institutions involved in CVE and counter-rad-
icalization. A first in-depth literature review highlighted knowledge and re-
search gaps and identified main official documents for textual analysis as well 
as refined the focus, objectives and research questions. Secondly, one week 
of semi-structured interviews was conducted in Prishtina in September 2018, 
with a total of seven semi-structured in-depth interviews as well as two infor-
mal interviews. Drawing on previous fieldwork research experiences, inter-
views have been conducted with the highest regards to the privacy and after 
securing the informed consent of the interviewees. Given the sensitivity of the 
topic and its hyperinflation in terms of research and policy analysis in the past 
years in the country, the author has encountered many difficulties in access-
ing and interviewing both international and local stakeholders. Main target 
groups that were interviewed during the week trip in Kosovo were key major 
international and national stakeholders that were divided into four groups: (1) 
representatives from international organizations; (2) government officials; (3) 
imams; (4) scholars, think tank and civil society representatives. 
The first section offers a brief conceptual and analytical review of the litera-
ture on counter-terrorism policies in Europe and its recent shift in focus to-
wards countering radicalization and preventing violent extremism within the 
EU and across its external borders under the Enlargement policy. This shift 
has also entailed the emergence of a de-radicalization and preventing violent 
extremism policy focus in Kosovo and the broader Western Balkans region. 
Analytically and theoretically it is based on recent scholarship from criti-
cal terrorism studies and it places the focus not on the effectiveness of such 
policies but on what informs them and how they affect the Kosovar society. 
The second section sheds light on the most recent radicalization phenomena 
often linked with the emergence of a jihadi threat in Kosovo and it critically 
analyses the causes, drivers and the concepts that have informed the action 
of state institutions, international donors and civil society. In this regard, the 
chapter suggests a more nuanced reading of such problematique. The third 
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section analyses international and local government policy responses to such 
challenges, and unravelling how these policies have targeted and prioritized 
specific actors and sectors. The fourth section investigates the incorporation 
of social sectors and actors within CVE and counter-radicalization and reflects 
upon the societal implications and effects.  
THE EU AGENDA OF COUNTER-
RADICALIZATION AND COUNTERING 
VIOLENT EXTREMISM
Counter-terrorism, counter-radicalization and countering violent extremism 
have become top security priority for international actors such as the Euro-
pean Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), the United National Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as well as EU member states (Kundnani and 
Hayes 2018). Law enforcement measures are increasingly complemented by 
societal measures aimed at addressing broader issues of social integration, po-
larisation and cohesion (Ragazzi 2017, 22). While an increasing focus has been 
put on preventing radicalization in prison, other detection and preventative 
measures have been developed to prevent violent extremism in sites such as 
neighbourhoods, communities, schools and hospitals. 
Western Balkan countries’ strategies have aligned with the ‘prevent, pursue, 
respond’ model established in 2010 by the EU. The model has focused on polic-
ing, community outreach and education and has aimed at countering extremist 
propaganda as well as monitoring social media and Internet traffic for terror-
ist-related activity.2 A shift towards preventing violent extremism can be seen 
in 2015, during the Balkans Regional Summit on Countering Violent Extremism 
held in Tirana, which saw the participation of Western Balkans ministers, civ-
il society representatives and other strategic partners such as the OSCE, the 
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EU, the UN.3 During the summit, discussions revolved around the importance 
of investing and strengthening particular local actors, such as youth, with the 
overall aim of improving societal resilience vis-à-vis terrorist threats. This was 
to be done by improving educational and economic opportunities. 
A decade of research and debate on the issue both at the academic and practi-
tioner level has led to no consensus around the issue of radicalization, both in 
what it means and how it should be prevented or fought. The European Com-
mission’s Expert Group on Violent Radicalization defined radicalization as a 
“context-bound phenomenon [...] Global, sociological and political drivers mat-
ter as much as ideological and psychological ones” while violent extremism is 
“socialization to extremism which manifests itself in terrorism” (2008, 7). This 
chapter builds upon previous academic work which adopts a conception of rad-
icalization as a relational process of escalation, and in line with these studies, 
it emphasises the need to take into consideration the relational dynamics be-
tween individuals, groups and state responses and the broader socio-political 
and economic structures in which they are embedded (see Bigo et. al. 2014).4
Counter-radicalization and CVE measures show mixed results while also rais-
ing fundamental questions regarding the efficiency of prevention, the risk of 
escalation and the broader societal effects in terms of Fundamental Rights, 
religious discrimination and social cohesion. In other words, a number of 
pre-emptive judicial powers across EU member states aimed at tackling rad-
icalization and violent extremism threats challenge citizens’ fundamental 
rights and civil liberties and might itself pave the ground to further violent 
escalation (Bigo et al., 2014, 7). Moreover, ‘softer’ approaches to preventing 
radicalization and violent extremism that have entailed the involvement of a 
number of non-traditional security actors such as communities, religious au-
thorities, and teachers may hamper social trust and cohesion by instilling a 
logic of surveillance and suspicion. 
Schmid (2013) argues that much of the literature on radicalization focuses on 
Islamist extremism and jihadist extremism. Related policies to counter this 
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form of extremism have been criticised by Human Rights organizations and 
Muslim associations for generating a feeling of suspicion between the state 
and Muslim communities across Europe and leading to the stigmatization, 
framing and making of Muslims as a ‘suspect community’ (Kundnani 2009). 
In recent years, teachers are also asked to spot radicalization through a set of 
indicators. A recent report by the Council of Europe argues that policies devel-
oped to identify and prevent radicalization, may itself undermine social cohe-
sion and inclusion by introducing a logic of suspicion and surveillance in the 
education sphere (Ragazzi 2017, 5). Families are also expected and encouraged 
to report signs of radicalization, especially in France, UK and the Netherlands. 
In the Netherlands, selected community members have been asked to report 
on possible cases of radicalization or deviant behaviors to the police and in-
telligence services (Kouwenhoven 2016 cited in Ragazzi 2017, 17). In Denmark, 
the ‘Arhus model’ is based upon the involvement of communities, social and 
health workers to generate intelligence data for law-enforcement purposes 
(Henley 2014 cited in Ragazzi 2017, 17). 
A NEW JIHADI THREAT IN KOSOVO? 
CAUSES, DRIVERS AND CONCEPTS OF 
RADICALIZATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM
Islam has historically been predominant among both the Bosniak population 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Albanian population in Kosovo following four 
centuries of Ottoman rule in the region. The revival of the Islamic faith in the 
Balkans during the 1990s and the 2000s and the threat of a radicalized and 
radicalizing Islam emerged following the arrival of foreign Islamic movements 
that brought both financial assistance and their respective ideas and agendas 
(Elbasani 2016). Such movements, often in competition between each other, 
can be grouped into two main fronts with opposing interpretations of Islam 
and differing agendas for its advancement in the region: (1) Salafism/Wahab-
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bism underpinned by a puritan version of Islam, that excludes mediation 
between mosque and society and promoted through foundations funded by 
Saudi Arabia or other Gulf States and organized through informal networks 
that include imams and militant missionaries; (2) a neo-ottoman model pro-
moted by Turkey through government-supported networks, such as Tika and 
Diyanet, or non-official networks such as the Gülen, which represents a per-
spective in historical continuity vis-à-vis the traditional Islam in the Balkans, 
strongly influenced by Sufism (Roy 2015). 
The involvement of Balkan foreign fighters,5 in particular from Kosovo and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the wars in Iraq and Syria has attracted the attention 
of national governments in the Balkans, the civil society, international actors, 
such as the US Embassy, the EU and OSCE, as well as local and international 
media with regard to a new threat of radicalization and violent extremism and 
a new generation of radicalized Islamists in both countries (Augestad Knudsen 
2017, 4). 
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Country
Total
2012-
2015 Returned Killed Women Children
Still in Syr-
ia and Iraq
Albania 136 40 (a) 20 n/a n/a 76 (b)
Bosnia- 
Herzegovina 260
43 men
6 women
44 men
2 women 56 n/a
77 men
48 women
46 children
Croatia 1 - - 1 n/a 1
FYR  
Macedonia 135 (c) 80 20 (d) n/a n/a 35
Kosovo 314
110 men
1 child
6 women 57 38 27
75 men
38 women
27 children
Montenegro Up to 30 5
Serbia 42 9 (e) 11 n/a n/a 22
Slovenia 3+3 (f) 2 1+1 (g) 2 5 2 women5 children (i)
Table 1: Balkan foreign figthers in Syria and Iraq, 2012-2015  
(source: Atlantic Initiative, May 2016)
NB:
(a)  Out of these, 33 are suspected of being engaged 
in fighting or military training.
(e)  Three out of nine returnees are in custody, and 
are being tried before Serbian court. Another 
three FTF are being tried in abstentia. 
(b)  Out of this number, 24 are considered as 
fighters. The rest are family members or sup-
porters.
(f)  Three Slovenian citizens, and three men with 
either dual Slovenian/Bosnian citizenships or 
places of birth in Slovenia. 
(c)  Macedonian security services estimate that the 
share of women in this contingent is close to 
10%.
(g)  One Slovenian, Jure Korelac, and Denis Del-
anovic, with dual Slovenian/Bosnian citizen-
ship.
(d)  The official figure is 17. (i)   Two women married to Bosnian men,  
and their five children
75
ERVJOLA SELENICA
The figure that brought Kosovo back to the attention of international me-
dia outlets was the high percentage of citizens that had travelled to territo-
ries under ISIS rule, measured in per capita and compared to other European 
countries, with around 400 people travelling to Syria or Iraq between 2012-17 
(Kursani 2015, 25; Kursani 2018, 5).6 Around one third of them has returned 
to Kosovo, one third has lost their lives in conflict zones, while the remaining 
one third is still in the above-mentioned areas. While a single profile of Kosovo 
foreign fighters does not exist, most of those who had travelled to Syria and 
Iraq belonged to the 20-30 age group. Several studies on the profile of Europe-
an foreign fighters may suggest Kosovo has the demographic features and the 
conditions for extremist recruitment (Heggammer 2016).7 Kosovo has a sub-
stantial number of male youth in socio-economic conditions of poverty and 
marginalization: 43 percentage of the population is below 25 years old, with 
unemployment around 32.9 and youth unemployment around 57.7 percentage 
(European Commission 2016, 39). 
Studies on radicalization and violent extremism in Kosovo have identified 
several explanatory factors for the phenomenon of radicalization and foreign 
fighters in Kosovo. Two key factors have dominated the debate: firstly, the 
invasive presence of religious foreign foundations stemming from diverging 
Islamic spheres, and secondly, the socio-economic factors. The role of Gulf 
backed foundations and organizations, especially from Saudi Arabia and Tur-
key, have been regarded as instrumental in promoting trajectories of radical-
ization and recruitment of young Kosovars through a combination of private 
mediators, extremist imams and donations (Kursani 2018). While several lo-
cal analysts and researchers argue that these foundations have contributed to 
the introduction in Kosovo of a Salafi/Wahhabi form of Islam, in contrast to 
the locally-rooted form of Hanafi Islam (Kursani 2015; Demjaha and Peci 2016; 
Shtuni 2016), “there is little (if any) evidence that the often-mentioned cases 
of Middle East funded religious based NGOs directly recruited people into vio-
lent extremist ideological groups, or exacerbated the phenomenon” (Kursani 
2018, 4). In fact, the recruitment and cooperation between violent extremists 
has occurred through physical or virtual close links (Kursani 2018, 4). 
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The socio-economic conditions of the country, and more specifically, the com-
bination of high levels of poverty, (youth) unemployment and low levels of 
education have been identified as a second factor for radicalization in Kosovo 
(Gjinovci 2016).8 However, recent data on violent extremists in Kosovo argue 
that education does not appear to be a significant factor in driving the phe-
nomenon (Kursani 2018). Poorer socio-economic conditions seem to represent 
an exacerbating factor rather than a driving one.9 When socio-economic data 
are further disaggregated, unemployment and social (im)mobility seem to 
play a greater role as data from foreign fighters’ socio-economic background 
show that regardless of their social strata, their unemployment rate is double 
the rate of the Kosovo average unemployment rate (Kursani 2018, 25).10 While 
foreign fighters belong to poor socio-economic backgrounds, there are also 
many individuals and families in Kosovo belonging to similar socio-economic 
conditions who do not choose an extremist path. Moreover, findings from a 
recent study commissioned by the British Council suggest that “significant 
drivers of the phenomenon seem to be based around the notion of an iden-
tity vacuum (expressed as detachment from the established social fabric) as 
well as very close intra-family ties of younger generations” (Kursani 2018, 3). 
In other words, “belonging to a group which […] embraces violent extremist 
ideas was more important than the religious doctrines that such groups were 
propagating” (Kursani 2018, 27) suggesting that ‘pack behavior’ was found to 
play a stronger role than religious doctrine. 
While the foreign fighters phenomenon is declining, two new threats have 
attracted both government’s action and donors’ funding on counter-radical-
ization and CVE: the possibility of future returnees and the radicalization of 
imprisoned foreign fighters and imams serving charges for terrorism the latter 
being both seen as potentially influencing other imprisoned inmates. Inter-
views conducted with imprisoned foreign fighters show that “there is a com-
mon sense of angst, alienation, and of injustice that many interviewed and ob-
served former foreign fighters and religious authorities feel with the decision 
of state authorities to imprison them” (Kursani 2018, 16). With regard to the 
potential danger of returnees, while opinions and approaches from different 
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stakeholders vary significantly, around 70 percent of Kosovo citizens still in 
Syria and Iraq are non-combatants (Kursani 2018).
While generally speaking the situation in Kosovo is not substantially different 
from that of other European or Western Balkan countries, it is important to 
note the absence in the country of jihadi-based terrorist attacks. Data on radi-
calization and violent extremism threats vary significantly depending on who 
is being interviewed. Such data are based on anecdotal evidence with numbers 
ranging from a couple of hundreds among those in prison and those expected 
to return to 20.000/30.000 thousand radicalized individuals detected by intel-
ligence sources in Kosovo.11 There are differing opinions from the stakeholders 
interviewed on the nature and extent of the threat of radicalization. While 
some interviewees consider the risk of religious extremism and radicalization 
as still very present,12 others emphasize the risk of other forms of politically 
and ethnically based violence, which are often overlooked.13 According to a 
researcher from the Kosovo Centre for Security Studies (KCSS), risk assessments 
on violence have shown that 40 percent of it is politically and ethnically based, 
whereas only 25 percent of it is religiously motivated.14 Criminal prosecutions, 
arrests and two failed planned attempts directed towards KFOR and the Israeli 
national soccer club may suggest that extremists’ activities are still undergo-
ing.15 Ongoing empirical investigation from KCSS has found that the spread of 
radicalization ideology is still occurring.16
While until 2018 there have been no de-radicalization and re-integration ef-
forts, in the past year the government has made it a priority with objective 
four of the Strategy being specifically on re-integration and de-radicalization 
of returnees and their families.17 The Kosovo’s Strategy on Prevention of Violent 
Extremism and Radicalization Leading to Terrorism 2015-2020 was quickly ad-
opted by the Kosovo government during the same year and was mainly based 
on the EU strategy, while an Action Plan is still under revision as of mid 2018.18 
The focus of the Strategy is being revised, shifting more towards prevention, 
the development of critical thinking and raising awareness among youth and 
their families.19 
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When asking for the definitions that are informing the concepts of violent ex-
tremism and radicalization, there was little clarity and consensus over their 
meaning and use. An investigative journalist who is also teaching in var-
ious trainings and seminars at the primary and high school level about the 
consequences of violent extremism (VE) and radicalization, defined both 
as “everything that is outside social norms”.20 For a prominent local imam, 
radicalization was “everything against religious norms that causes violence,” 
emphasizing that “radicalization that does not lead to violence, is not neces-
sarily negative,” with violence being the key differentiating element according 
to him.21 For a local researcher, the concepts of violent extremism and radi-
calization have been tightly linked to the definition given in the government 
strategy.22 However, they have been loose and interchangeable.23 For this re-
searcher, “radicalization is the process that leads to extremism but not neces-
sarily to violence.”24 Another local researcher argues that violent extremism 
has several components such as behavioral and psychological ones, and it is 
underpinned by different political, religious and ideological factors.25 While, 
she argues, there is no single factor or profile of violent extremism, in Kosovo, 
the local media have solely identified violent extremism with Islamic extrem-
ism.26 A local employee working with a prominent international organization 
active in counter-radicalization and CVE did not give a definition of either con-
cepts but maintained that the terminology being used by the organization is 
the one used by the United Nations (UN), with prevention being the priority: 
according to this interviewee, violent extremism is “whatever produces reli-
gious violence that leads to terrorism.”27
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THE GOVERNANCE OF COUNTER-
RADICALIZATION AND COUNTERING 
VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN KOSOVO
Since 2014, following 130 arrests with charges of terrorism, Kosovo authorities 
have tightened the fight against radicalization and foreign fighters (Perry 2016, 
36). With regard to foreign fighters, an amendment to the law in 2015 has re-
moved the obligation for Kosovo judges to prove that someone has effectively 
participated in a terrorist group: in line with the legislation approved in other 
European countries, now it is sufficient to have participated in a foreign con-
flict.28 According to a report from Balkan Insight, such an amendment has led to 
a situation in which the threshold for terrorist charges has become lower, lead-
ing to convictions based on weak evidences (Qafmolla 2016). One of the major 
risks of such measures concerns a perspective of criminalization for subjects 
whose de-radicalization could go through programmes of social re-integration 
and rehabilitation. The risk that such repressive measurements could entail is a 
further radicalization in and through prisons (Silke 2014; Williams 2016). 
Mapping out the governance of international and local actors dealing with vio-
lent extremism and radicalization in Kosovo as well as their activities, projects 
and strategies has been a challenge. There have been many overlapping ini-
tiatives and actors, and each having their own strategy. For a local researcher 
working on this topic, the field has been transformed into “business” driven by 
“profit.”29 Since the 2015 Washington Summit, the focus of local and interna-
tional actors has shifted from fighting terrorism to preventing violent extrem-
ism with both mainly focusing on religious extremism.30 However, tensions 
have emerged during the drafting process following the involvement of US 
advisors: two approaches have emerged, on the one hand the European ap-
proach focusing more on re-socialization, and on the other, the US approach 
focusing more on punishment and prosecution.31
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The US embassy has played the main role among international actors through 
funding and the provision of US experts in different state structures such as 
the police and the Anti-terror Unit.32 It has contributed to projects focusing 
on youth, women and media.33 Other actors have included the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) that has financed small proj-
ects focusing on civil society; the EU that has provided experts at the Minis-
try of Interior as well as funding trainings for youth, women and local com-
munities; the OSCE that has supported research and analysis, assistance to 
Rule of Law bodies, awareness campaigns targeting at risk communities such 
as women and youth. Recently more focus has been placed on the process of 
radicalization in prisons with new projects focusing on the social re-integra-
tion of returnees.34 Reintegration has been based on the German and Danish 
model.35 The Dutch embassy has also funded projects focusing on the develop-
ment of critical thinking, activism and awareness campaigns targeting youth, 
parents and teachers.36 New projects are focusing on imams that are lecturing 
in prisons, putting counter-narratives as central in the fight against prisons 
radicalization. Main sectors that have been targeted include youth, women, 
returnees and their families.37 
A plethora of international actors such as the US, Italian, and Dutch embas-
sies, the EU, USAID, Advocacy Training and Resource Centre (ATRC), British 
Council, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM) and OSCE among others have contributed 
to the creation of referral mechanisms.38 According to a local employee work-
ing with an international organization in Kosovo, findings of UNDP have been 
instrumental in the development of a pilot referral mechanism in Gjilan that 
comprises municipality authorities, imams, police officers.39 There is an at-
tempt also to involve families as well as friend-to-friend involvement, thus 
developing a tool that can be applied to for all kinds of violence. According 
to this interviewee, there have been several cases in which families have de-
nounced their children to the police, so this project envisages the creation of 
a formal referral mechanism based on the UK and Danish model and that can 
be applied to every Kosovo municipality.40 To sum up, counter-radicalization 
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and CVE efforts have initially focused on the push and pull factors of extrem-
ism, subsequently the focus has shifted on youth and local communities and 
more recently, attention has been placed on reintegration of returnees and 
their families.41 
SOCIETAL EFFECTS OF COUNTER-
RADICALIZATION AND COUNTERING 
VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN KOSOVO
The following three subsections will analyse how social sectors and segments 
of Kosovo society such as youth, education and the Muslim community have 
been incorporated in explanatory frameworks for violent extremism and rad-
icalization, targeted by countering and preventative measures and with what 
effects.
Youth, radicalization, counter-radicalization and CVE
Data on Kosovo foreign fighters reveal similar findings to those of European 
foreign fighters. There is no single profile of  ‘a terrorist’ fitting all the indi-
viduals that have travelled to Syria and Iraq: “there are individuals who have 
been poor or uneducated or both, and others who come from economically 
well-off families or are highly educated or both” (Kursani 2018, 12). A recent re-
port commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
shows that the majority of Kosovo foreign fighters or those travelling to Syr-
ia and Iraq were between 21 and 30 [see Fig. 1 taken from Kursani 2018, 13] 
(Xharra and Gojani 2017). 
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Figure 1. Age distribution of Kosovo originating foreign fighters, N=334
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Another factor neglected or little researched both within media and studies 
conducted by local civil society analysts and that only recently have gained 
new attention is the widespread inactivity among young Kosovo citizens. 
While interrelated to the socio-economic dimension, this factor is at the same 
time analytically different as it points out and recognizes the agency of those 
choosing a path of radicalization. This is related also to a widespread absence 
of perspectives concerning also those that have studied and that are not con-
sidered economically poor. 
In this framework, what is at stake is a dynamic of frustration of expectations, 
and a promise of order and meaning in a context that lacks both. In other 
terms, following the analytical perspective of Roy (2004), rather than a mech-
anism of radicalization influenced by a sectarian and identity based Islam, in 
Kosovo one could notice a form of Islamization of those lacking identity, which 
is radicalized between perceptions of marginalization and nihilism. Inactivity 
and the absence of perspectives among Kosovo youth is related to another ex-
planatory dimension, that of identity. According to the study of a local think 
tank, following years of resistance and national affirmation, the identity di-
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mension is to be seen as a central factor in understanding and explaining the 
radicalization of both Kosovo and other Western Balkans youth (Kursani 2015, 
61). In particular, the study argues that the problematic management of the in-
ternational community of post-conflict Kosovo and their support to a corrupt 
local political élite is to be seen at the basis of a collective identity crisis, and 
the search of authenticity often found in religion (Kursani 2015). 
The radicalization in Kosovo is to be seen as mainly a youth phenomenon 
(Malm 2016). As shown above, most of the Kosovo citizens who have travelled 
to Syria were adolescent or young adults following the Kosovo war and the 
unilateral declaration of independence in 2008. During the post-war interna-
tional intervention period characterized by a hybrid and complex governance, 
several efforts both locally and internationally have tried to de-emphasize the 
exclusive traits of the Albanian identity of 92.9 percentage of the Kosovo pop-
ulation, emphasizing the construction of a new Kosovo identity based on the 
‘European’ values of inclusivity, multi-ethnicity and liberal multiculturalism 
(Bargués Pedreny and Randazzo 2012). This might have led many young Koso-
vars into a state of confusion, disillusionment and disapproval (Demjaha and 
Peci 2016). Several interviews confirmed that the main focus from interna-
tional actors in the coming years is expected to be on youth.42 A new USAID 
funding of 9-10 million USD has been approved and is expected to be on youth 
and social inclusion: although it is not directed explicitly at preventing violent 
extremism, the aim is preventing it through and among youth.43 Kosovo is also 
part of the Western Balkans Counter-Terrorism Initiative (WBCTI) framework 
against intolerance, violent extremism and radicalization. Part of the projects 
supported within this framework identify young people as crucial actors at 
the forefront and identify strengthening youth resilience44 as one of the main 
objectives.45
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Education, counter-radicalization and CVE
Education, and more specifically poor education, has been often linked to the 
foreign fighters’ phenomenon in Kosovo and identified as a driving factor be-
hind radicalization and violent extremism in the country. There are varying 
interpretations as to the exact role of education depending on the different 
stakeholders dealing with the issue, with some putting more emphasis on the 
level of education and others emphasizing more the quality of it. More than 80 
percent of Kosovo foreign fighters have finished secondary education, while 
only 9 percent have a university degree, with the remaining 8 percent having 
completed primary school (Kursani 2018). Around 52 percent of Kosovo for-
eign fighters are poor, while 41 percent have average standard of living [see 
Figures below 2 and 3 taken by Kursani 2018, 14].
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While research analysis on the level of educational attainment of foreign fight-
ers compared to the country level suggest no correlation between low educa-
tional levels and the emergence of the foreign fighters phenomenon, foreign 
fighters have on average slightly higher levels of education, it is the way in 
which young people and students are engaged within the system that seems 
to matter more (Kursani 2018). Moreover, the extent to which education can 
act as a space where critical thinking is encouraged and the freedom to express 
themselves is ensured is identified as crucial for education’s link and role vis-
à-vis CVE and radicalization.
Those actors who regard radicalization as a phenomenon driven and under-
pinned by a religious ideology identify in education an arena where radical-
ization and violent extremism can be understood, prevented and addressed. 
Understanding extremist indoctrination and radicalization as also driven by 
inadequate information and awareness about extremist ideologies and their 
consequences, education is identified as a key sector for counter-radicaliza-
tion responses and intervention with more than 40 percent of activities in the 
government’s strategy expected to be implemented by the Ministry of Edu-
cation. In practice, this has translated into a plethora of training sessions ad-
dressing education from primary to tertiary level and implemented by a num-
ber of governmental and non-governmental actors often lacking coordination 
by the Ministry of Education. 
Counter-radicalization, CVE and the Muslim Community
Data from prosecutors, biographical evidence from Kosovo foreign fighters 
and ISIS documents all confirm that many foreign fighters had basic religious 
knowledge, suggesting that religion as an explanatory and driving factor may 
have been overrated while at a same time a sense of frustration, alienation and 
stigmatization may have contributed to radicalization of certain individuals 
(Kursani 2018, 28). As a matter of fact, most of those that went to Syria had not 
frequented mosques and their radicalization occurred in and through other 
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venues and means.46 Islamist religious violent extremism remains the domi-
nant security threat within narratives of threats and security concerns among 
Kosovo institutions and international stakeholders (Kursani 2018). In official 
discourses by state institutions, Islamist religious extremism and violent ex-
tremism have been often used interchangeably.  However, a study by the KCSS 
has shown that over the past 10 years, around 80 percent of violent extremist 
threats that were executed were politically motivated, while 70 percent of un-
executed threats were religious in nature (Kursani 2017).47 Although Kosovo 
has been characterized by a phenomenon of Islamization or re-Islamization, 
and the dominant narrative has linked Islam with violent extremism, both Is-
lam and the religious question within the broader society have been contested 
topics in post-war Kosovo (Augestad Knudsen 2017).
Since the government has launched the strategy against violent extremism 
and radicalization, the Kosovo Islamic Council (BIK) has been part of it in par-
ticular through awareness raising campaigns in partnerships with the Kosovo 
police and the Ministry of Education. More specifically, this has lead to “week-
ly lectures in 800 mosques targeting young Muslims and describing the phe-
nomenon of radicalization as foreign to Islam.”48 This involvement, according 
to an imam within BIK, has exposed the institution to threats. Furthermore, 
the Kosovo Islamic Council has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with 
the Ministry of Justice according to which BIK’s imams should teach against 
violent extremism in prisons. For a prominent imam within BIK, there has 
been an increasing discrimination towards the whole Muslim community in 
Kosovo, a demonization of Islam and a rising Islamophobia fuelled by specif-
ic Islamophobic journalists following the advent of the foreign fighters phe-
nomenon.49 According to him, “violent extremism is just paralleled to Islamist 
extremism,” and the “arrests of 40 imams by the Kosovo police has been a 
big offence to the Muslim community.”50 According to a local researcher, the 
equivalence between violent extremism and religious extremism and discus-
sions on violent extremism in local and international media has affected Mus-
lims in Kosovo in a negative way, leading to their stigmatization.51 For another 
local researcher, Muslims in Kosovo have felt obliged to show that they are not 
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violent. Recently, in several roundtables among local stakeholders there has 
been some reflection and problematization on why Islam has been the focus 
and target of much of CVE and counter-radicalization discussions.52 
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter argues for a more contextualized and comprehensive analysis 
of counter-radicalization and CVE initiatives and strategies in Kosovo and 
a greater focus on their societal effects. Discourses over threats of terrorism, 
radicalization and violent extremism should go beyond the media and anec-
dotal evidence and should be backed by substantiated data. Most of the anal-
ysis is based upon a reductionist and oversimplified reading of the problem of 
radicalization: i.e., the number of foreign fighters and a superficial reading of 
the role of religion in the Kosovar society. The equation of violent extremism 
with religious Islamist extremism risks stigmatizing and alienating the Muslim 
community that represents also the majority of the Kosovo population. There-
fore, diagnosis of radicalization and violent extremism should be revised and 
definitions put under scrutiny. Current explanatory models overemphasize 
the role played by foreign foundations and overlook the agency of local sub-
jects such as youth. Moreover, they overlook other equally important factors 
and dimensions in the analysis of the link between youth and radicalization 
in Kosovo: most importantly, the question of anomie, inactivity, a lack of em-
ployment opportunities for the generation born after the war, the societal seg-
ment that seems today as more vulnerable to religious radicalization. In this 
regard, attention should be placed on the effects of counter-radicalization and 
CVE measures and policies, looking at radicalization and counter-radicaliza-
tion as co-shaping each other. The polarization of the debate so far may further 
damage social cohesion in an already fragile country. Counter-radicalization 
and countering violent extremism policies might come into contradiction with 
some of the key objectives that are identified as central in CVE and counter-rad-
icalization strategies in particular strengthening social inclusion and cohesion. 
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The nexus youth-security has emerged as an important area of intervention for 
national and international strategies of countering violent extremism, radical-
ization and terrorism in Kosovo. A critical review of policy documents shows 
a framing of the role of youth, education and local communities according to 
a securitized logic. In this regard, youth risks to be read within two opposing 
views: on the one hand, as objects of radicalization and thus potentially dan-
gerous for the country’s security; on the other, as a tool for preventing radi-
calization and violent extremism. This has entailed a semantic shift whereby 
youth are no longer regarded as radical agents but as potentially radicalized 
subjects. The risk that such a shift entails is that their imminent potentiality 
to be or become actors of social change and emancipation is hampered and re-
stricted. In other terms, the debate on the role of youth and education vis-à-vis 
radicalization and violent extremism in Kosovo lacks an analysis on how youth 
as political subjectivities and education as a social arena could contribute to 
social change, justice and emancipation. Education is a transformative pro-
cess. In this regard, it is a primary institution for the development of critical 
skills, including the critique of status quo and the questioning of established 
values and authorities. For this purpose, schools should be safe, free learn-
ing environments and based on diversity. Promoting intercultural exchange, 
otherness and respect cannot occur in a place where specific sections of the 
population are considered a priori at risk of radicalization. As the reviewed lit-
erature has pointed out, the instrumentalization of education to serve count-
er-radicalization goals may hamper trust and generate more resentment and 
exclusion and thus further fuel radicalization (Ragazzi 2017). 
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ENDNOTES
1 According to the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove, around 2000 
young Europeans from France, the Netherlands, the UK, Belgium, Germany have joined 
the Syrian conflict (France info, 7 February 2014).
2 Albania, for example, established its Center for Countering Violent Extremism as a hub 
for regional coordination and capacity development of local stakeholders.
3  Balkans Regional Summit on Countering Violent Extremism Statement by the Ministry 
of the Interior for the Government of Albania, 19-20 May 2015, Tirana (https://www.
state.gov/documents/organization/245704.pdf, last accessed 28 August 2018).
4  Seeing radicalization and dynamics of violent extremism as a relational process implies 
shifting the focus from the investigation of policies that counter it and their effective-
ness to the analysis of the effects, and sometimes the side effects, of state and non-state 
policies and actions in countering it.
5  The term foreign fighters refers to those travelling to and participating in the Syrian and 
Iraqi conflicts. Most of the Kosovo foreign fighters have travelled to Syria and part of 
them have continued on in Iraq. 
6  Since 2013, the phenomenon of foreign fighters and Islamist religious extremism has 
dominated the debate regarding violent extremism threats in Kosovo, often overlooking 
other kinds of extremism such as political and ethnic based (Kursani 2018, 3). 
7  While socio-economic data, combined with the number of citizens travelling to Syria 
and the number of arrests related to terrorism charges, seems to distance Kosovo from 
other Western Balkan countries, Rita Augestad Knudsen shows in a recent study that the 
international attentions has been disproportionate and very much influenced by a form 
of sensationalism supported by local media (2017, 10). 
8  See also the latest World Bank data on Kosovo: https://data.worldbank.org/country/
Kosovo, last accessed 21 August 2018). 
9  Rather than the broader socio-economic conditions at the municipal level what seems 
to play a more important role in explaining participation and recruitment in extremists 
activities and organizations are the immediate socio-economic conditions at the individ-
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The purpose of this chapter is to identify what nonviolent resistance methods 
were used and not used in Kosovo in the period from 1988-1998. More  specif-
ically, the chapter focuses on the actors involved and the factors and rationale 
that underpinned choices made the critical moments of the nonoviolent resis-
tance movement in Kosovo. To this end, the chapter is using Gene Sharp’s the-
ory of nonviolent resistance, which classifies relevant action into three types: 
‘nonviolent protests’ involving symbolic acts of peaceful opposition to show 
that those who resist are both against and for something, ‘non-cooperation 
methods’ referring to social, economic and political forms of non-cooperation, 
and, finally, ‘nonviolent interference’ that refers actions to change the situation 
through psychological, physical, social, economic and political interferences.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to identify what nonviolent resistance methods 
were used and not used in Kosovo in the period from 1988-1998; what actors, 
factors and rationale underpinned choices taken towards one method or the 
other at the time; and what this tells us about Kosovo’s contemporary politi-
cal landscape. To achieve this aim, I will use Gene Sharp’s theory of nonvio-
lent resistance. Sharp identified 198 methods of civil resistance. He classified 
nonviolent methods of action into three types: firstly, ‘nonviolent protests’ in-
volving symbolic acts of peaceful opposition to show that those who resist are 
both against and for something; secondly, ‘non-cooperation methods’ which 
refer to social, economic and political forms of non-cooperation; and, third-
ly, ‘nonviolent interference’, which implies actions to change the situation 
through psychological, physical, social, economic and political interferences 
(Sharp 2013).
My hypothesis is that methods of ‘nonviolent interference’ were not used be-
cause they could have accelerated and aggravated the repression of the Ser-
bian regime in Kosovo. But if this is the case, then the question is how did 
Kosovo’s political representatives think that Kosovo was to achieve its main 
political goal – the independence of Kosovo? A better comprehension of these 
historical events and processes provides a better understanding of Kosovo’s 
contemporary frictions and conflict in the wider political landscape.
In an effort to answer above questions, the research explores existing stud-
ies of nonviolent resistance in Kosovo (Clark 2001). Beyond such literature 
review, this paper employs further, qualitative research methods, including 
historical research into media and archives in Kosovo in order to trace deci-
sions, resolutions and declarations regarding the civil resistance movement, 
and structured interviews with key actors of this movement in Kosovo during 
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1988-1998. This study, furthermore, applies a behaviourist theoretical frame-
work to its findings. Herbert Blumer, one of the early researchers of social 
movements, suggested four stages of social movements: social ferment, pop-
ular excitement, formalization and institutionalization (Blumer 1969, 67-121). 
Redefined since, there are today generally recognized as: emergence, coales-
cence, bureaucratization and decline (Porta and Diani 2006, 150).  
The chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part, I describe the acts of 
peaceful opposition that Kosovo Albanians organized in the period from 1988-
1992, in order to demonstrate that they were opposed to the abolition of Koso-
vo’s autonomy and in favour of the Republic of Kosovo, reflecting Sharp’s first 
type of non-violent methods of action. In the second part I present the rejection 
by Kosovo Albanians of the social, economic and political system of Serbia and 
the creation of their parallel system in these areas, representative for Sharp’s 
second action type. In the third and final section, I elaborate on why Kosovo 
Albanians did not use certain types of nonviolent interference methods, such 
as blocking roads, occupying public buildings, and other methods which would 
fall into Sharp’s third category of non-violent actions of resistance. 
KOSOVAR RESISTANCE: AGAINST THE 
ABOLITION OF KOSOVO’S AUTONOMY AND 
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO
Action against the abolition of Kosovo’s Autonomy
At the end of 1988 and in the early 1989, Albanians undertook a series of peace-
ful acts against the abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy, based on the Constitu-
tion of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) of 1974, an abolition 
initiated by Serbia under Slobodan Milošević. On 17 November 1988, nearly 
3,000 Trepça miners, soon joined by tens of thousands of Albanian citizens 
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from all over Kosovo, marched for five days and for tens of kilometers through 
cold weather to the capital of Kosovo in order to demonstrate against the sup-
pression of Kosovo’s autonomy, as based on the Constitution of the SFRY of 
1974 (Vllasi 1990, 11). The marchers further demanded not to change the two 
main political leaders of Kosovo Albanians - Kaqusha Jashari, President of the 
Central Committee of the League of Communists of Kosovo, and Azem Vllasi, 
member of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Kosovo. 
However, Belgrade fired Kaqusha Jashari under the pretext that she was ‘re-
sponsible for the general situation in Kosovo’, and Azem Vllasi because he was 
‘a member of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugo-
slavia and cannot hold two positions at the same time’ (Jashari 2015, 237-294; 
Vllasi 2017, 501-597).
Three months later, on 20 February 1989, over 1,000 Trepça miners entered a 
hunger strike deep down at underground levels in the mine, demanding that 
the principles of the SFRY Constitution of 1974 were upheld. The strikers fur-
ther requested to dismiss three Kosovo Albanian politicians, seen as vassals 
of Serbian and Milošević’s rule - Rrahman Morina, Ali Shukriu and Husame-
din Azemi (Abrashi and Kavaja 1996). The strike ended after seven days on 27 
February 1989, when the Presidency of the Socialist Autonomous Province of 
Kosovo (SAPK) promised that the fundamental principles of the SFRY Con-
stitution of 1974 would not be affected and that the three politicians named 
above, had resigned. However, the strikers were deceived when, the day after 
ending the strike, the three resignations were revoked and their former polit-
ical leader, Azem Vllasi, as well as the leaders of the Trepça Mines, arrested. 
These leaders were accused of organizing the marches and strikes in order to 
start a ‘counter-revolution to the state’ (Kavaja 2015, 93).
At the same time as the miners’ strike, on 22 February 1989, 215 Kosovo Alba-
nian cultural workers and academics signed an appeal to the Serbian Assem-
bly and the Yugoslav People’s Assembly, requesting that the majority Kosovo’s 
citizens’ demand to preserve the constitutional position of Kosovo under the 
SFRY Constitution of 1974 were to be respected. The signatories considered 
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that a narrowing of Kosovo’s autonomy would be an anachronistic act and a 
cause of wide-spread dissatisfaction. At the same time, they issued a warning 
that those who insisted on the abolition of autonomy of Kosovo would be held 
responsible for any resulting crisis. At the very end of the document, the sig-
natories suggested to the Kosovo Assembly not to consent to any reduction of 
Kosovo’s autonomy.1 A few weeks after the publication of this appeal, police 
forces arrested dozens of the document’s signatories.2
Arguably, these event amount to the first and emerging phase of a social move-
ment in Kosovo, as described by Blumer, the phase of “social ferment”. At that 
time, the social movement in Kosovo was still at a preliminary stage only and 
not very organized. These actions, although collective, were not strategic, yet 
they contributed to strengthening a sense of general discontent. However, 
very soon, at the end of February 1989, the SFRY Presidency declared the state 
of emergency in Kosovo “to end the bloodshed”. Immediately, the Yugoslav 
People’s Army (JNA), supported by some 1,500 federal police officers under 
Serbian command, deployed to Kosovo (Meier 1999, 89). In response, the stu-
dents of University of Prishtina organized protests for several days, and so did 
the miners across Kosovo - although the resulting strikes were considerably 
smaller than the preceding ones, and quickly were extinguished by the state 
authorities (Clark 2001, 51).
Serbian violence against Kosovo Albanians
Despite the Miners’ March, as the major February 1989 strike came to be 
known, as well as the subsequent strikes, appeals and numerous peaceful pro-
tests by Albanians mobilizing against the abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy, the 
Serbian government engaged in a series of violent acts against the Albanian 
population in Kosovo and against Kosovo’s autonomous status in breach of 
the 1974 SFRY Constitution. By the end of March 1989, Serbia completed the 
process of constitutional changes when it abolished Kosovo’s autonomy under 
the motto ‘Serbia of three parts is whole again’. Surrounded by army and po-
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lice, the majority of Kosovo Assembly MPs, apart from a handful of Albanian 
MPs, accepted the abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy on 23 March 1989. Evidence 
exists that the Serbian government had exerted pressure on MPs and brought 
into the Assembly Hall people who had never been members of the Assembly 
to vote on the issue (Malcolm 2002, 344).
Consequently, in Prishtina and in other major cities, spontaneous protests 
broke out on mass scale by the end of March 1989. This time, the protesters 
were not peaceful: they threw stones and, in some places, even Molotov cock-
tails. Police interference was brutal. They used tear gas, water cannons and 
bullets. According to official data, 25 people including 2 police officers were 
killed. Moreover, police arrested hundreds of Albanians who had participated 
in these demonstrations (Mertus 1999, 182). In addition to such brutal repres-
sion and state violence, during March and April 1989, police and the author-
ities arrested over 250 members of Kosovo’s elite strata - professors, doctors, 
engineers, enterprise directors, and others - including further, former signa-
tories of Appeal 215 and some of the organizers of the Miners’ March and the 
strike (Osmani 2009, 71-80). The detainees were kept in isolation, not allowed 
any contact with their families and denied the right to any defense lawyers. 
Only after about two months the police informed that the detainees had been 
“isolated in a special place because their activity was oriented towards endan-
gering the constitutional order” (Osmani 2009, 72-80). After approximately 
four further months, all of those thus ‘isolated’ were finally released.
Kosovo Albanians’ response to Serbian state violence
Albanians in Kosovo responded in different ways to the abolition of autonomy, 
the killing of dozens of demonstrators, the isolation of hundreds of Kosovar 
elite members and other forms of repression by the Serbian state apparatus 
(Mertus 1999, 183). In December 1989, they founded a number of political asso-
ciations and parties. These included, as the first such organisation, the Kosovo 
branch of the Yugoslav Association of the Democratic Initiative (UJDI), and 
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also the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms (KMDLNj). 
The last such association, formed in 1989, was the Democratic League of Koso-
vo (LDK), led by Ibrahim Rugova, which was soon to become the largest politi-
cal party of the Kosovo Albanians with about 700,000 members. Although the 
original intention of these political groups, equally as with those established 
in the first months of 1990, only was to restore Kosovo’s autonomy based on 
the 1974 Constitution of the SFRY, they shattered the monopoly of the Com-
munist League of Yugoslavia.3 It is here that the social movement in Kosovo 
passes into its second phase, known as ‘coalescence’ or ‘popular stage’, which 
is characterized by a clearer definition of a sense of discontent. This sense of 
discontent is more coordinated, since the leadership of the social movement 
emerges on the scene. 
At this stage, mass actions are organized to show the power of the social move-
ment and to make the demands clearer. The violence of the Serbian authori-
ties against any Albanians who opposed the abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy 
led some of these newly established associations - UJDI, KMDLNj, and The 
Association of Philosophers and Sociologists of Kosovo, supported by LDK 
activists - to initiate a petition, titled ‘For Democracy, Against Violence’, in 
February 1990. The petition included several demands, including the aboli-
tion of the state of emergency, the release of all political prisoners who had 
not used or preached violence, respect for the right to free political organiza-
tion, scheduling of free elections, the abolition of all decisions that denied the 
right to education and employment - due to ‘moral-political inadequacy’ - to 
many citizens, and the ending of state control over the public media.4 About 
400,000 citizens signed this petition, which was sent to the Yugoslav federal 
authorities in Belgrade.5
Regardless of this petition, the repression through Serbian rule continued. In 
March 1990, about 7,000 students in state schools were sent to hospitals with 
stomach pains, headaches and sickness. The authorities did not allow an in-
vestigation, yet offered a diagnosis of mass hysteria. Meanwhile, the parents 
of the affected pupils were convinced that their children had been poisoned in 
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school. United Nations toxicology experts found Sarin and Tabun substances 
in the blood and urine samples of these children, poisons manufactured by 
the JNA (Malcolm 2002, 345). This mobilized Albanians even more strongly 
against Serbia and Yugoslavia. It also triggered dozens of attempts to attack 
Kosovo Serbs, which were prevented only through the intervention of some 
Albanian political activists (Malcolm 2002, 345).
Throughout the 1990s, Albanian citizens of Kosovo organized symbolic and 
peaceful protests repeatedly. A particularly noteworthy protest occurred on 
12 June 1990, when some of the newly-established political organizations, 
including UJDI and the ‘Youth Parliament’, organized an action against the 
introduction of emergency measures by the Serbian Parliament in almost all 
public enterprises and institutions in Kosovo. According to the lawyer Nekibe 
Kelmendi, the basic aims of the parliament introducing these measures in 
Kosovo were: “the destruction of public enterprises and institutions in Koso-
va, ruining of the economic basis, of banking, schooling, educational, health, 
information, juridical, and cultural system in Kosova; mass dismissal of Alba-
nians from work, and the creation of conditions for employing as many Serbs 
and Montenegrins settling to Kosova, aiming at an ethnic cleansing of Koso-
va respectively” (Kelmendi 1993, 18-19). The organizers of the demonstration 
against these measures, on 12 June 1990, led about 50,000 citizens, starting 
from the Catholic Church of Prishtina in the direction of the City Cemetery, 
carrying a coffin without a corpse inside. On top of the coffin laid a flower bou-
quet. The idea was that the missing corpse symbolised ‘violence’. This action 
was called ‘The Burial of Violence’. It aimed at raising awareness of the outside 
world to the repressions that the Serbian regime exercised in Kosovo (Gashi 
2010, 106).
The most significant action in terms of rallying and mobilizing the Albanians 
behind a shared cause, occurred in the spring of 1990. About 500 Kosovo Al-
banian young activists and intellectuals engaged in a campaign to reconcile 
those Albanian families across Kosovo who were engaged in internal strife, 
rooted in customary blood feuding traditions. The main purpose of this cam-
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paign was to stop the killings and eliminate the blood feuds in order to unite 
the Albanians against the Serbian occupation, while making a step towards 
integration into Europe. The biggest gathering for this purpose was held in 
‘Verrat e Llukës’ in Deçan on 1 May 1990. According to the Serbian authorities, 
about one hundred thousand Albanian citizens of Kosovo gathered for this 
activity. The organizers claimed that approximately five hundred thousand 
citizens assembled. In this campaign people “…stretched out the hand of rec-
onciliation and forgave blood on behalf of the people, the youth and the flag” 
(Clark 2000, 62). The campaign led to thousands of families being reconciled 
for cases of homicide that underpinned feuding threats from the past as well 
as approximately five hundred for injuries, and about seven hundred for a va-
riety of other disputes amongst them (Pirraku 1998, 20). 
Action demanding a Republic of Kosovo 
In my opinion, during the period from the end of 1988 to the mid-1990s, Al-
banian protest actions mainly opposed the abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy as 
based on the 1974 Constitution of the SFRY as well as the repressions of the Ser-
bian regime. From the early 1990s, they increasingly began to show that they 
were in favour of creating an independent Republic of Kosovo through an array 
of non-violent acts. During the below-mentioned activities the social move-
ment in Kosovo was consolidated into the third stage of ‘bureaucratization’ or, 
as Blumer defines it, of ‘formalization’, characterized by a high level of organiza-
tion. The social movement in Kosovo at this stage is increasingly based on staff 
with specialized knowledge, with some even receiving a salary for their work.
At the end of June 1990, the Albanian deputies of the Kosovo Assembly, elected 
in December 1989, began preparations to announce the Constitutional Decla-
ration of the Republic of Kosovo. Thus, on 2 July 1990, out of 125 Albanian dep-
uties, 114 gathered in front of the Kosovo Assembly building and, as they were 
not allowed to enter, proclaimed Kosovo an independent and equal entity with-
in the Yugoslav federation on the steps of the building.6 Three days after this 
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public declaration, the Serbian government dissolved the Assembly and the 
Government of Kosovo and other institutional bodies of Kosovo when deploy-
ing paramilitary police armed with machine guns (Djuric 1990). Two months 
later, on 7 September 1990, the now formally illegal Kosovo Assembly gathered 
secretly in the town of Kaçanik, where it proclaimed the Constitution of the Re-
public of Kosovo, which foresaw Kosovo as an independent and sovereign state 
within Yugoslavia (The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, 1990). This con-
stitution defined Kosovo as a state of the majority Albanian people and its other 
ethnic groups, who were guaranteed reserved seats in the Assembly of Kosovo 
– fourteen seats were reserved for the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo.7 Soon 
to be known as the ‘Kaçanik Constitution’, it stipulated that the laws of Yugo-
slavia should be valid only if they were in harmony with this constitution. Not 
surprisingly, the Serbian authorities immediately began to persecute those MPs 
who had promulgated this constitution (Ismajli et.al. 2005, 7-8).
Just over a year later, on 26-30 September 1991, the Kosovo Assembly, dis-
missed by Serbian authorities, organized a referendum on Kosovo as a sov-
ereign and independent state with a right of association to Yugoslavia. Of the 
1,051,357 citizens of all communities with the right to vote, 914,802 citizens or 
87.01 percent (likely the vast majority of them being Albanians) participated in 
the referendum, out of which 913,705 or 99.87 percent voted for such recogni-
tion (Report of the Central Council of the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo 
on Referendum, 1991). Three weeks after the referendum, on 19 October 1991, 
the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo changed article 2 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Kosovo (‘Kaçanik Constitution’) and disbanded any links with 
the state of Yugoslavia. Almost half a year later, on 24 May 1992, Albanians held 
parliamentary and presidential elections for the Republic of Kosovo, enrolling 
24 parties and civic associations. The LDK, led by Ibrahim Rugova, became the 
undisputed winner with 76.44 percent of the vote or 574.755 votes. As for the 
presidential elections, the only candidate for President of Kosovo was Rugova, 
who won 99.5 percent of the vote (Report of the Central Commission for the 
Parlamentary and Presidential Elections in the Republic of Kosovo, 1992). Ser-
bia viewed these initiatives as illegal, but let them proceed in any case.
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In summary, when applying Gene Sharp’s distinctions, it emerges that the Al-
banians of Kosovo experienced an escalation of state violence and oppression 
when applying the first type of nonviolent action methods. This type is char-
acterized by nonviolent protests that rely on symbolic acts of peaceful oppo-
sition to show that those who resist are against something and are for some-
thing. Between November 1988 and March 1989, the Albanians showed that 
they were against the abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy as granted in the SFRY 
Constitution of 1974, through the Serbian authorities led by Milošević. They 
protested through marches, strikes, appeals, petitions, and numerous other 
peaceful actions. However, despite these peaceful actions, the Serbian govern-
ment responded brutally against the Albanians. They abolished Kosovo’s au-
tonomy regardless, while killing dozens of demonstrators, incarcerating and 
isolating hundreds of members of Kosovo’s elite. In response to these forms of 
repression by the Serbian government, Albanians engaged in peaceful forms 
of opposition. They founded a host of political parties, thus defeating the mo-
nopoly of the Communist League; they organized a petition with about 400 
thousand signatures ‘For Democracy Against Violence’, engaged in symbolic 
action through ‘The Burial of Violence’, attended by about 50,000 citizens, 
campaigned for the ‘Reconciliation of Blood Feuds’ and much more. Also, 
from the beginning of 1990, Albanians, through a series of non-violent acts, 
showed that they are for something, namely for the Republic of Kosovo, as evi-
dent in the Constitutional Declaration for the Republic of Kosovo (2 July 1990), 
in declaring the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (7 September 1990), 
in conducting a Referendum for Independence of Kosovo (26-30 September 
1991), and in the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections (24 May 1992).
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REFUSING SERBIA’S SYSTEM AND CREATING 
KOSOVO’S PARALLEL SYSTEM
From the second half of 1990, Kosovo Albanians increasingly started using 
methods akin to the second category of non-violent resistance suggested by 
Gene Sharp’s methods of non-coperation, here, with the Serbian system in 
politics, economy, health and education. They began creating their own par-
allel system in these sectors.
Non-participating in the Serbian political system and the 
establishing a parallel political system
American and European diplomats suggested to the representatives of Kosovo 
Albanians to compete in the Serbian elections held in 1990, 1993 and 1997. Their 
main argument was that disciplined minorities managed to paralyze parlia-
ments, such as the Irish in Great Britain or Algerians in France (Zimmermann 
1999, 80-81). Albanians also faced criticism from Serb opposition politicians 
who thought that if the Albanians were to enter the election with their 800,000 
votes, they could topple Slobodan Milošević (Judah 2000, 77). One of the 
most prominent critics from among the opposition parties, dissident Mihajlo 
Mihajlovic, taking the Irish model as an example, suggested that the Kosovo 
Albanians change their methods, but not their goals, and that they should take 
the fight to the Serbian Parliament. According to him, Albanian deputies, apart 
from being crucial to the election of a new Serbian leadership, through hearings 
in the Parliament and media would have had the opportunitiy to defend their 
cause with the added benefit of acquiring respect and recognition in the world.8 
However, the representatives of the Kosovo Albanians opposed any partic-
ipation in the local, parliamentary and presidential elections of Yugoslavia, 
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later Serbia, between 1990 and 1997. Their reasoning was that – following the 
Referendum – Kosovo had declared independence and thus held its own, free 
and multiparty parliamentary and presidential elections. The transcripts of 
the round-table entitled ‘Kosova and Serbian Elections’, held in Prishtina, 
reveal a range of additional reasons for their objections. These included that 
Kosovo’s status would not change at all and, worse, the colonial situation of 
oppression would be endorsed through such participation, that Serbia was 
not a parliamentary state, but a presidential one, where the parliament had 
no authority, that Albanians would not stand to benefit at all from these elec-
tions but be manipulated only, that the fall of Milošević and Serbia’s democra-
tization was a matter for the Serbian people and the Serbian opposition, that 
the Serbian opposition had a similar position in regard to Kosovo, as the the 
regime of Slobodan Milošević, and that hardly any Albanians would accept 
to be nominated, and even if someone would, no-one would vote them since 
Albanians would boycott the elections massively.9
Non-participating in the Serbian economy in Kosovo and 
the creating a parallel economic system 
In July 1990, the Serbian Parliament adopted a special Law on Labor Relations 
in Kosovo, which made possible the expulsion of many Albanians from their 
work places. Apparently, this process contributed slightly to the alleviation 
of Serbian unemployment in Kosovo (Human Rights Watch 1993, 107). All so-
cially-owned enterprises in Kosovo were transformed into Serbian enterprises 
and the production in many of them was reduced or interrupted. In response 
to these measures, Albanians took various actions to survive. There was mas-
sive social solidarity. Each family sent at least one member to an EU country 
– overall, their number ranged between three to four hundred thousand - to 
materially support their families in Kosovo. About 20,000 small family busi-
nesses opened, which were frequently and brutally targeted by police. Small 
businesses (65 percent) and diaspora incomes (35 percent) contributed to a 3 
percent tax collection to maintain a parallel system of, especially, education 
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and healthcare (Hajrizi et.al. 2007, 25-39). At the beginning, the salaries for 
Kosovo Albanian teachers in this parallel system were extremely small, but 
soon they earned more than Serbian teachers in Serbia (Sylejmani 2016, 153). 
Simultaneously, Albanians registered their businesses formally, paying taxes 
and fees to the Serbian state. Moreover, Albanians did not engage in the pro-
ductive industries, yet bought Serbian products worth an estimated $ 1 million 
a day (Riinvest 1998, 79).
Non-participating in the Serbian education system and the 
creating a parallel education system
In September of 1989, Serbia initiated measures for the ethnic segregation of 
schools in Kosovo. At first, there was physical segregation only: Serb students 
attended classes on the first floor of the school and Albanians on the second; or 
Serbs attended in the morning and Albanians in the afternoon. However, one 
year later, in September 1990, Serbia imposed the use of a uniform curriculum 
in all of the territory of Serbia, including Kosovo and Vojvodina. Consequently, 
Albanian teachers refused to implement these curricula. In response, Serbia 
first cut their wages and then expelled all the teachers. However, in early 1992, 
the Albanians mobilized to re-open most primary schools, following curricula 
in Albanian language. Teachers taught in private homes, garages, basements, 
mosques and other buildings that were not provided by the state. The ethnic 
segregation consolidated. Contact possible between Albanian and Serb stu-
dents incrementally decreased. In the fall of 1992, hundreds of thousands of 
Albanians protested for the release of their formal school buildings, but to no 
avail (Kostovicova 2005, 75-96).
During the entire 1990s, both elementary and secondary schooling of about 
four hundred thousand Albanian students relied on the initiative of about 
twenty thousand teachers alone, who ensured the continuation of the edu-
cational process in Kosovo under extremely difficult conditions. Meanwhile, 
the University of Prishtina, the sole university in Kosovo at the time, counting 
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about one thousand members of staff and twenty thousand students, experi-
enced a fall of student numbers by the year, because of the migration of many 
young people to the EU countries. The parallel education system in Kosovo was 
funded by the Kosovo government in exile, which collected above-mentioned 
3 percent tax from both the citizens of Kosovo and those living and working 
abroad. Teachers and organizers often-times were subjected to threats, arrests 
and beatings by the Serb police (Shatri 2010, 20; Clark 2000, 96-105).
Non-participating in the Serbian health system in Kosovo 
and the creating a parallel health system
In the second half of the 1990s, more than half of Kosovo’s healthcare workers 
were dismissed from work with the justification that they had provided medi-
cal care to the demonstrators and provided assistance to the strikers. Albanian 
state employees also in this sector were sacked for writing medical reports in 
Albanian rather than Serbian and other similar reasons. The alleged mass poi-
soning of Albanian students in March 1990 had greatly increased the distrust 
of Albanians towards Serbian doctors. Furthermore, Albanians suspected a 
Serbian plot of ‘sterilizing Albanians (men and women)’, so the overwhelming 
majority of Albanians rejected calls by LDK representatives under Ibrahim Ru-
gova, not to boycott the Serbian vaccination programs (Clark 2000, 106-108; 
Mertus 1999, 187-198). However, the main response of Albanians in the field of 
health-care was the establishment of the humanitarian organization ‘Mother 
Theresa’, with 96 clinics and about seven thousand volunteers across Kosovo. 
This organization provided free health services for all citizens regardless of 
ethnicity, language or religion. It distributed humanitarian aid, mainly food 
and medicines. The clinics were placed in private homes that were provided 
without compensation from citizens throughout Kosovo, and medical services 
were provided free of charge by doctors. Also, many international humanitar-
ian organizations supplied essential drugs, but there were many cases when 
the Serbian police intervened and confiscated these (Demolli 2000, 3; 2010, 
8-42).
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In summary, when applying Gene Sharp’s typology, it appears that his second 
category, that of non-cooperation, was evident already from the boycott of 
the Serbian elections, on the one hand, and the organization of parallel parlia-
mentary and presidential elections, on the other. While these actions contrib-
uted to the denial of the legitimacy of Serbian rule in Kosovo, however, apart 
from the institution of the Presidency of Kosovo, the other parallel political 
institutions that emerged from these elections were not functional. Most sig-
nificantly, the Assembly almost never assembled. Meanwhile, the government 
acted in exile, mainly by informing the international community of Serbian 
repression in Kosovo and organizing the diaspora to support Kosovo financial-
ly. Likewise, also in the field of economy, while Albanians opened their small 
businesses and collected a 3 percent tax to maintain the parallel system, the 
non-cooperation methods to be found in Gene Sharp’s framework were not 
enacted in Kosovo. Albanians registered their businesses in state-run Serbian 
institutions, then paid taxes and fees to Serbian state bodies. Moreover, Alba-
nians did not produce anything, yet consumed Serbian products on a massive 
scale. Meanwhile, the sectors of education and health best present Sharp’s 
non-cooperation type of non-violent resistance. It is here that we find not just 
stories of self-organization and solidarity, but also of boycotting the Serbian 
educational and health institutions.
REJECTION OF NON-VIOLENT 
INTERFERENCE METHODS
The third type of Gene Sharp methods comprises non-violent methods of 
interference, which refers to actions aimed at pro-actively transforming un-
democratic situations, for example, by blocking the streets, organizing hunger 
strikes, occupying public buildings, and other similiar activities. Such form 
of resistance was rejected by the Albanian political representatives of Kosovo 
under Ibrahim Rugova’s leadership. The Albanians of Kosovo called Rugova 
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their Mahatma Gandhi, because of his promotion of peaceful resistance and 
associated with the ambiguous actions described so far. Meanwhile, Rugova’s 
opponents, led by Adem Demaçi aimed to use just methods associated with 
Sharp’s third type of action. The Kosovo Albanians called Demaçi the Nelson 
Mandela of Kosovo, because he had spent 28 years in Yugoslav prisons.
Prior to officially entering politics, in the middle of 1989, Rugova rejected the 
idea of violent conflict in Yugoslavia on the grounds that this would play into 
the hands of Serb interest groups eager to see armed actions in Kosovo. Rugova 
claimed that these forces intended to justify the severity of their repression 
by portraying the Albanian resistance against Serb hegemony to the world as 
terrorism, thereby counteracting any international sympathy for the plight of 
the Albanians in Kosovo. However, he also warned that if Serbia crushed the 
Albanian national identity, there would be an insurrection, because “the Serbs 
are a small nation, and in the past, whenever a small nation strived to play as a 
powerful nation in the Balkans, it ended in its tragedy”.10
Furthermore, in the beginning of 1990 and even after officially entering pol-
itics, Rugova rejected any suggestions for an armed uprising, reasoning that 
Serbia had seized the Kosovo Territorial Defense with all its armament and 
subsequently destroyed the Kosovo Police.11 According to him, Serbia had 
brought in police and reserve forces and, at the same time, disarmed any 
Albanians who held licensed weapons, while massively arming the civilian 
Serb and Montenegrian population in Kosovo. He insisted that Serb control 
and surveillance was total, and the borders between Kosovo and Albania her-
metically sealed, making it sheer impossible to organize an armed struggle.12 
Milazim Krasniqi, one of the co-founders of the LDK under Ibrahim Rugova, 
remembers that the former US ambassador in Belgrade, Warren Zimmer-
mann, had explicitly proposed to them the idea of peaceful resistance: «the 
US would support a non-violent political movement, because now that Mi-
lošević is on the rise, you cannot overcome his violence with violence, and 
even the US cannot stop Milošević at this stage”.13 Krasniqi says that Rugova 
agreed to this formula and never abandoned it, partly because of his intellec-
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tual and moral views, but also because of such adamant recommendations 
by the US.
Rugova, however, went even further. He appealed to the citizens of Kosovo to 
stop demonstrating in the streets in order to avoid incurring new victims and 
not to cause a civil war.14 According to him, “demonstrations and the mani-
festations of dissatisfaction of citizens are short-lived, and they only make 
sense where there is a functioning rule of law”.15 He suggested that even if 
such conduct appeared cowardly, the Serbian authorities were only looking for a 
pretext for a great massacre on the Albanians, as they had repeatedly done since 
1912.16 Rugova also stated that what, at first glance, might seem as if giving up, 
in the long run would be beneficial. According to him, any resistance by means 
other than political would be fatal, risking the loss of many people’s lives.17 Fur-
thermore, Rugova claimed that by articulating their determination via peaceful 
means alone, ‘’Kosovo Albanians were adopting contemporary European val-
ues’’, which could not be said of the other parties and governments in Yugosla-
via.18 Rugova prepared the Kosovo Albanians for a long-term resolution process, 
regardless of the fact that the international community, with particular empha-
sis on the EU and the US, had recognized the Kosovo problem. He believed that 
“the support from abroad should be considered as a game of political, diplomat-
ic and geo-strategic interests of different countries. The aid will be effective in 
as far as we are agile enough to understand and to get involved in the game with 
our interests. We shall prevail if we are patient and if we know what we want”.19
Yet, since 1993 Rugova also warned that, unless a solution was found, radical-
ism would grow. He therefore demanded pre-emptive measures, suggesting 
that Kosovo should be placed under UN protection.20 He added that “so far we 
have managed to avert war in Kosovo, by not accepting provocations and by 
sacrificing a lot, so we ask the international community - the United States and 
EU - to reward this sacrifice of the people of Kosovo for stability in the region 
and in Europe’ (Kelmendi 1994). It can, thus, be claimed that Rugova’s first 
goal was to avoid violent conflict. Even his close associates suggest that his 
primary goal was “to save Kosovo citizens from police brutality”. He habitual-
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ly and frequently stated that “we do not need a Kosovo without its people”.21 
His second goal was to destroy existing prejudices of Albanians as routinely 
armed and vindictive people, who started feuds for the smallest offence. Ru-
gova’s third goal was the internationalization of Kosovo’s plight through a 
communication strategy aimed at informing the world of Serbian repressions 
in Kosovo. In this way he hoped to achieve a UN protectorate for Kosovo, and 
then to declare it independent later. 
In contrast, Adem Demaçi valued the symbolic acts of peaceful oppo-
sition against the abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy and for the Republic 
of Kosovo as well as non-cooperation with Serbia in politics, education, 
health, economics and other sectors. According to him, this  peaceful 
passive resistance had united the people of Kosovo against Serbia, it had 
proven to the world that Kosovo Albanians do not respond to violence with 
violence, but it had also shattered the illusion that someone from the outside 
would do the work for the Kosovo Albanians. For him, the solution was active 
peaceful resistance to defend Kosovo’s democratic institutions in the fields 
of politics, law, economics, health, education, scholarship and the media 
(Demaçi 1990, 18-19). Demaçi was thus a protagonist advocating the third type 
of Gene Sharp’s methods – the methods of non-violent interference. Demaçi 
proposed that Kosovo Albanian citizens should vacate the buildings of politi-
cal, judicial, economic, media, health, educational and scholarly institutions 
occupied by the Serbian regime, and to occupy the streets and main squares; 
staying there for days and nights, and not leaving as soon as the Serb forces 
would arrive. Opponents insisted that Serbia would probably kill ten-thou-
sands of citizens engaged in such protests. Demaçi countered that “Serbia 
would probably kill even twenty thousand citizens because Serbia is serious 
about the whole thing, but we need to show Serbia and the international com-
munity that we were serious about it, too, because Serbia does not give up the 
occupation of our institutions without washing them with blood”.22
Arguably the first attempt of using non-violent methods of interference, in 
practice, was on 3 September 1990, when the Union of Independent Trade 
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Unions of Kosovo (BSPK) organized a general strike of workers throughout 
Kosovo to oppose violent measures imposed by the Serbian regime. The strik-
ers also demanded the return of thousands of Albanian employees dismissed 
from work earlier in violation of international conventions. However, the 
strike lasted only for a day and, furthermore, the Serbian regime used it as a 
pretext to dismiss the next day thousands of people more among those who 
had still been employed.23 This drastic measure probably was the reason that a 
large part of the Kosovo Albanian society “became convinced that the strikes 
did not bring any results in the nonviolent struggle against Serbian repressive 
rule”.24 Another, more serious, effort occurred in 1993, when Serbia aimed to 
close all print media publishing in the Albanian language. In response, on 24 
May 1993, the editor of the weekly newspaper ‘Zëri’, Adem Demaçi, along with 
several journalists from other newspapers and magazines went on a hunger 
strike at the so-called Palace Press of ‘Rilindja’, another prominent daily news-
paper and printing house. However, on 3 June 1993, day eleven of the strike 
and, both, in following medical advice and in reaction to LDK propaganda that 
“the purpose of Adem Demaçi is to oust Ibrahim Rugova from power”, Demaçi 
interrupted his hunger strike, although the Serbian authorities had not met 
the conditions set (Gashi 2010, 107-109). In the middle of the 1990s, Demaçi 
intensified his criticism of passive nonviolent resistance as embodied by Ru-
gova, describing it as a décor that served the Serbian government to prove to 
the international community that a democratic system still worked in Kosovo. 
Moreover, he added that this policy was convenient for Serbia because Koso-
vars still paid taxes to Belgrade for nothing in return: neither for education nor 
health, nor in any other field.
In 1995, at the Dayton Conference, Kosovars acutely noticed that their situation 
was not mentioned at all and Slobodan Milošević was promoted as a man of 
peace by the international community. This fact, in conjunction with increasing 
repressions by the Serbian regime (Humanitarian Law Center 1998), led young 
people in Kosovo to gradually lose their patience. Some LDK members at the 
time felt that, what was needed now was the use of ‘nonviolent interference’, 
but “gradually, administered in doses, in order to avoid violent intervention by 
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Serbia”.25 In fact, during this period, the LDK held discussions in order to adopt 
an active form of resistance, but Rugova’s refusal was again decisive, since “the 
US request to him to remain on a peaceful course was adamant”.26
On 1 September 1996, the leader of the Kosovo Albanians, Ibrahim Rugova, and 
Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, mediated by the Sant’ Egidio Commu-
nity, signed an agreement for the return of Albanian students into schools and 
the university buildings.27 A year later, on 1 October 1997, at the beginning of 
the academic year and following the lack of any implementation of the Rugo-
va-Milošević agreement, the Independent Student Union of the University of 
Pristina (UPSUP) organized a massive all-student protest requesting the un-
conditional release of all of UP’s facilities, still occupied by the Serbian regime. 
In response to this protest, the Serbian police forces injured over 200 protest-
ers. They also arrested and released the members of the Organizing Board of 
the protest on the same day (Koha Ditore 1997, 1). During 1996-97, the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) launched a series of guerrilla actions against the Ser-
bian forces in Kosovo. On 28 November 1997, it also appeared publicly for the 
first time at the funeral of a teacher killed by Serb forces in a village of Drenica 
(Koha Ditore 1997, 2). While the LDK pronounced that Serbia was behind these 
militant actions against Serbian police forces, Serbia pointed the finger at the 
KLA and described it as a terrorist organization. At the end of February 1998, 
the armed struggle commenced (Krieger 2001, 90-114).
To summarise, under Rugova, ‘nonviolent interference’ methods were not 
used because they could have accelerated and aggravated the repression of 
the Serbian regime in Kosovo. Rugova was categorically against the use of 
these methods, because his goal was to avoid the armed conflict, which Serbia 
wanted at any cost. During the 1990s, no-one had more impact on the citizens 
of Kosovo than Rugova.  At that time, the majority of citizens was unwilling to 
use non-violent methods of interference;28 and Kosovo’s political represen-
tatives believed that Kosovo could have achieved its main political goal – the 
independence of Kosovo – through the intervention of the international com-
munity and by placing Kosovo under UN protection.29
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The last stage of a social movement is the ‘decline’, which does not neces-
sarily mean failure. As another researcher of social movements, Frederick 
Miller suggests, there are four ways in which social movements experience 
decline: repression, co-optation, success or failure (Miller 1999, 303-324).30 
As discussed above, the first way, repression, used by the Serbian regime, and 
the second way, co-optation, through offers to participate in the Serbian elec-
tions, did not succeed to destroy the social movement discussed in Kosovo. 
Despite some undeniable successes of the social movement in Kosovo during 
the period from 1988 to 1998, above all a degree of internationalization of the 
Kosovo issue, it failed to achieve its main goal - independence - with non-vio-
lent methods.
CONCLUSIONS
In the period from 1988-1992, Kosovo Albanians applied actions to Gene 
Sharp’s first type of non-violent methods of action through organizing acts 
of peaceful opposition in order to demonstrate that they were opposed to the 
abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy and in favour of the Republic of Kosovo. They 
protested through marches, strikes, appeals, petitions, and numerous other 
peaceful actions. This is the first phase of a social movement in Kosovo, or as 
described by Blumer, the phase of ‘social ferment’. These actions, although 
collective, were not strategic, yet they contributed to strengthening a sense of 
general discontent.
However, despite these peaceful actions, the Serbian government responded 
brutally against the Albanians. They abolished Kosovo’s autonomy regardless, 
killed dozens of demonstrators, persecuted, incarcerated and ‘isolated’ hun-
dreds of members of Kosovo’s elite, and, in general, annuled the Albanians’ 
rights as citizens. Also, during this period, Albanians showed through a se-
ries of acts that they were ‘for something’, namely for the Republic of Kosovo, 
through the Declaration for the Republic of Kosovo, Constitution of the Repub-
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lic of Kosovo, Referendum for Independence of Kosovo and the Presidential 
and Parliamentary Elections. 
It is here that the social movement in Kosovo passed into the second phase, 
that can be termed as ‘coalescence’ or ‘popular stage’. The sense of discontent 
was more coordinated, since the leadership of the social movement emerged 
on the scene, and mass actions were organized to show the power of the social 
movement and to make the demands clearer. Through these actions the social 
movement in Kosovo was consolidated into the third stage of ‘bureaucratiza-
tion’ or, as Blumer defined it, of ‘formalization’, characterized by a high level 
of organization. The social movement in Kosovo at that stage was increasingly 
based on staff with specialized knowledge, with some even receiving a salary 
for their work.
Applying Gene Sharp’s typology further, it appears that the second catego-
ry, that of non-cooperation methods, was evident already from the boycott 
of the Serbian elections (1990-1998), on the one hand, and the organization of 
parallel parliamentary and presidential elections, on the other hand. Also, in 
the field of economy, Albanians opened their small businesses and collected 
a 3 percent tax to maintain the parallel system, but they registered their busi-
nesses in state-run Serbian institutions, and paid taxes and fees to Serbian 
state bodies. Moreover, Albanians did not produce anything, yet consumed an 
estimated $ 1 million a day of Serbian products. Meanwhile, the sectors of ed-
ucation and health best present Sharp’s non-cooperation type of non-violent 
resistance. Albanians not only rejected the system of Serbia in education and 
health, but, furthermore, they created a parallel system in these areas. 
The ‘nonviolent interference’ methods – referring to actions aimed at changing 
the situation through psychological, physical, social, economic and political 
interferences - were not used because they could have accelerated and aggra-
vated the repression of the Serbian regime in Kosovo. Kosovo’s political rep-
resentatives thought that Kosovo could have achieved its main political goal 
– the independence of Kosovo – through the intervention of the international 
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community and placing Kosovo under UN protection. Kosovo, in fact, follow-
ing NATO military intervention, later was placed under UN administration and 
became independent. However, this was not due to non-violent resistance 
but, rather, to an escalation of violence, including the violent victimization of 
civilians by Serb forces disseminated in the media, worldwide, and – according 
to local understanding - the armed struggle of the KLA. This was the last stage 
of the social movement in Kosovo - the ‘decline’, which does not necessarily 
mean failure. The repression, used by the Serbian regime, and the co-optation, 
through offers to participate in the Serbian elections, did not succeed to de-
stroy the social movement discussed in Kosovo. Despite some undeniable suc-
cesses of the social movement in Kosovo during the period from 1988 to 1998, 
it failed to achieve its main goal - independence - with non-violent methods. 
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This research paper investigates the everyday experiences, perceptions and 
practices of ordinary Serb citizen of a village in central Kosovo, here anony-
mised as The Village, a settlement situated outside the cluster of majority 
Serb villages and cities in northern Kosovo. The study aims to shed light on lo-
cal peoples’ attempts to negotiate their national identity and readjust relations 
with the ‘other’ in the context of competing citizenship regimes which they 
are subjected to, by Belgrade and Pristina, respectively. Through employing 
an emic perspective, it explores their quotidian social reality in which Serbian 
identity are negotiated and made meaningful in everyday performances and 
understandings of ‘good personhood’. By venturing underneath the parapet 
of the currently heightened ethno-nationalistic discourses, fears and claims, 
the main aim of this research paper is to disentangle local values and uses of 
good personhood from the externally imposed post-war discourse over ma-
jority-minority relations. The results reveal pragmatic identity constructions 
geared towards ordinary citizen rights which challenge any assumptions of 
a purportedly homogenous ethno-nationalist Serb identification preference. 
The research focus employed may open up the possibility for further compar-
ison with other minority Serb settlements in Kosovo in order to explore how 
‘otherness’ is situated in Kosovo’s nation-building process on the ground, con-
tingent on different situations, with implication for the future of the country. 
T
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INTRODUCTION
This research paper investigates the everyday experiences, perceptions and 
responses in quotidian practices of ordinary Serbs living in a central Kosovar 
village, in what follows, anonymised as ‘The Village’.1 Although situated out-
side the cluster of majority Serb settlements in northern Kosovo, this entirely 
Serb inhabited village, which counted more than a thousand inhabitants be-
fore the 1999 Kosovo War and only a few hundreds today, continues to repre-
sent a significant cultural centre in the eyes of most Serbs. This is thanks to 
the geographical position in the region of Metohija/Dukagjini and its cultural 
heritage of medieval Orthodox churches. The villagers find themselves caught 
up in-between two competing ethno-nationalistic discourses and the associ-
ated, respective, fears and claims to which they have to respond to and which 
they may or may not share. 
The main purpose of this paper is to shed light on the everyday attempts of 
these local people in the Village to negotiate and readjust their relations with 
the respective ethnic ‘other’, either Serbs or Albanians. In this, the paper’s 
main aim is to explore how a sense of ‘good personhood’ is lived and enacted 
under the parapet of the currently heightened ethno-nationalist tensions in 
the public sphere. In order to do so, the emphasis is on human agency and 
choice, rather than predetermined ethnic labels. It is hoped that through the 
focus on everyday life, approached through an emic perspective, the paper 
can contribute to disentangling the local perspectives from the externally 
imposed discourse about majority-minority relations in Kosovo since 1999. 
According to Randazzo (2015, 83), studying the realm of the everyday qual-
ifies as a more authentic field of studying human agency than focussing on 
political rhetoric alone. However, while challenging stereotypical views and 
ethnically defined stigma of the Serbian community, the study does not ig-
nore the possibility that local Kosovo Serbs might often draw, and subtly rein-
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force, ethnic identity-related cultural claims and political actions themselves, 
regardless. 
Almost every research respondent addressed as problematic the parallelism of 
the Serbian-sponsored citizenship regime and the hegemonic Kosovar citizen-
ship regime, between which the Serb citizens of Kosovo find themselves situated 
at large. It is with some background information to this topic that the empirical 
section begins, as this sets the stage for exploring the context within which the 
local interviewees have to navigate their identity and sense of good personhood 
on a day-by-day basis. In this, the focus is not on the largely known legal aspects 
of the parallel jurisdiction of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Kosovo, 
such as meaning, genesis, boundaries, and materialisation of the Serb regime cit-
izenship in Kosovo (Kumric 2015). Rather, the main concern is the interviewees’ 
everyday experiences, understanding and performance of their Self (Goffman 
1990). Inspired by Billig’s (1995) concept of ‘banal nationalism’ and a wider ‘local 
turn’ in peace studies (MacGinty 2006), this approach seeks to identify those as-
pects of the respondents’ ‘citizenship dilemma’ which they might spontaneously 
highlight or ignore in attempts to foster inclusion and resilience constructively as 
a matter of strategies for coexistence conceived in and of a given moment. 
In other words, it is of particular interest to this study to understand better 
the scope and choice which ordinary, local Serb citizens have in constructing 
their identity vis-à-vis others, for example, whether they are free to ignore 
or not respond to situated ‘otherness’ or rather affirm it, in the wider, divi-
sive context of contemporary Kosovo. At the same time, the research focus on 
the concept of personhood, or more specifically, what it means ‘to be a good 
person’, serves exactly to pre-empt any unnecessary ethnicisation from the 
outside and allows for non-ethnic identifications to emerge ‘from below’, if 
and where relevant. This is not to suggest that the concept of identity was not 
a relevant parameter of analysis in exploring the social role of civic identities. 
Overall, it is hoped that this study and its approach to everyday human agency 
in relation to the geographically remote, yet contained, Village and its majority 
ethnically homogenous Serbian community might even serve as a pilot case 
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study for potential future comparisons with other Serb situations across the 
country and outside the main settlement clusters in the north. 
A main finding evident throughout this paper, is that interviewees refer to 
all issues of the competing citizenship regimes as problematic. For the inter-
viewed Serb citizen of Kosovo, it is not only challenging to align with the de 
facto hegemonic Albanian definition of Kosovar citizenship. It emerged as 
equally challenging to align with symbols of the Serbian nation and a nation-
al identity in relation to an effectively ceased and, hence, non-existent state 
membership. Might such time-sensitive, socially differentiated and local-
ly-nuanced findings regarding power dynamics and experiences at grassroots 
level, even reveal unharvested peace potentials?
The choice to look at the realm of everyday life ‘from below’ also evokes the 
issue of spatialisation. Given a shortage of information on both rural and ur-
ban Serb-majority milieux in South Kosovo, this contribution treats the Vil-
lage, firstly, as a physical space: a marginalised rural milieu with a traditional 
lifestyle which was historically typical and common across the ethnic divide 
in Kosovo (Kostovicova 2005). Secondly, it is a space for everyday symbolic 
and social interactions (Goffman 1990) where people’s everyday struggles over 
the morality and definition of ‘otherness’ can be observed, often in opposi-
tion with the moral hierarchies and ideologies that have emanated from the 
war and post-war power structures in Kosovo. Thirdly, the latter are evident 
in the wider, symbolic and hegemonic ideological appropriation of space in 
Kosovo at political levels. Such symbolic territorialisation has long been doc-
umented for competing ethnic communities aiming to ascertain their group 
identity and ethno-national claims to space in Kosovo politically (e.g. Di Lellio 
and Schwandner-Sievers 2006). Yet this focus is different from depicting the 
Village as an enclave or, alternatively, a segregated region similar to northern 
Kosovo (until 2013, see Salihu 2019) which relatively unambiguously envis-
aged its future with Belgrade. Contrary to the Serb majority dominated towns 
and villages of northern Kosovo, in the Village the constitutive tropes of con-
structing national identities and claiming space appear much less manifest. 
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One of this study’s relevant findings is that, where such reminders and signifi-
ers of identity exist, they also might be criticised and contested by some com-
munity members. It is on the basis of these considerations and findings that 
the use of the term ‘enclave’, which coincides with the post-war period, is con-
sidered problematic. It provides prejudicial information about the significance 
attached to ethno-national belonging, civic identity and social background of 
the local inhabitants of their place of residence.  In fact, freedom of movement 
to and from the Village has always been restricted for, both, Serbs and Alba-
nians, but only for its geographically isolated position and underdevelopment 
typical for any rural area in Kosovo.    
It is generally held that, while in northern Kosovo ethnic Serbs have always 
been the vassals of Belgrade’s political agendas evident in the existence of 
parallel structures (e.g. police, border control, transportation, and telecom-
munication) since the end of the 1999 war,2 Kosovo Serbs living in the villages 
and cities across the central, southern and eastern parts of the country have 
been much more positively accepting of Kosovo’s constitutional framework. 
Although formally beneficiaries of the same rights, for Kosovar Serbs of the 
ethnically fairly homogenous towns and villages of the north compared to the 
villages of the south, such as thet, everyday life might offer quite different 
options for identity negotiations. However, there is a risk of generalising or 
suggesting monolithic responses to the respective context and settings. To 
counteract such risk, yet without losing sight of the institutional restrictions 
which Kosovo Serbs continue to deal with at large, this study pays specific at-
tention to any dissonant voices when tracing potential patterns of responses. 
In general, this paper maintains that listening to a plurality of voices among 
Kosovo Serbs is paramount to counter the idea that deprivation automatically 
fuels hatred and exclusion resulting from the frustration of being excluded 
(Rancière 1995). The focus on the realm of everyday life and human agency 
in the Village challenges any assumptions that Kosovo Serbs may have ever 
represented a monolithic group of ethnic hard-liners doomed by isolationism, 
victimisation and marginalisation.
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At the very end, this paper will address two caveats. Firstly, the political de-
bate over the territorial swap suggests that the observed local readjustments 
in everyday inter-subjective relations may remain unnoticed as a result of wid-
er media coverage which, at respective national levels, tend to replicate only 
the post-war hegemonic ideologies described above or, at international level, 
omitting ordinary processes that don’t fall within the paradigm of interethnic 
conflict. Secondly, not all concepts taken from the study of everyday life at 
grassroots level may lend themselves to useful insights and, in fact, there is a 
risk that they could potentially add to culturalist stereotyping. 
This research paper advocates a rethinking of the role of Serbian communities 
in central Kosovo and beyond. It questions standard etic (external) represen-
tations and constructions at both national and international levels, and the 
ways in which these ascribe particular views and societal roles to this group 
by juxtaposing the respondents’ subject position (emic perspective) to such 
assumptions. The case study of the Village suggests that only better knowl-
edge of, and a greater sensibility to, distinct local factors allow addressing the 
specific needs and sensibilities of the local subjects appropriately (Begby and 
Burguess 2009). It is hoped that the study of local people’s everyday perspec-
tives of ‘good personhood’ in their place of residence can thus serve, in the 
context of Kosovo’s contested statehood, as an indicative case study of the 
human potential for Kosovo to succeed in its long-term state-building without 
dismissing the central role of people and their identities.    
METHODOLOGY
As part of limited in time, but intensive fieldwork, the author participated in 
most of the local practices of community life, such as the diploma awarding 
ceremony at Saint Anna School, the manifestations for the Vidovdan anniver-
sary, and other outdoor activities among young locals. Inteviews in the Village 
were conducted in June 2018, while in August 2018 additional interviews were 
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conducted in the Serb-majority area of Mitrovicë/Kosovska Mitrovica, mainly 
with NGO practitioners of NGO Aktiv, and in Pristina with researchers at the 
European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI). Filed work was complemented 
with interviews conducted via Skype with academic experts on the relevant 
topics such as citizenship and interethnic relations, including Gezim Krasniqi 
(University of Edinburg) and Vjosa Musliu (Ghent University). 
The research employed a mix-method approach based on a qualitative, ethno-
graphic strategy, including semi-structured interviews along a theme-guide 
designed to let potential interviewees consider their personal take on what 
constitutes ‘good personhood’. This method mix was chosen in order to let in-
terviewees speak freely about factors and topics they considered relevant, yet 
remaining within the broad themes of the research interest (Longhurst 2016). 
The study’s normative and moral-philosophical concept of ‘good personhood’, 
as used in the English language, in translation, at first, caused some conster-
nation as to its meaning.  Yet, the diversity of points raised by the respondents 
in response led to analysing a much wider range of subtopics, revealing how 
local people relate and interact on a daily basis across the ethnic divide, than 
originally anticipated when posing the specific question. 
In following the research ethics guideline of Sofia University ‘St. Kliment 
Ohridski’, respondents were given a Participant Information Sheet and an In-
terview Consent Form to assure their voluntary participation, their right to 
remain anonymous, their right to withdraw at any time, and their informed 
consent. This research paper is based on interviews only of those who formally 
agreed to participate anonymously. Led by a male researcher, this resulted in 
a male bias as it was difficult to approach women in the village. It is hoped that 
future research can rectify this limitation. 
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EVERYDAY LIFE IN THE VILLAGE: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS FROM BELOW
The parallel citizenship regime along with Serbia’s interferences within Koso-
vo’s domestic politics play a critical role among Kosovo Serbs in the Village. 
While travel visa restrictions remains the most prominent issue voiced, locals 
expressed more concern about a potential double discrimination they may con-
tinue to face if they would be left behind any agreement based on ethnic-ma-
joritarian lines.3 The majority of ethnic Serbs living in the Village and holding 
a Serbian passport does not have the identical status of those Serbian passport 
holders residing in the Republic of Serbia. Although both categories of citizens 
are considered Serbian citizens, those residing in Kosovo are subject to specific 
and more complicated procedures for obtaining travel visas or updating their 
expired Serbian documents (e.g. Passport, ID, Driving license) to the new Koso-
var ones. In particular, the caption ‘Kosovo’ on the front page of their Serbian 
passports obliges Kosovo Serbs to interact with the authorities and embassies 
in Pristina even though the same passports have been issued by the Coordinate 
Directorate within the Ministry of Interior in Belgrade (Kumric 2015, 86).
In the Village, many locals expressed a deep sense of double discrimination. 
They mention both the stigma ascribed to them by Kosovo Albanians in the 
aftermaths of the 1999 Kosovo war and the paradoxical difference of treatment 
they face in comparison with other Serbian passport-holders by the Republic of 
Serbia. This citizenship dilemma was one of the most discussed controversial 
topics of controversy for the Kosovo Serb respondents, evidently caught in a 
situation of having to navigate the mutually contradictory Serbia-aligned par-
allel system and Kosovo’s constitutional framework. Although officially having 
the same rights and benefits as anyone else regardless of ethnic belonging in 
Kosovo, Kosovo Serbs remain trapped in-between. A few locals from the Village 
have begun to apply for the new Kosovar documents in the attempt to escape 
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such limbo situation and improve their life accordingly. Previously, during the 
period from 2009 to 2011, those applying for naturalisation were mostly Kosovo 
Albanians without documentation, e.g. returnees from abroad after five years 
of residence in Kosovo (Kumric 2015, 16). As two respondents explain:
I have Kosovo documents, such as my driving license. Without it, my Serbian 
one was not valid, and they [Albanians] were ready to charge me I do not even 
know how much. I went to apply for a Kosovo driving license, and I refused to 
keep my Serbian one. 
Respondent no. 10, female, adult
I do not have a Serbian passport, only the Kosovar one. I do not care to be hon-
est with you. 
Respondent no. 6, male, adult
The increasing willingness among Serbs to obtain Kosovar documents has previ-
ously been suggested to oppose external assumptions that ethnicity favours so-
cietal and spatial divisions among the population (Kumric 2015, 75). Rather than 
emphasising interethnic dispute, locals in the Village expressed fear for the ongo-
ing economic stagnation and threatening political instability. By looking beyond 
the hegemonic discourse, it becomes clear that spatial separation between the 
Village and the Albanian-majority towns, which has worsened economic condi-
tions within the Village after the 1999 Kosovo war and the 2004 turmoil, does not 
entirely depend on ethnic factors. In fact, both a policy vacuum in key economic 
sectors, such as agriculture and the waste industry, which remain yet underde-
veloped all over the country, and the incapacity of local politics to tackle pover-
ty-related issues are currently impeding locals to perform positively in the public 
sphere. Frustration over the economic situation prevailed in all interviews: 
For me [not mentioning that his background is Serb] it is only a matter of oppor-
tunities for the future… I do not wish my kids to stay [in the Village] only 500 peo-
ple live within the village, approximately. Young people cannot live without jobs 
Respondent no. 8, male, adult 
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Where can I go without money? Of course, if I have money I would like to travel, 
perhaps twice a year with my family, and coming back to [The Village] after-
wards. I cannot afford it right now. Although I work hard, I would have nothing 
if my wife would lose her job … the situation here is tough: neither job nor op-
portunity… 
Respondent no. 6, male, adult
Given the economic insecurities, people displayed a vivid criticism against the 
political state of affairs at large and voiced an increased dissatisfaction with 
Srpska Lista (Serbian List), the main Serb minority political party in Kosovo. 
Throughout the fieldwork, the majority of the interviewees highlighted their 
personal disappointment and disagreement with most of Serbia’s interferenc-
es in Kosovo, which have been permanent in the northern areas and also over-
whelming in the central, southern and eastern regions of Kosovo. This politi-
cal dissatisfaction with Serbian political representatives and their attempts to 
interfere through manipulating ethnic Serbs stands in direct contrast to eth-
nically stereotyped assumptions, which Kosovo Albanians and international 
commentators in the region typically have ascribed to Kosovo Serbs, usually 
depicting them as a potential security threat or group at risk. 
The question arises whether related assumptions, such as that Kosovo Serbs 
tend to self-isolate and marginalise themselves from the majority ethnic Al-
banian population in the public sphere, also cannot be upheld. Previously, 
ethnographers and researchers have employed such assumptions to analyse 
the multiculturalism of the urban areas of North and South Mitrovica in north-
ern Kosovo as exceptional, while overlooking local attempts of adjusting to 
interethnic coexistence and dialogue in Southern Kosovo. In contrast to urban 
spaces of northern Kosovo where political disaffection is far from being open-
ly expressed, the case of the demonstrates how particularly in rural milieux 
of South Kosovo, although left behind in policy plans and academic investi-
gations, locals negotiate their collective identities in support of interethnic 
coexistence and well-living. This is evident from critical, and sometimes even 
sarcastic, reflections such as these:    
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We have the same status as the Kurds in Turkey. If you have a Serbian passport, 
maybe it is good for you, otherwise you are like a Kurd in Turkey. Politics does 
nothing at the end of the day … 
Respondent no. 1, male, adult 
I have been forced to quit my position in another local town dominated by Al-
banians. Perhaps, I was too good at working there [ironic tone of voice]. After 
the war no one used to go [to this previous town], now each of us [Serbs of the 
Village] can go without any issue. Look at this here for example [showing the 
daily copy of the Serb newspaper ‘Jedinstvo’ (Unity)] “Politika je Matematika, 
a ne narodna poezija” [Politics is Math, not popular poetry]… when we have 
an enemy to blame, you can always find an excuse. 
Respondent no. 6, male, adult 
On the wall there is [a graffiti of] Šešelj, a Serb, but I do not like him as a person. 
I know also the people who sprayed his face on the wall … but he is like a Nazi, 
and we have got many troubles with Croatia because of him … 
Respondent no. 2, male, teenager
As evident from the last citation, in the Village ‘banal’ (Billig 1995) Serbian 
symbols of national identity, can be ubiquitous in the everyday physical en-
vironment. However, this nationalism neither unfolds in a vernacular dis-
course directed against the ethnic ‘other’ nor in disloyal attitudes towards 
Kosovar formal institutions. This wide range of banal signifiers (e.g. a Serbian 
flag hanging at the entrance of the village, graffiti dedicated to Šešelj, and reli-
gion-related reminders and symbols) do not impinge on those few and rare so-
cial encounters across the ethnic divisions inside as well as outside the village. 
More likely, they reproduce a standard set of traditional symbols, customs and 
beliefs typical for the traditional culture of all Serbs in Kosovo and beyond 
(Čolović 1997). Following Billig’s argumentation (1995, 200), such everyday 
performativity related to national identity might serve Kosovo Serbs to fill pol-
icy gaps and tackle frictions in present time of uncertainty, remaining ‘banal’ 
in the way it is unfolded on a day-by-day basis and, often, simply ignored. 
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Contrary to what the symbolic display of ethno-national Serbian identity in 
the physical environment might seem to suggest, Serbs from the Village ex-
plicitly expressed readiness to engage increasingly with people from outside 
the village regardless of their ethnicity. However, the visible presence of such 
ethno-nationalist signifiers lent itself to a continuation of distrust towards 
Kosovo Serbs in the eyes of Kosovo Albanians’ and, thereby, to their positional 
weakness.
However, the following statements suggest that ordinary locals of both sides 
of the ethnic division are, in fact, little likely to become potentially involved in 
ethnic turbulences and security-related events.         
 I do not like the term community because it divides us [Serbs and Albanians]. 
There are good and bad people, and I do not draw lines along blood or ethnic 
belonging. 
(Respondent no. 6, male, adult) 
Although I am the only one Albanian and Muslim working in [the Village], I am 
fine. I do not have issues with the locals. We watch football matches together for 
example … and this is what we do together in the place I work at, on a daily basis 
(Respondent no. 4, adult, Albanian, self-described as Muslim)
The interviews revealed also less promising statements. However, these need 
to be put in context of the specific location, situation and generation. Some 
adolescents and young adults, whose families had decided to move out of the 
village and settle in Mitrovica in northern Kosovo or in Serbia and who were 
interviewed during their holidays back in their home village, suggest a consol-
idation of ethnic divisions and perpetuation of stereotypes which were likely 
to originate from their places of normal residence. This stood in contrast to 
most attitudes found during interviews in both the ethnically divided urban 
area of Mitrovica and among the stationary villagers of the Village . 
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I do not have any contact with them [Albanians]. I speak a bit of Albanian but I 
do not have Albanian friends, only Serbs. They [Albanian adults] pass by [the 
Village], whereas they [young Albanians] do not come to play here. 
Respondent no. 2, male, teenager
I do not interact with Albanians outside [the Village]. I tried once to speak with 
them, but I do not want to do it again. I think only about bad things. Sometimes 
they come here, doing something that in my opinion is connected with the local 
Mafia [i.e. corruption], not something positive. 
Respondent no. 11, female, university student living in Mitrovica 
These young people, unlike as for those post-conflict societies where youth re-
silience is regarded as future hope compared to attitudes among the older gen-
erations and their living memory of violence (Cheskin 2016, 140; Glavanakova 
2016; Savinas 2015), continued to impose an ethnically stereotyped view of 
‘the other’ – namely, Kosovo Albanians, fuelled by distrust and fear. Tragically, 
few have had much more chance to ever meet ‘the other’. Contrary to the older 
generation, who learnt the other’s language in school, during Yugoslav time, 
they also have lost a common language (Radonjic 2018). In contrast to the atti-
tudes of these young people (respondents no. 11 and no. 2 above), members of 
the older generation, in particular, were eager to readjust everyday relations 
and promote an idea of well-living together with the ‘others’, as the following 
response exemplifies: 
 […] one of my two daughters hopes to move out and start studying in Mitrovica. 
I am afraid that something may happen to her over there. In [the Village] the 
situation is very peaceful, even during the last turmoil [in March 2004] they 
[Albanians] did not touch us. In Mitrovica instead… 
Respondent no. 8, male, adult 
This variety of attitudes and opinions in the Village sheds some light on the role 
that Serbia plays among Kosovo Serbs within the country. While cultural affinity 
with Serbia is vividly reflected in the physical environment through various sig-
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nifiers of banal nationalism, there are also everyday performances of Serbian so-
cio-cultural heritage and traditions which are not, per se, nationalist (e.g. the use 
of the Serbian language, respect for traditional holiday and rituals, Christian wor-
shipping). At the same time, political dissatisfaction with Serbia-sponsored polit-
ical institutions, such as the Srpska Lista (Serbian List) and the parallel citizenship 
regime, is increasing in the Village. Within this mosaic of Serb identification pos-
sibilities, only a few interviewees considered Serbia and its parallel institutions as 
the only ‘guarantors’ and ‘protectors’ of the Serbian communities and their rights. 
In contrast, many others considered the role of Serbia in Kosovo as highly prob-
lematic. Moreover, many Serb respondents considered the realm of everyday life 
a mutually accessible space in which positive encounters and interactions could 
be restored. These respondents played the role of ‘extrovert insiders’ (Naumović 
2002, 21) by positioning themselves against their political representatives in terms 
of ethnic representation, and against the (parallel) institutions that are charged 
with providing the current conditions of Serbs in Kosovo. 
Broadly, there seems to be a correlation between job security and attitudes 
towards the other. Respondents who are dependent on Serbia-sponsored insti-
tutions and organisations defined the Albanian claims over Kosovo as ‘provoc-
ative’ and the attitudes through which Kosovo Albanians interact with Koso-
vo Serbs as ‘inaccurate’. This became evident when conducting interviews 
in connection with the Serbia-sponsored school, the only functioning public 
school in the Village. It guarantees the right to education in Serbian language 
and offers education according to the Serbian curriculum to several dozens 
of local pupils. In addition, the school provides employment for a couple of 
dozens Kosovo Serbs from the wider administrative area of the municipality. 
Exactly those respondents who complained about the state of affairs and ev-
eryday encounters with ethnic Albanians within their place of residence, were 
from among those respondents who neither reside in the Village nor spend 
their entire everyday life there. Undoubtedly, they also suffered less from eco-
nomic deficits than their Village-based peers. Thus, expressing their position-
ing as subaltern to the hegemonic Albanians at large, their statements reveal 
the prevalence of a prejudicial ‘us versus them’ dichotomy which informs their 
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practices and attitudes in the realm of everyday life. Among them, ideas such as 
a rampant criminality among ethnic Albanians as well as conspiracies of Koso-
vo-government-sponsored policies aimed at keeping Serbs underdeveloped, 
are salient. The differences and frictions between Serbs from within and out-
side the Village is evident in the following statement, a typical example reflect-
ing also the situatedness of these Serb attitudes towards the Albanian ‘other’. 
The school functions in accordance with the educational system of the Republic 
of Serbia. They [Kosovo Albanians] do not even know their system. This is nei-
ther good for us nor for them. They want to play their tough role for defending 
something they are not aware of ... They [Kosovo Albanians] came here on 22 
May in order to put barcodes on everything inside this school, which survives 
through donations and belongs to the soil of the Church. For me, this was done 
on purpose, to show us [Serbs in the Village] that everything belongs to them 
[Kosovo Albanians] and that in the future they will come to rule over here
 Respondent no. 9, male, adult, living inside the village 
I agree with him [Respondent no. 9], they [Kosovo Albanians] came inside 
the school acting like ‘bosses’. They wanted to prove that everything around 
here belongs to them, because we are in Kosovo. But […] those who came here 
work for the municipality [of Municipal Town]. I know that there are good Al-
banians, but they cannot speak up because of the corruption they face within 
their own community. […] I have this golden cross, but I hide it inside my clothes 
anytime because it seems to be a provocation in their eyes [Kosovo Albanians]. 
There are no problems, but the reality is that we continue to live in Kosovo un-
der a system that suffocates us. 
Respondent 10, Female, Adult, living elsewhere in the municipality
The ‘us versus them’ dichotomy evident in such statements assigns problems 
such as corruption to one side only, even where attempts are made to see the 
‘other’ in more benevolent ways.  However, the experience of a local Serb from 
the village documents both the experience of corruption and a critical view of 
corruption also for the side of local Serb politicians:
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[Serbian politicians in the Municipal Town] don’t like me anymore. I applied 
for the permission to build up a wall in my backyard. Ironically, they said to me 
that I was not supporting the party anymore. In order to get votes, they used 
to give you something, such as building materials. Because of that, I will not 
probably get any positive result. But I need them. When people are hungry, they 
become easy to manipulate. Hunger drives politics.
Respondent 6, Male, Adult
Those respondents, who stated some critical opinions towards the Serbian au-
thorities, tended to be neither politically involved in nor economically depended 
on Serbia’s parallel system in Kosovo. They seemed aware that there is ‘no-way 
back’ with regard to Kosovo’s independence and sovereignty and eager to move 
on and improve their lives.4  The above interview quote, however, also demon-
strates that they were acutely aware of being situated in-between the external-
ly Serbian parallel system and the internal Kosovar institutions. Although they 
spoke up against the Serbia-sponsored institutions and initiatives organised in 
the Village, a clear link is made between destitute living conditions and depen-
dencies on local Serb politicians and Serbian institutions and organisations. The 
latter send donations and humanitarian aid to support the reconstruction of 
houses and guarantee schooling in the Village, while reinforcing the villagers’ 
isolation and spatial division (Randazzo 2015). Such economic and political de-
pendencies have to be weighted up against security risks emanating from village 
outsiders who are not aware of the final balance that needs to be maintained.      
 Once, they [a couple of ethnic Serbs from Serbia and Montenegro] came to [the 
Village] and tried to set an Albanian-Kosovo flag on fire. I stopped them. They will 
leave afterward. I will stay here with my family instead. I told them: “if for you 
guys ‘Kosovo is Serbia’, you are welcome here! Why don’t you settle down here, 
live here with us and stay here?” [bitter smile and ironic tone of voice]
Respondent no. 8, male, adult
However, not all local attitudes were as proactively conciliatory. There were 
some respondents who displayed passive conciliatory attitudes which, argu-
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ably not representative for the majority of respondents, positioned them-
selves into a subaltern role of ‘We, the Serbs’ – the ‘good’ but ‘inferior’ – against 
‘them, the Albanians’ – ‘the evil’ but ‘superior’, in Kosovo today. In the attempt 
to simplify the post-1999 realm of the everyday and counteract any Kosovo 
Serbs ‘collective escapism’ (Spickard 2010, 129), these interviewees displayed 
resigned, defiant and ethnocentrically informed ideas of the Serbian-Albanian 
division which, however, still highlighted prospects of peaceful coexistence 
regardless.  
We are planning to live here anyway, because I am sure half of Kosovo’s popula-
tion will leave the country and maybe we can improve our situation with them 
[Kosovo Albanians] and, finally, we can come back to live traditionally in the 
same way our ancestors did here without problems, and keeping our tradition 
alive 
Respondent no. 7, male, adult
 At school I repeat to the kids that the condition under which we live is ‘peace’. 
Let’s call it peace, but this peace has come only from one side [implying the Ser-
bian side]
 Respondent no. 9, female, adult
Considering that the Village is geographically located within a Kosovar area 
with one of the higher numbers of Kosovo Serbs who had been kidnapped 
and murdered during the Kosovo war and immediately after,5 the capacity of 
some respondents to criticise a ‘ghetto mentality’ of local Serbs could come 
as a surprise. Even when recollecting events and autobiographical memories 
from the problematic recent past (e.g. 1999 Kosovo war or the 2004 turmoil) or 
when touching upon more recent political issues (e.g. former KLA combatants 
in charge of post-conflict transition, Municipality Agreement) conciliatory atti-
tudes of reaching out beyond the ethnic divisions can be found, where based on 
concrete social interactions both in real life and in the virtual space on facebook. 
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Look here [scrolling his Facebook page] I have UÇK guys who are my friends. I 
was serving the Serbian Army those days [1999 Kosovo war], we were shooting 
at each other and, luckily, we missed each other… now we are friends … I know 
what means ‘going to war’. I can tell you without any doubt: war is the paradox 
of everything … Now, look [showing me one of his pictures on the phone] I 
am with [the President of Kosovo and former KLA leader] Hashim Thaçi and I 
posted it even on my Facebook profile.
Respondent no. 6, male, adult
 Such attitudes tend to go along with criticism of both externally imposed as-
cription from the Albanian side and a political dissatisfaction with the Serbian 
side including with the exaggerated display of Serbian paraphernalia of banal 
nationalism. In this, again, frictions between insiders and outsiders (here of 
both the village and the country) are apparent: 
 I did not go today to celebrate Vidovdan. I went last year to Gračanica to cele-
brate, but I refused to go this year. I am sick and tired of those Serbs that come 
from abroad once a year with their Serbian flags and banners: “Kosovo je Srbi-
ja” [Kosovo is Serbia]. 
Respondent no. 8, male, adult
The refusal to celebrate the ‘Vidovdan’6 along with the denial to continue to 
support Srspka Lista (Respondent 6) did not only demonstrate individual agen-
cy directed against the political situation, but these actions also reveal a will-
ingness to compromise an exclusively ethno-national defined Serbian identi-
ty. Similar to the above-mentioned decision of respondent no. 8 to stop a few 
‘foreign Serbs’ to set an Albania-Kosovo flag on fire, such acts and utterances 
signify the rejection of a simple ‘Serbs-against-Albanians’ dichotomy. Howev-
er, this dichotomy is still transmitted in the history books currently in use for 
primary and high school students in Kosovo through the archetype of two op-
posite ethno-nationalist myths, Albanian and Serbian (Semić 2018). These po-
sition the two communities against each other as ‘occupants-against-survival’ 
or ‘oppressor-against-oppressed’ (Bogomilova 2016, 129), and there are subtle 
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indications that such opposition is still being perpetuated by some, even if 
insisting to be cross-ethnically tolerant (on shaky grounds): 
 […] I do not say to the kids to hate them [the Albanians], but only to be alert, 
because we can’t forget. If we forget, something could be repeated over again 
[…]. At school, for example, we do not have Albanians but we have a Roma stu-
dent. She belongs to a Roma family that has always lived in [the Village] since 
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Her ancestors and family used to work for many 
decades for a very rich Serbian family of [the Village]. She is completely fine 
with us, and we with her too 
Respondent no. 10, male, adult
For various historical reasons, including segregated schooling during Milose-
vic’s years (Kostovicova 2005, 170), the chances for actual interethnic contact 
with Albanians in The Village have been limited. Its Serb inhabitants usually had 
to venture beyond the village boundaries in order to meet the ominous ‘other’. 
However, nowadays such traditional lack of contact seems not to impinge on lo-
cal readiness for reconciliation with ‘otherness’. Apart from the situation of, and 
attitudes described around, the school, something is currently moving towards 
more interethnic relations between Albanians and Serbs in the Village. Within 
this historically homogenous place, these are not taboo anymore, as also this 
perspective of an Albanian, interviewed in the Village, suggests:   
I have two Serbian colleagues from [the Village] with whom I work well together, 
we have different daily shifts, so we cooperate very well at work. 
Respondent no. 4, male, adult, Albanian and self-described as Muslim 
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WHAT  RESTORES ‘GOOD PERSONHOOD’
During the interviews, at first respondents misunderstood the question of 
“how do you define good personhood in Kosovo?”. Nonetheless, in the attempt 
to give a more precise opinion, respondents treated the question itself on two 
levels: firstly, as explained above, they began to address the complexities of 
their everyday life with regard to a wide range of overlapping circumstances af-
fecting them, including not only Kosovar politics and authorities, but also eco-
nomic stagnation, social disadvantages and exclusion. Secondly, respondents 
linked ‘good personhood’ with ideas of ‘good practices’ for living with and near-
by people with respect for their dignity. Thus, respondents associated ‘good 
personhood’ with a ‘good life’ in general, considering the latter to define an in-
tegrated ethical attitude in interaction with others. Here, respondents exclud-
ed ethnically-defined as well as any externally imposed societal ascriptions of 
identity, subjugating thereby politics and the ethnicization of contemporary 
Kosovo’s socio-political landscape to a person’s moral choices. In other words, 
respondents replied to the question of “how could a good person perform?”, or 
“what can a good person do for being such?”, rather than asking “are Kosovo Al-
banians good people?”; or “are their claims over Kosovo good for us?”.
A good person is honest, social and helpful. When you need something, she is 
always eager to help you out
 Respondent no. 11, female, university student 
… [smiling] I want to tell you even in Serbian [language]: “we’re all different, 
but under God’s eyes, we are all “of the same meat”
 Respondent no. 4, male, adult, Albanian and self-described Muslim
We [Serbs], as Christians, can try to look like Him [God] in order to be good peo-
ple. I think that even a good person possesses “a hidden wolf within himself, and 
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he needs to tie it all times”, otherwise temptations will overcome his goodness, 
making him sinful. […] In general, I can say that a good person has to obey the 
following command: do not harm the other.
 Respondent no. 10, female, adult 
I absolutely agree. You cannot do harm unto others. Also, be honest, correct and 
respectful with the person next to you … he will do the same with you, I hope.
 Respondent no. 9, male, adult
This general reference to ethical values and moral principles of social interac-
tion as restoring   ‘good personhood’ for the respondents not only included a 
care for the Self – namely, for their one’s community, but also a care to estab-
lish ‘good relations’ with ‘the other’. Rather than considering ‘good person-
hood’, respondents considered ‘performing in a good way’ as remedy to coun-
teract the bitterness of everyday life, including feelings of being ostracised by 
the majority of the Kosovar population. As described above, while everyday 
performativity of Serbian identity in the Village was based on nationalism, in-
cluding the ubiquitous use of Orthodox Christian symbols and paraphernalia, 
it might come as a surprise that the majority of respondents employed some 
religious rhetoric in their moral deliberations of good personhood and asso-
ciated practices. However, not all respondents expressed ethno-nationalist 
sympathies while exploring commonalities across the dividing lines based on 
religious rhetoric (with an exception of one respondent). Many seemed very 
well aware of how religious institutions have carried some responsibility in 
projecting ethno-national divisions across the post-Yugoslav communities 
(Bogomilova 2015, 128).
 […] I know the people who came to spray the face of Šešelj on the wall […] I dis-
agree with them and I do not like Šešelj. He is not a good person, and we have 
had a lot of troubles because of him…
 Respondent no. 2, male, teenager 
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 […] I stopped supporting Srpska Lista [Serbian List]. The problems I have with 
Albanians very closed to Islam and ‘very Muslims are the same I have with 
Orthodox Serbs. After all, religious institutions are like politics in Kosovo, no 
matter if for Christians or Muslims in Kosovo […] I am not interested in politi-
cal issues such as ‘de facto’ or ‘de jure’ situation of Kosovo, the role of Albania, 
‘Kosovo-versus-Serbia’. Here and now, there is a country and it’s my country, 
and there are people to live together with … 
Respondent no. 6, male, adult 
A good person cares about his family. I do not care about Serbian-ness or Alba-
nian-ness. If someone will attack my family or my house, I will defend it. 
Respondent no. 7, male, adult
In this situation [high level of exclusion of Kosovo Serbs] ‘good personhood’ 
does not really matter. You depend on other’s behaviour anyway. I cannot fully 
trust them [Albanians], because they can be in a bad mood, and this might be 
a problem for us [Serbs]. I am trying to do my best here and not play that dirty 
game [Serbs vs. Albanians]. 
Respondent no. 8, male, adult
Similar to other fieldwork conducted in the Western Balkans, such as in post-
war Bosnia or Croatia (Kostandinova 2018; Leutloff-Grandits 2002), respon-
dents in their place of residence were primarily concerned with the potential 
‘bad performance’, in moral terms, of a person within their own community. It 
emerged that a sense of responsibility and self-criticism was not only towards 
‘the other’ but also, and specifically, towards those belonging to the same com-
munity. Within a context dominated by poverty, economic underdevelopment 
- including abysmally high unemployment rates, and the fear of double ex-
clusion, respondents depoliticised the realm of the everyday they live in. In 
fact, they showed willingness to consider ‘the other’ – no matter whether Serb 
or Albanian and whether situated inside or outside of the Village – as holding 
great responsibility for improving everyday life and building a common future 
in Kosovo. 
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CONCLUSIONS
Within the limits of this study, on the basis of the in-depth interviews and field 
observations collected, the findings of this research paper are twofold. Firstly, 
many local Serbs of the Village were found to navigate their in-between situa-
tion, between the Serbia-sponsored system and the Kosovar institutions, prag-
matically. In fact, most respondents refused to employ an ‘us-versus-them’ 
dichotomy and even criticised the community they belong to, its members 
and its representative organisations, where these replicated such simplistic 
world view. They thereby demonstrated a reconsideration of political trajec-
tories and outdated paradigms aimed at perpetuating interethnic separation 
and ethno-nationalist loyalty claims. In line with critiques of ideas such as that 
war-affected communities suffering from mass-trauma are in need of ‘ther-
apeutic intervention’ (Hughes and Pupavac 2005) and that their pathologies 
are the root cause for all the failures of the country (Krasniqi 2010, 534), this 
study thus suggests that there might be potential in trusting and empowering 
Kosovo’s local actors for future decision-making processes rather than blam-
ing them. 
Secondly, in an attempt to elicit what in local people’s perceptions of everyday 
encounters restores ‘good personhood’, this study documented many respon-
dents’ willingness to abandon the rigid constraints of any ethno-nationalist 
ideology and leave room for those ‘good practices’ that, on a daily basis, may 
allow for increased social interaction and the sharing of common ethical val-
ues and political institutions accordingly. However, beyond any misplaced 
idealism, the findings also point to the role of economic and security stress 
and dependencies on Serbian organisations and institutions as potential spoil-
ers of ‘good practices’ and open-mindedness towards ‘the other’. However, 
both, chances and obstacles cannot be understood without acknowledging the 
realities on the ground first (Randazzo 2015, 79). Here it seems particularly rel-
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evant to consider the de facto low degree of social interactions and exchanges 
of ideas and services between members of different ethnic background in the 
Village, including young people’s lack of a common language. However, there 
was not a single respondent from the Village who did not know what it means 
to perform as a good person in social encounters, including in the rare inter-
ethnic encounters reported on. Such knowledge seems a societal precondition 
on which all intra- and inter-ethnic encounters should be based. This research 
suggests that the question regarding “what restores good personhood in Koso-
vo” provides a central, moral domain to think about and respond to in practice. 
Beyond being just a research tool, it anticipates ethno-political implications by 
valuing everyday responsibilities toward ‘the other’ in practice, especially in 
times of uncertainty.      
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ENDNOTES
1 In the following sections of this paper, the place where the research was conducted has 
been anonymised and replaced with “The Village” for the sensitive information given 
during the interviews and for potential political implications that respondents might be 
exposed to.  
2 Gëzim Krasniqi (University of Edinburg), 10 August 2018, Skype interview, 38 min. 
3 Since summer 2018, the EU-facilitated Kosovo-Serbia ‘normalisation talks’ have gen-
erated the contentious idea of a ‘land swap’ between the two countries. While many 
politicians, policy experts and scholars of the wider region have debated whether its 
implementation would be a recipe for renewed ethnicisation and war, some others have 
presented this option as a ‘win-win solution’ effectively addressing the long stalemate in 
bilateral relations. Meanwhile, under the parapet of nationalistic rhetoric and a predom-
inant, international focus on stability, the everyday experiences, concerns and aspira-
tions of those ‘to be swapped’ or otherwise directly affected by the swap, have barely 
been taken into account.
4 Vjosa Musliu (Ghent University), 16 August 2018, Skype interview, 50 min.
5 At the entrance of the Village, a monument is dedicated to the memory of those local 
Serbs who were kidnapped and murdered in the period between 1998 and 2000. Among 
others, the murder of a man who gained popularity because his body was released by 
the KLA forces operating in the municipality in March 1999, thanks to the involvement 
of the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
6 For all Serbs, the celebration of Vidovdan refers, among a chain of legends reiterating 
the significance of this holiday, to the ‘Battle of Kosovo’, which occurred in 1389 on 
today’s territory of Kosovo and plays a central role in ethno-nationalist Serbian identity 
construction based on the territory of Kosovo.    
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Liberal-peacebuilding is faced with the mammoth task of providing viable 
inter-ethnic educational systems in post-conflict ethnically/religiously divid-
ed societies. The analysis and the impact of its actions in this specific sector 
remain, however, largely uninvestigated. This article explores the main chal-
lenges of the liberal paradigm of inclusion in the context of an integrated edu-
cational system in the aftermath of war in Kosovo. Far from being able to set 
the basis for a unified education, the international community provided the 
legal space for an institutionalized segregated education between Albanians 
and Serbs. Also, it enabled significant room for a business-led and corrupt ed-
ucation, reflecting the segregation model, to step up. This move, which proved 
to be a pragmatic one considering the circumstances on the ground, has been 
shortsighted in the end. Notwithsanding this, a relatively young European-
ization process and its related activities may represent the way ahead for a 
‘successful’ integrated education in the country. By relying on the existing lit-
erature on the subject and field work in Kosovo, this chapter provides new in-
sights on the understanding of the rational choice for a segregated education 
in post-conflict settings and ethnically/religiously divided societies. 
L
LIBERAL PEACE-BUILDING, LOCAL ETHNO- RELIGIOUS BONDS AND INSTITUTION BUILDING ON THE GROUND 
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INTRODUCTION
Liberal-peacebuilding is significantly challenged by ethno-religious bonds 
hindering its main purpose of inclusion and integration. The case of post-war 
reconstruction of Kosovo’s educational system is emblematic in this regard. 
Notwithstanding an impressive and long-standing international commitment, 
including enormous assistance, funding and support, this sector still remains 
separated along ethnic lines, while registering considerable corruption cases 
around ethnic affiliations and networks of loyalty. The central question of this 
paper is: Why the international community’s substantial commitment has given 
way to a separate, segregated and increasingly corrupt educational system? 
Alex Bellamy’s critical approach helps figuring out why the international com-
munity deviated from its original paradigm of inclusion, while also leading to 
unexpected side-effects to the overall peacebuilding process. This paper is or-
ganized into five sections. The first section outlines the main presumptions of 
liberal peacebuilding, its rationale and shortcomings. It clearly pinpoints that 
liberal peacebuilding is a political and relational process, while being compro-
mise- and conflict-based between the local and the international actors. The 
second section elaborates on the stages and roots of ethno-religious narratives 
and discourses that inform the organization of education in post-war Kosovo. 
In this context, the starting point of the international efforts to build a new 
narrative and system of education was far from being an easy one. The third 
section explores how the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) took over the building of a new system of education and the 
challenges it encountered along the way. Certainly, the original purpose of UN-
MIK proved to be problematic and unrealistic in the end. De facto the first and 
most challenging experiment ever in the field of post-war reconstruction end-
ed up to institutionalize separation between Albanians and Serbs, as a prag-
matic way for ‘safeguarding’ pluralism. Moreover, much of the reconstruction 
of post-war education remained a top-down process lacking local partnership 
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and accountability. The fourth section focuses on the local context in which 
UNMIK’s operation took place, the complexity of its engagement as well as the 
illusive character of the original project. Specifically, deep-rooted and even 
nurtured ethno-religious bonds and affiliations represented a hostile environ-
ment for the international community’s purpose of inclusion. The final sec-
tion, then, traces the side-effects that followed the international communi-
ty’s approach, that is privatization and corruption. To this date, Kosovo hosts 
among the highest number of private colleges in the whole Western Balkans. 
Most of those private higher education providers are organized on ethnic 
grounds and are mainly business-oriented. Those developments overlap with 
ongoing Europeanization processes, that is EU-led reforms aimed at provid-
ing the basis for ‘reconciliation’ between Kosovo-Albanians and Kosovo-Serbs 
that UNMIK failed to realize. 
The analysis relies on a qualitative methodology and a range of primary data. 
Seventeen semi-structured interviews were conducted with local and inter-
national representatives involved in post-war education-building in Kosovo as 
well as with students and lecturers. The interviewees were asked to comment 
on 3 open-ended questions regarding 1) the understanding and rationale of 
the international community’s approach to education, 2) the local authorities’ 
bargaining power in making their voice being ‘heard’, and 3) the role of the 
European Union in enforcing a new alternative of education. 
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LIBERAL PEACE-BUILDING, LOCAL ETHNO-
RELIGIOUS BONDS AND INSTITUTION 
BUILDING ON THE GROUND
Peace-building is a complex process relying on a joint effort between the local 
population (Handrick 2005, 30) and the consistent involvement of internation-
al agencies with the ultimate goal of achieving peace (An Agenda for Peace 
1992, 4). Yet, those efforts do not take place in a vacuum. Rather any form of in-
ternational activity, especially when it comes to the implementation, evolves 
at the intersection between the international agency and its takeover from 
the local population (Last 2000, 87,  93; Elbasani 2018). As such, liberal peace 
building is a political and relational process built upon various forms of nego-
tiation, compromise and conflict between the local and foreign actors (Légaré 
2018, 106-107). Often, compromise seeks to guarantee the participation of the 
warring parties to the peace agreement as opposed to continuing violence 
(Cheng and Zaum 2012, 5). The outcome of such interaction is almost invari-
ably hybrid institution building on the ground. Foreign actors are unlikely to 
generate local demand for change, besides limited political alliances (Légaré 
2018, 108) that forge a new post-conflict order with unknown risks. Some of the 
risks follow from the interventionary, top-down and elite-led kind of exter-
nal state-building (Richmond 2005, 96, 104; Comfort 2014). Others are due to 
state-building being a long-term process of reform (Ramsbotham 2000, 174), 
which is aimed at transforming local institutions into an orderly, predictable, 
disciplinary and disciplined administration (Zanotti 2006, 152) as well as local 
attitudes and behaviors that bring about conflict in the first place.
Whether quick top-down or long-term institution-building, the external ac-
tors have to work with and eventually empower local actors to take over the 
task of state-building. At a minimum, sovereignty prerequisites that peace- 
and state-builders aim to export should rely on and transfer governing tasks to 
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the local actors. At the same time, liberal approach is meant to constrain local 
population’s room for nourishing tribal solidarity bonds or claims to special 
links with one segment of humanity (Parenti 2006, 92).  But this is exactly the 
biggest challenge international actors are faced with in post-conflict contexts, 
including Kosovo and the Western Balkans. Here, to use Anderson (2006) 
terms, two juxtaposed imagined communities have been forged and well ex-
ploited by nationalist ideologies over time, especially in critical moments of 
change and crisis. The international community is left with the arduous task 
of bridging these two diverse and competing imaginaries.
Moreover, the special bonds that nourish and maintain such imaginaries are 
entrenched into hard to change world views juxtaposing the division between 
‘us’ versus ‘the other’. Quite often in the Balkans, those bonds, imaginaries 
and deep-rooted divisions go back to the system of diversity management 
in the Ottoman Empire, when the millet system of organization highlighted 
religion as the key unit of administering a vast range of ethno-religious diver-
sity. The weakening of the empire in the 19th century and the emergence of 
the European modern state model across the Balkans enabled the creation of 
new overlapping identities, but institutional legacies and local daily practic-
es hollowed out the creation of multi-ethnic national entities (Elbasani and 
Roy 2015). During the state-building era, these separate communal identities 
were effectively promoted, manipulated and usurped by political elites with 
the purpose of demarcating unitary nations, consolidating central authority 
and re-configuring borders, often along the line of us versus them approach 
(Elbasani 2015, 4-5). The collapse of Yugoslavia amid the rise of exclusive na-
tionalism in the early 1990s unleashed those competing world views and ex-
clusive ideals of nation- and state-building. Not surprisingly, all international 
attempts to aid and sponsor an inclusive and pluralist model of state-building 
in the Balkans have faced the local problem of ethno-religious understanding 
of state, a tendency conflicting with the developments across Europe in the 
same time-frame, where borders became less important and states multicul-
tural (Hehir 2010, 4). Post-communist national entrepreneurs across the Bal-
kans played a crucial role in sweeping the Yugoslav experience of cohabita-
LIBERAL PEACE-BUILDING, LOCAL ETHNO- RELIGIOUS BONDS AND INSTITUTION BUILDING ON THE GROUND 
170
tion among all ethnic communities with clear-cut ideals of ethnically defined 
political entities and the creation of homogeneous national states at all costs.
Those same national entrepreneurs were active in devising and sometimes 
capturing post-conflict institutions along their vision of ethnically-divided 
pure communities. While the role of the international community grew, the 
Balkan national entrepreneurs had few means to directly oppose the interna-
tionally-promoted ideal of multi-ethnic state or the backing of international 
aid, assistance and support. Yet, they have often resorted to resist and trump 
international models of state-building, given rise to a dominant mode of hy-
brid institution-building that resemble Western templates in words, but oper-
ate differently in practice. This is even more so as local structures – co-opted 
or not into the international structures – gradually expanded their power and 
took over crucial tasks of state-building (Elbasani 2018, 150, 156).
What is often ignored in the analysis of internationally promoted reforms, is 
that the internationals often embrace the institutional seeds that have grown 
into hybrid institutions. Bellamy’s critical approach theory (2004, 24) pro-
vides helpful indices to explain how the international community may give 
way to unexpected side effects. To be more concrete, Bellamy tells us that in-
ternationals, because of and during their in-theatre commitment, create ad-
ditional causal relations to those they meet on the ground. This said they are 
not simply supposed to solve ‘preexisting’ problems. Rather they set the basis 
for additional ones. And, this coupled with deep-rooted local ideals may lead 
to ‘unexpected’ side-effects, which reflect the clashes between the local para-
digm of exclusion and the international paradigm of inclusion. Moreover, this 
normative critical approach is well suited to explain the phenomenon of post-
war education-building in Kosovo, because it does not take ‘the world as it is’. 
Rather, it questions the underlying inter-linked factors shaping the post-war 
order itself. Also, it well guides the understanding of why the international 
community (e.g. UNMIK) preferred a separate, rather than an inclusive, edu-
cational model in the aftermath of the conflict, as well as the consequent tech-
nical and palliative measures undertaken by the European Union afterwards.
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By providing poor central leadership, issuing contradictory laws, creating 
overlapping institutional structures and failing to enforce its own vision, the 
international community created an institutional window for the local in-
terests and ideals of state building to survive and thrive. This is particularly 
the case in the field of education. Despite mounting assistance, a relatively 
well-established paradigm on the goals of liberal state-building and actual 
authority to revise the area of education, the international intervention has 
given way to what it sought to replace – a segregated, particularistic and in-
creasingly corrupt education sector that conforms more to primordial ethnol-
ogy-religious bonds and practices than to the ideal of an inclusive and plu-
ralist education for all. The internationals’ over-emphasis on equal collective 
rights, extensive autonomy for the different communities and ethnicity-based 
decentralized governance (Selenica 2018, 239-259), has fostered an ethnically 
defined and corrupt system of education at all levels.
THE REVIVAL OF ETHNIC IDENTITIES IN THE 
FIELD OF EDUCATION
Albanian Kosovars often stage their battle for statehood in terms of upgrading 
the influence of Albanian identity and language at higher education. As former 
Minister for Dialogue1, Edita Tahiri, stressed “Albanians were discriminated 
in the former Yugoslavia. They were considered as second-ranked citizens, 
so Serbs wouldn’t like to talk in Albanian”.2 The creation of the University of 
Pristina reflected Serbian ‘superiority’: the first four-year university degree es-
tablished in 1961 operated as a branch of the University of Belgrade (KIPRED 
2007, 10). Given Serbian control over what Albanians were to learn, the latter 
demanded increase of their own ‘ethnic’ grip over the university policies and 
teaching. In 1968 demonstrations across Pristina demanded a local University, 
which ended with the creation, a year later, of a multi-ethnic University pro-
viding classes in Serbo-Croat and Albanian. Although evolving in the context 
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of liberalization of centralized Yugoslavia (KIPRED 2007, 10), the demands for 
a University were closely bound to the Albanian nationalist movement. “We 
started the basis for a University as a basis for a nation. We have all been an 
education-loving nation”3, says Edita Tahiri.
Similarly, Milošević’s battle for Kosovo started in the field of education (Som-
mers and Buckland 2004, 43). Even if educational policy was subject of the 
1974 Constitution, which recognized large autonomy of local authorities in 
terms of policy content and delivery, Milošević de facto re-transferred various 
powers over education to the Belgrade center. In August-September 1990, one 
year after Milošević dissolved Kosovo’s autonomy, a new Serbian curriculum 
was imposed over the University of Pristina. The Albanian staff and students 
were also soon expelled from the University, making it a vehicle of Serbian 
domination. In response, the emerging Sorbonne educated leader of Koso-
vo, Ibrahim Rugova, envisioned an all-Albanian parallel system of education 
along the political vision of an independent republic, as proclaimed in 1990. 
The parallel education, financed by the Albanian diaspora and conducted in 
private homes became a centerpiece of Kosovar resistance, but also a vehicle 
of infusing Albanian ideals on the political community. Certainly, this type of 
informal system had the effect of reinforcing pure communal bonds among 
Kosovar Albanian students, teachers and school administrators, along em-
powering cultural resistance and ethno-religious identification. In this frame-
work, any commonalities between Albanians and Serbs were swept out at least 
until the end of the conflict, when the parallel system ceased to exist (Malcom 
cited in Bache and Taylor 2003, 285-288).  
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UNMIK’S UNFINISHED PEACE: INCLUSIVE 
EDUCATION IN FUNCTION OF A MULTI-
ETHNIC POLITY
When UNMIK stepped in to take full responsibilities for the administration of 
the territory of Kosovo after the cessation of the conflict in 1999, the rebuilding 
of the educational system was one of its central tasks. Its aim of establishing a 
unified education system, able to bring the conflicting parties together, how-
ever, proved difficult. As Dukagjin Pupovci, executive director of the Koso-
vo Education Centre, reports “at that time I was vice-dean in the Faculty of 
Sciences and I was the coordinator for the reconstruction of the University of 
Pristina. In that framework we, locals and internationals, were going through 
buildings to see if there could be a solution for Serbs to come back, and we 
worked under the same roof’.4 Yet, “UNMIK’s intention to establish one single, 
unified educational system was much easier to say than to do” 5, says Pupovci.
As soon as UNMIK stepped in, Serbian academic staff and students were re-
located in the north part of Mitrovica where they continued to operate under 
Serbian laws rather than UNMIK’s jurisdiction. They were involved into the 
international efforts of pluralist state-building only much later in the context 
of the Brussels Dialogue (2011). As a lecturer at the Mitrovica north-based In-
ternational Business College Mitrovica (IBCM) reports “before that we didn’t 
think that any kind of law which is brought before the Kosovo’s parliament 
is relevant for Serbs. We are paid from Belgrade, Kosovo ignores us and we 
ignore Kosovo. If Serbia stops paying someone must continue. But, nobody 
told us from Belgrade that they are no longer our Ministry of Education”. 
6 Conversely, their Albanian counterparts continued to operate under the 
laws of the Republic of Kosovo decreed in the 90s, which recognized two uni-
versities in Pristina: the Serbian University of Pristina, temporarily moved to 
the north of Mitrovica, whose Rector was Jagoš Zelenović7 appointed from 
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Belgrade; and the Albanian University of Pristina whose Rector was Zejnel 
Kelmendi.  
The University of Pristina reopened in 1999. The University of Mitrovica North 
(UMN), which Kosovo Serbs keep referring to as University of Pristina tempo-
rarily re-located in Mitrovica (UPKM) was established and immediately recog-
nized by UNMIK the following year. Both structures claimed ownership over 
the same buildings and properties and continued to operate effectively undis-
turbed during the UNMIK’s administration, laying down the basis for institu-
tional and legal separation. As an employee at the Austrian embassy in Pristina 
critically asserts “internationals were lying a lot to people. People didn’t know 
what was going on, they believed that the University in the north of Mitrovica 
would have been re-integrated into the UP. This is what we all knew”.8 Similar-
ly, Arsim Bajrami, former UP’s vice-rector and director of Ministry of Education 
and Technology (MEST)’s in 2004-2005, acknowledges that the “UP was pre-
pared to receive back Serbian students to study together with their Albanian 
colleagues. But, Belgrade with the support of the international community ob-
structed this plan. Also, UPKM is totally and fully on an ethnic base and it is ab-
solutely a political institution”.9 In fact, UMN/UPKM operates under the direct 
responsibility of the Ministry of Education in Belgrade and implements Serbia’s 
dictated curriculum, replicating a particularistic reading of a Serbian political 
community, what its features are and who belongs to it (Baliqi 2010, 48).
UNMIK’s certification of political ethnic alternatives to education, moreover, 
reflected a top down modus operandi that failed to bring in and empower alter-
native local actors and solutions. As Xhavit Rexhaj, vice-rector for internation-
al cooperation at the AAB College puts it, “I don’t think anybody ever asked us 
Kosovars what we think, if we should be integrated or not. UP was a kind of 
imposed reality in Kosovo”.10 The German-Austrian social scientist, Michael 
Daxner, who was appointed Principal International Officer (PIO)11 maintained 
key prerogatives of rebuilding Kosovo’s education system. Although Daxner 
shared responsibility with a local rector, he served as de facto administrator of 
UP while his counterpart was more of a figurehead. As international co-head 
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Daxner appeared little interested in cooperating with the administrative or 
teaching staff of UP (Kosovo Initiative for Democratic Society 2002, 6, 14). For 
some, he even “ran the system in a very authoritarian way. He did not con-
sult the local community“ (Xhavit Rexhaj).12 Still, Daxner didn’t really have 
much local ‘capital’ to build on too. Rexhaj recognizes that he operated and 
had to make choices in a highly divisive and hostile context: ‘patriotism was 
crazy at that time’. Daxner also apparently believed in the potential virtues of 
a parallel system to safeguard pluralism. “His idea was having a special status 
for the North, including the education system. He was trying to satisfy the 
Serbian minority, by allowing them to have double structures. But, he didn’t 
have a good vision for Kosovo”.13 (Bajrami). Altogether, the activities of UNMIK 
not only exacerbated the deep-rooted problem of ethnic animosities but also 
created new obstacles to the realization of Kosovo statehood: “[…] instead of 
working to remove obstacles related to the sovereignty problem and preserve 
its neutrality as officially authorized, UNMIK tolerated changes on the ground. 
In fact, sovereignty was exercised by the former ruler, leading to a de facto 
partitioned territory, in the northern part of Kosovo”. (Edita Tahiri 2010, 46).
The toleration of problems on the ground was not entirely a personal choice of 
UNMIK officials.  Much of the problem derives from the contradictions of UN-
MIK’s status as informed by UN resolution 1244 (UNSC Res. 1999). Specifically, 
the resolution recognized the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia, 
while making clear that from that moment onward UNMIK was officially re-
sponsible for the provision of education in Kosovo. UNMIK Regulation 1999/1, 
which confirmed that all laws governing the territory prior to 24 March 1999 
will continue to apply, as long as they didn’t conflict with the fulfillment of 
UNMIK’s mandate didn’t really remove the legal  conundrum (UNMIK Regu-
lation No. 1999/1, 25 July 1999), even if the mission made it clear that it would 
be the only official authority operating in Kosovo (UN Report S/1999/779, 12 
July 1999).
The mission’s engagement of Kosovars to co-head the Department of Educa-
tion and Science (DES) by December 1999 was neither a real partnership nor 
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one that empowered Pristina in the running of the education system. More-
over, the revisions of Regulation 1999/1, a requirement for Albanians to accept 
DES’s co-leadership exacerbated the complexity of the Kosovo’s legislative 
landscape by recognizing that the law in force on 22 March 1989, prior to the 
revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy, would be the ‘second applicable law’ (Som-
mers and Buckland, op. cit., 68-69).
The Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government as promulgated 
by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in May 2001 paved 
the way for the empowerment of local actors in the education sector (UNMIK Reg-
ulation No. 2001/9, 15 May 2001). In March 2002 the first Ministry of Education 
Science and Technology (MEST)’s Minister, Rexhep Osmani, drafted the MEST’s 
work program 2002-2004, as a continuation of the DES. Accordingly, the ministry 
endorsed a pragmatic approach to providing better education for all Kosovars, 
regardless of their ethnic, religious, social and gender background14. Although the 
role of internationals was reduced to an ‘advisory’ one (Sommers and Buckland 
2004, 70), they still had ‘reserved’ powers, including the power to veto crucial 
laws and ensure supervision at least until Kosovo’s declaration of independence 
in 2008. To be more concrete, UNMIK had the final ‘say’ in terms of legislation in 
the educational sector as well as in the drafting of the curriculum. By doing so, 
direct governance by UNMIK enabled the space for an exogenous and what locals 
increasingly saw as an illegitimate educational project. The unlimited powers of 
the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) were evident in the 
field of education, considering that it was the SRSG that dictated the rules to the 
former DES. Also, the SRSG’s decisions could not be challenged by the local insti-
tutions, considering that he was the highest international civilian officer endowed 
with ‘exclusive’ decisional and executive power. Moreover, the UNMIK’s head was 
not solely unaccountable towards the local population, but he even enjoyed a cer-
tain degree of autonomy within UNMIK itself (Lemay-Hébert 2009, 67).
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The 2003 Law on Higher Education (UNMIK/REG No. 2003/14) first formalized 
the right of all communities to higher education without direct or indirect dis-
crimination. The law was also the first to incorporate the requirements of the 
Bologna Process (Kosovo Initiative for Democratic Society 2002,10). Still, the 
creation of two separate universities, claiming same properties and operating 
under different legal frameworks became an issue of fierce contestation be-
tween international and local actors. UNMIK and Daxner, the fiercest support-
ers of the creation of a separate university for Serbs in the northern part of Mi-
trovica, even interfered with the work of the experts of the Council of Europe 
(CoE) in their efforts to ensure the creation of a Serb public university, separate 
from the University of Pristina in the new legal framework. The Kosovo As-
sembly discussed the law and adopted it only after the articles enshrining the 
existence of a Serb university in the north were removed. Interestingly, the 
Albanian version of the draft law did not contain the article legally regulating 
the existence of this university, while the English and Serbian versions did. 
The international officials interpreted the mistake as a printing error. 
Even if the Kosovo Assembly adopted the law without reference to the articles 
mentioned above, the then SRSG, Michael Steiner, refused to sign it until it 
did not contain the legal base for the establishment of a Serbian University 
in the northern part of Mitrovica. Steiner’s decision finally failed to take into 
account the views of UP officials who were consulted about the law (Kosovo 
Initiative for Democratic Society 2002, 10-12). As Xhavit Rexhaj recalls, “I re-
member that Michael Steiner, the then SRSG, went to Belgrade and reached an 
agreement about special rights of Serbia to interfere with Kosovar affairs, in 
particular in the north of Kosovo, and that included of course also education. 
UPKM was an UNMIK deal and Kosovars couldn’t do anything about it”.16 Dax-
ner, himself, hardly worked to engage Serbs into possible cooperation if not 
integration with their Pristina-based counterparts. As a lecturer at the ICBM 
suggests “I remember Daxner came here. He brought us papers, I actually 
translated those papers for my Dean. But he never talked about how to inte-
grate with Albanians”.17 Former Minister of Dialogue, Edita Tahiri too believes 
that UNMIK performed very poorly its mandate of neutrality: “it somehow, 
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maybe not alone and behind the scene of politics we did not see, allowed Ser-
bia to interfere in Kosovo and create parallel systems in many areas, including in 
education. Also, UNMIK – since 2003 – did not even accept that Serbian parallel 
structures are up and functioning. When OSCE came up, in 2003, with an official 
report about parallel structures, it was the first time when UNMIK admitted the 
existence of that parallel world”.18 By that time, the ethnically segregated parallel 
system had become a fact of life mostly thanks to UNMIK’s activity.  
THE HOLLOWING ROLE OF ETHNIC 
HOSTILITIES
UNMIK role and decisions, however, are intricately bound with deep seated 
and prevalent ethno-religious divisions they found on the ground. According 
to Pupovci, “neither Albanians nor Serbs were interested to find any common 
language in continuing to have one single university, and I fully understand 
that. In the 1990s, we were deprived of anything related to normality. I don’t 
think that Daxner should be blamed for our own shortcomings here”.19 A first 
meeting between the Serbian and the Albanian delegation on 15 July 1999, 
held within the framework of the Joint Civil Commission on Education (JCCE), 
failed to suggest solutions, making it clear that there were two contrasting po-
sitions and visions about education in post-war Kosovo (Sommers and Buck-
land 2004, 63-64). Indeed, there is little evidence that internationals could bet 
on any local counterpart able to take over the implementation of the ideal of 
an integrated pluralist system of education. As Gazmend Qorrai, Jean Monnet 
Chair at UP, explains “at that time there was a local rector for UP, but he had 
been recruited politically, and he didn’t have any management skills”.20 Any-
way, the experience of co-governance between internationals and locals lasted 
until the first elections in 2001 (KIPRED 2007, 11). 
The challenge of the local context, deep-rooted divisions and lack of local part-
ners to carry out their vision of education reforms became more relevant once 
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the local actors took over decision-making tasks. Undoubtedly, UNMIK had to 
rebuild the educational system in a complex legal and political context defined 
by ethnic animosities and institutional segmentation. As Pupovci recognizes, 
“we may be multi-ethnic in terms of composition of the population, but not 
multi-ethnic in terms of communication between different ethnic groups, be-
cause first of all we haven’t learned the language of each other since the begin-
ning of the 90s. And, I am aware that the gap between the two communities is 
widening, instead of being bridged”.21 Similarly, a rectorate assistant at UMN/
UPKM reports that “one has to keep in mind that, in fact, Northern Mitrovica 
is the only multi-ethnic city of Kosovo, and it is here where we have problems. 
Also, I believe we have lost time and energy to achieve multi-ethnicity stan-
dards and we spent all money on that. If we would have spent more on the 
economy, we would be much more peaceful here”.22
Because of the divisions that define the Kosovo society or the international 
licensing of such divisions, the international community failed in organizing 
an integrated system of education. As Alastair James Butchart Livingston, a 
Senior Advisor at the Office of the Prime Minister, put it, “We came here in 
1999 to ensure that a multi-ethnic democracy was established, to replace 
what was here before. The reality is that twenty years after, we are having a 
predominant mono-ethnic democracy”.23 Indeed, given the plagues of con-
flict, many Albanians share a ‘bottom up’ belief that “it is too early for a truly 
multi-ethnic educational system in Kosovo”.24 Serbs tend to share similar be-
liefs. As a lecturer at UMN/UPKM suggests, “as you can see there is no Koso-
vo flag around here and there are no Albanians…I can’t see myself living and 
working in Pristina, no I am completely focused on Belgrade”.25 A Rectorate 
Assistant at UMN/UPKM explains the fiasco of the multi-ethnic paradigm as 
a baggage of the 1990s, “after the war, 40,000 Serbs left and/or were expelled 
from Pristina. Today, you can count them on your fingers there. Also, if you 
want multi-ethnicity, you need educated persons and how to have them if you 
don’t have the quality of education and the necessary investments which are 
very important?” He also notes that “there are Albanians studying at UPKM, 
but the majority of them is from southern Serbia, not from Kosovo”.26
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CORRUPTION AS A SIDE EFFECT OF AN 
ETHNICALLY SEGREGATED SYSTEM
Internationals’ approach and failure to rebuild the higher education system has 
spilled over the private educational sector, which mostly blossomed between 
2002 and 2005. The 2003 Law on Higher Education itself foresaw the establish-
ment of private higher education (Kosovo Initiative for Democratic Society 2002, 
29). In 2002 DES, then still under the guidance of UNMIK, licensed 12 private in-
stitutions of higher education (KIPRED 2007, 12). Today, Kosovo officially hosts 
22 private colleges27, but unofficially the number is much higher.28 The private 
system, much as the public one, reflects ethnic segregation. But, perhaps the 
most important ‘unintended’ consequence of the internationals’ integrative and 
liberal approach to education reforms is the propelling of business-oriented ed-
ucational institutions (GAP 2008, 13). Such institutions are typically focused on 
profit rather than quality or diversification of the education (Baliqi 2010, 45-46). 
The high number of private colleges in such a small country with youth unem-
ployment at 55 percent29 and poor economic prospects is a clear indicator that 
these institutions are an easy way of making money more than reflecting edu-
cation needs and increasing its quality. Gerxahliu, senior Officer for evaluation 
and monitoring of the Kosovo Accreditation Agency (KAA), makes it clear that 
“all private colleges are teaching and not research-oriented institutions.”30 Still, 
“the KAA faces a huge challenge in monitoring private colleges’ compliance with 
the necessary academic standards. The Agency [he says], is understaffed we are 
only six people. Therefore, we are carrying out programs’ monitoring not on-site, 
but on paper by looking into contracts and programs. Only external evaluators 
do site-visits and libraries’ checks. But these of course are pre-planned visits”.
The private institutions themselves see the KAA as a problem. As an employee 
at the Pristina-based (private) Iliria College pinpoints “on the one hand the 
KAA asks for qualified academic staff. On the other hand, there is not the pos-
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sibility of accrediting PhD programs in Kosovo, while there is a huge demand 
for academic staff. But, if you want to do research, you need to have PhDs”.31 
The problem of many universities with little capacities is exacerbated by the 
politicization and political hierarchies that dominate the Ministry of Educa-
tion and the University of Pristina (KIPRED 2007, 54). In the broader frame-
work of political patronage and abuse of power, irregularities such as students 
paying professors to pass exams, colleges communicating falsified numbers 
of academic staff to the MEST in order to get programme accreditation, and 
even selling of diplomas without students attending the program are a dai-
ly concern in the university sector, particularly in the private one.32 The poor 
quality in the education sector is extended to the widespread phenomenon of 
plagiarism, copyright infringement and breaches of intellectual property as a 
shortcut to getting academic titles and promotions (Baliqi 2010, 52).
INTEGRATION THROUGH 
EUROPEANIZATION?
The EU had started to develop a strategy to step in the country and take over 
the liberal peace building project, while enabling UNMIK to step out at least 
since 2006. To this end, a European Union Planning Team (EUPT) was sent to 
Kosovo to plan the deployment of the European Union Rule of Law Mission 
(EULEX), which was to assist, monitor and mentor Kosovar authorities in the 
judicial, customs and police sectors (Picciano 2016). But the EU has also been 
involved in the field of higher education through various activities (e.g. Tem-
pus and Erasmus programmes, a verification commission for the recognition 
of diplomas, a pilot project like the International Business College Mitrovica 
[IBCM]). Specifically, Brussels has supported “several Erasmus programmes in 
both universities. It appointed one Tempus Coordinator for Kosovo and one in 
the north of Serbia. It also helped to negotiate a diploma agreement between 
Kosovo and Serbia, which has been implemented for several years and went 
through the European University Association”33, says Pupovci.
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The other EU’s major achievement in terms of education is the agreement on 
diplomas’ recognition negotiated as part of the EU-led facilitated Dialogue 
launched in 2011. Former Minister for Dialogue, Edita Tahiri, reports as such: 
“I regularly met Serbs in the north, and I always told them that their qualifica-
tion won’t be disputed, but that their legal diplomas’ situation had to change. 
One cannot dispute education. But we don’t accept that they bear the stamp 
of the Republic of Serbia”.34 For this purpose, a procedure for the recognition 
of diplomas for students of the University of Mitrovica North (UMN) has been 
established. To this end, the government of Kosovo has adopted a regulation 
(Regulation No. 21/2015) on the procedures and the criteria for issuance of cer-
tificates to the citizens of Kosovo who have received their diplomas from the 
UMN/UPKM, for the purpose of applying for jobs, obtaining licenses and pro-
fessional exams in the public institutions. In that framework, Alastair James 
Butchart Livingston had been mandated, in 2015, as Senior Adviser to the 
Office of the Kosovo Prime Minister, Office of Community Affairs, by the UK 
government, with the task of trying to ensure that the government of Kosovo 
would establish a process to stop the discrimination against Serbian commu-
nity members who have graduated from that University, for the purpose of 
either further studying in, or working for Kosovo institutions. Under the diplo-
mas’ recognition procedure, all citizens of the Republic of Kosovo who have 
graduated from UMN/UPKM, since 2001, are eligible to apply to the MEST and 
submit their necessary documents. From the time it started working until 31 
October 2017, the Commission has verified and issued certificates for a large 
number of citizens of the Republic of Kosovo who have graduated from UMN/
UPKM, as the table below shows.
Applications received 1,133
Verified positive applications 633
Verified negative applications 32
Incomplete applications 3
Applications currently under review 465
Table 1 – Status of diplomas’ recognition requests at October 201835
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Data from the table above indicate that having studied at the UMN/UPKM does 
not present the graduate with any kind of obstacle when it comes to having 
diplomas accepted and validated by the organs of the Republic of Kosovo. 
“This system works well and is a good achievement for Kosovo” says Dukagjin 
Pupovci.36 The procedure works as follows. Students who want to work for 
Kosovo’s institutions need to go to the competent municipality (e.g. Ranillug, 
Gracanica, North Mitrovica) to submit their application/request. And, there is 
a number of drop-off points in the municipal departments of education, where 
the students, who want their diplomas certified, drop off their documenta-
tion. For this purpose, the Verification Commission within the MEST (Ministry 
of Education Science and Technology) has signed a Memorandum of Under-
standing (MoU) with the municipalities authorized to receive/accept the ap-
plication (Article 20, Regulation GRK – No. 21/2015). Afterwards, their copy of 
diplomas goes to the Commission, in the MEST, and the Secretary of the Com-
mission checks that all documents are there. Soon thereafter, the European 
Centre for Minorities Issues (ECMI)37, which is a kind of mediator between the 
UMN and the Commission, brings the copy of diplomas back to UMN, which 
either confirms or rejects the recognition request. “Then the Commission sits, 
we have a panel for it, and evaluates the case and issues the certification”, says 
Butchart Livingston.38 
However, the diplomas’ recognition procedure is often overlooked by Serbs 
as falling short of European accreditation standards. A rectorate assistant at 
UMN/UPKM explains: “we have an Accreditation Agency and our University is 
accredited by the Serbian Accreditation Agency, which is part of the European 
Accreditation Agency (EAA). But Kosovo is not part of the EAA, because the 
KAA has been expelled from the EAA. So, we are at a level above them, but 
our diplomas need to be checked by them”.39 Moreover, he says, “the Verifi-
cation Commission is nothing of academic, it is a pure political commission. 
Also, it didn’t recognize diplomas from 1999 to 2000, because the then Rector 
was expelled from Pristina and moved to central Serbia. For me this is double 
discrimination for students”.40 Over the problems of recognizing diplomas is-
sued between 1999 and 2000, by the then temporarily re-located University of 
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Pristina in Kruševac, “the Kosovar government is trying to do something. The 
issue is that the recognition of diplomas has to take place within the boundar-
ies of Kosovo, and the fact is that those diplomas were issued in Serbia proper. 
So, we have a window of two years, but we are working on it, the Commission 
is working on it”, says Livingston.41
A further EU’s achievement in the educational sector is represented by the 
pilot project of the International Business College Mitrovica (IBCM). The 
college, which was originally an NGO funded by Denmark and UK, was tak-
en over by the European Union last year. It issues two diplomas: one Danish 
and one Serbian, both validated in Kosovo. And, it is an institute accredited 
in Baden-Württemberg (Germany). At the beginning it worked with separate 
classes for Serbs and Albanians. But after a couple of years, the institution 
managed to enroll “2/3 Albanian students, 1/3 Serbs and other minorities sit-
ting in the same classroom and attending programmes in English”.42 The Col-
lege is also attracting internationals. Dukagjin Pupovci, who serves as IBCM’s 
Board member, explains that the institution is in the process of recruiting “an 
international director, so that he/she could be acceptable to both parties. In 
this way, no side feels that is being dominated by the other”.43 But, the Senior 
Adviser to the Office of Kosovo Prime Minister, Livingston pinpoints that “this 
project is very limited. Why would you as a student, or Serb student in partic-
ular, pay a lot of money to get the degree from there, when three hundred me-
ters away you have the University of Mitrovica, where you can go for free?”.44 A 
Rectorate assistant at UPKM, previously working for the project idea of IBCM, 
also looks at the “college project as being too idealistic”. 45
In the meantime the education system, especially that outside of the two con-
tested universities (University of Pristina and UMN/UPKM) synthesizing eth-
nic battles, has expanded its options. The private AAB college in Fushë Kosovo 
and the public University of Peja offer courses in Bosnian; the University of 
Prizren (public) also teaches in both Bosnian and Turkish besides Albanian. 
These are, thus, signs that some degree of integration is taking place in the 
educational sector in Kosovo.
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CONCLUSIONS
Post-war education-building in ethnically and/or religiously divided societies 
is a relatively unexplored area. In fact, educational reform in post-war settings 
has been marginal so far, with external support confined to advice and training, 
but not radical reform. The latter is never a straightforward choice. Rather it 
lays at the intersection between the local and the international agency. Further-
more, the results of this interaction manifest in hybrid institutions. In Kosovo, 
liberal peace-building failed to provide the basis for an inclusive education sys-
tem. In the end, separation has been pursued as a pragmatic way for guaran-
teeing a peaceful and functioning post-war educational scenario. The case of 
the international commitment in post-war Kosovo is exemplary of this choice. 
Certainly, the complexity of the local context, and to be more concrete oppo-
site ethno-religious bonds and nationalistic views, refurbished and reflected 
by corruption-led and business-oriented educational activities, can help ex-
plain the hybrid outcome. In fact, internationals (UNMIK and EU) have con-
tinuously been confronted with the ethno-religious affiliations informing 
the reconstruction of the educational system after the end of the conflict in 
Kosovo. The starting point of their commitment was thus objectively compro-
mised. Even if willing to implement a multi-ethnic educational model, foreign 
actors soon realized that this approach was bound to fail. Aware of this, they 
intentionally established the legal framework for helping an already and de 
facto existing segregated education to be institutionalized. Empirically, I went 
through an analysis of the historical circumstances which provided room for 
two opposite educational visions to step up. This starting point represented a 
tangible and concrete obstacle to the international community’s paradigm of 
inclusion and integration. 
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Alone this, however, does neither explain nor justify its final choice over two 
separate (Albanian and Serbian) educational systems. If the rationale of its 
commitment was of bridging the two ‘visions’, by also acknowledging that it 
wouldn’t have been an easy task from the very start, why did it end up doing 
completely the opposite? The answer is neither easy nor straightforward con-
sidering that various actors, international and local, shared conflicting views 
over the way educational reform in post-war Kosovo should have looked like. 
Under those circumstances, separation may have been the most pragmatic 
choice to follow. However, the findings of this chapter show that it proved to 
be shortsighted in the end. In fact, education has been further ghettoized in 
post-war Kosovo and the chances of integration are minimal, if not non-ex-
istent to date. There have been attempts at the European Union level to do 
something in this regard. But its measures (e.g. verification commission, IBCM 
pilot project, etc.) are merely palliative and the chances for a genuine inclu-
sion are a far-distant reality. Also, the case of post-war education-building in 
Kosovo has shown that the international community has not yet found the 
‘recipe’ for how to reconcile opposite nationalist visions and aspirations. The 
only way it has explored so far is to divide them and recognize upon them ex-
clusive rights. Shall we assume that multi-ethnicity will stay a loose concept 
in post-conflict ethnically-divided societies? Certainly, the liberal paradigm of 
inclusion proved to be a fiasco so far.
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Kosovar students in Greece provide an interesting societal link between the two 
countries and a potentially vibrant source of information about issues relating 
to culture, identity and attitudes. Investigating their lived experience within con-
temporary Greek society promises to provide insight into the discursive field of 
mutual perceptions with a view on starting a conversation about whether and 
how existing stereotypes could be challenged and transformed. Along this line, 
the aim of this chapter is to explore what the chances and avenues of overcom-
ing prejudicial perceptions on each side, and to investigate the potential of young 
Kosovars to serve as arbitrators of positive change for their country inside and 
outside of Kosovo. The first part of the chapter focuses on examining the identity 
negotiations of the Kosovar young people studying in Greece in their interaction 
with Greek people, as represented in their own words and also based on obser-
vation during social interactions. By understanding reciprocal stereotypes, re-
spective ideologies as well as potential cultural constraints and values, the anal-
ysis sheds light on the ways in which an image of Self and identity is constructed 
by the actors involved and projected by them onto the ‘other’. The second part of 
the chapter investigates the impact of Kosovar alumni from Greek universities 
in their home country. The paper focuses on the image of Greece taken back 
home and discusses whether and how the learning experience of living in a dif-
ferent society, one that is already part of the EU and regarded as comparatively 
more ‘open’, can challenge rigid ideologies and facilitate Kosovo’s EU path.
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INTRODUCTION
The relationship between Kosovo and Greece has been characterized as ‘a core 
paradox’ (Armakolas 2014, 5); despite their geographic proximity, shared cul-
tural values and common visions towards their European and EuroAtlantic 
orientation, these two countries remain a stranger to each other, maintaining 
minimal relations at all levels (Kursani et al. 2014, 43-44; Armakolas 2014, 5). 
The two nations, which have never been in direct conflict with each other and 
whose mutual misconceptions stem mainly from their different interpreta-
tions of the Yugoslav tragedy during the ‘90s (Armakolas and Karabairis 2012, 
111-112), feed and preserve obsolete stereotypes about each other, which have 
discouraged the creation of solid bridges and sustainable synergies between 
people (Maliqi 2014, 50; Konstantinidis and Armakolas 2014, 33). 
Little academic research has been conducted on the bilateral relations of 
Greece and Kosovo. From the few sources available in the international bibliog-
raphy, findings suggest that a closer and more meaningful relationship would 
result in positive long-term effects for both partners in the field of economy 
and would foster stability and cooperation in the region (Armakolas 2014, 5; 
Stamelos 2016, 89-90; Kalay 2017, 1035; Ukshini 2017). The sources are even 
more limited (if not non-existent) when it comes to exploring the dynamics of 
this relationship in the realm of youth, academia and youth policy. Despite the 
weak relations of the two countries, young Kosovars study in international ed-
ucational institutions based in Greek cities; this has been made possible thanks 
to scholarships granted by private colleges operating in Greece, in cooperation 
with state or private universities based in Kosovo.1 In recent years, the number 
of Kosovar students studying in Greece, particularly in Thessaloniki, has been 
growing.2 The presence of Kosovar alumni from higher educational institutions 
in Greece are currently holding key positions in Kosovar society and, more spe-
cifically, in the sectors of politics, education and banking. 
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Kosovar students in Greece provide an interesting diplomatic link between the 
two countries and a potentially vibrant source of information about bilateral 
issues relating to culture, identity and attitudes. Investigating their lived expe-
rience within contemporary Greek society promises to provide insight into the 
discursive field of mutual perceptions with a view on starting a conversation 
about whether and how existing stereotypes could be challenged and trans-
formed. Along this line of thought, the aim of this paper is (1) to explore what 
the chances and avenues of overcoming prejudicial perceptions on each side 
are; and (2) to investigate the potential of young Kosovars to serve as arbitra-
tors of positive change for their country inside and outside of Kosovo.    
The first part of the paper is devoted to examining the identity negotiations of 
the Kosovar young people studying in Greece in their interaction with Greek 
people, as represented in their own words and also as based on observation 
during research interactions. By understanding reciprocal stereotypes, re-
spective ideology as well as potential cultural constraints and values the pa-
per aspires to shed light on the ways in which an image of Self and identity is 
constructed by the involved actors and projected by these, arguably represen-
tative for their wider societies, onto the other. The second part of the paper in-
vestigates the impact of Kosovar alumni from Greek universities in their home 
country. The paper focuses on the image of Greece taken back home and dis-
cusses whether and how the learning experience of living in a different society, 
one that is already part of the EU and regarded as comparatively more ‘open’ 
can challenge rigid ideologies and facilitate Kosovo’s EU path.     
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:  
NEGOTIATING IDENTITIES
Presenting different aspects of oneself to fit different occasions is a universal 
social practice that members of a community acquire and develop in their in-
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teraction with others (Goffman 1955/1972). Adjusting to the ‘norms’ of each so-
cial occasion means putting on different ‘fronts’ that, project selected (and of-
ten idealized) aspects of oneself (Thompson 2015, 93). In social interactionist 
framework, human social interaction can be understood through comparison 
with a theatrical play performed in front of an audience (Goffman 1955/1972, 
19). People put on different ‘faces’ in order to adjust to the social setting, just 
like actors on a stage (Goffman 1955/1972, 5). Erving Goffman defines ‘face’ as 
an image of the Self which depends, on the one hand, on the norms and values 
of a society and on the other, on the situation in which a social interaction is 
taking place. Through ‘face work’, people adjust their image situationally; just 
like acting on a big social stage, they manipulate the space, their appearance, 
their words and their ‘co-actors’ in order to make a performance in response to 
the expectations of the audience (Goffman 1955, 5-14). 
Albanian migrants at large have previously been documented to adjust their 
facework to the host conditions at social micro-level (Schwandner-Siever 
2008, 48). The status or the ‘reputation’ that their country of origin has within 
the host country defines the scope for individual choices on how to present 
oneself and one’s ethnic background. As true not just for Albanian migrants 
and their experiences and practices in different host countries (Mai 2003; Kret-
si 2002a; Schwandner-Siever 2008; Kokkali 2015), when faced with negative 
ethnic stereotypes in a new environment, hiding, negotiating or shifting one’s 
identity can be some of the strategies employed in order to avoid social ex-
clusion and discrimination, or to obtain certain privileges or a more favorable 
treatment. 
The strategic negotiation of one’s identity is a phenomenon which is also ev-
ident among the community of Kosovar students in Greece. It should be em-
phasized that Kosovar students in Greece constitute a special category. First of 
all, they cannot be labeled as ‘migrants’ in the conventional sense; Kosovars’ 
migration to Greece has a transitory character (Vullnetari 2008). Consequent-
ly, the way they project or negotiate their identity cannot be analyzed under 
the same conditions that apply to Balkan populations migrating to the more 
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prosperous West for the long term. Students from Kosovo come to Greece for 
a specific period of time with the plan of either returning home after the com-
pletion of their studies or continuing their career somewhere else abroad. Un-
like migrants who enter Greece in quest of employment as unskilled working 
force with an average or low educational profile, Kosovar students are usually 
well-educated, with a strong command of English and also knowledge of oth-
er foreign languages. Sometimes they come from affluent and socially elite 
Kosovar families which have the economic capacity to send their children to 
study abroad. Some of them even left jobs at home, in order to gain what they 
hope will be a better education. Furthermore, given the geographic proximity 
of Greece with Kosovo, many Kosovar students tend to travel back home on 
weekends and on holidays, meaning that their time spent in Greece might be 
focused nearly exclusively on studying.   
Secondly, Kosovar students in Greece do not form a homogeneous group with 
regards to language, culture, religion, individual identifications or attitudes. 
Even if we attempted to categorize them into Albanian-speaking and Serbi-
an-speaking groups in a questionable attempt to differentiate them accord-
ing to ethnic origins, we would soon come to realize that there are cross-cut-
ting as well as intersecting similarities and differences throughout. Thirdly, 
and independent of my personal inhibition to impose ethnic labels, what is 
very interesting and original in the way young Kosovars strategically negoti-
ate their identity is that, in order to be socially accepted, they tend to project 
their wider ethnic identity first, presenting themselves as ‘Albanian’ or ‘Ser-
bian’ before anything else. After some months of living in Greece, however, 
most seem to realize that introducing themselves as ‘Kosovars’ can be more 
useful and respectable in Greek society, given existing stereotypes, positive 
or negative, with which Greeks associate these ethnic identities. As a result, 
students from Kosovo eventually adapt their presentation of self according-
ly.3 However, Greeks still tend to entertain a very incomplete, distorted and 
obsolete image of Kosovo and Kosovars (Konstantinidis and Armakolas 2014, 
13-15). Hence, Kosovar students still also always face the challenge to explain 
what today’s Kosovo is to the local population. Consequently, young Kosovars 
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employ a plethora of narratives to present themselves. Nevertheless, they do 
not just present themselves to the Greeks as the host population, but also to 
the ‘world’, given that both Athens and Thessaloniki are multicultural cities.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
From a research methodology point of view, Goffman’s social interactionist 
approach suggests methodological tools involving personal interaction with 
participants, such as ethnographic (participant) observation and in-depth 
conversations.4 This article presents findings from the analysis of sixty-two 
theme-guided, semi-structured and open in-depth interviews conducted 
over a period of seven months, from June to December 2018. In detail, I in-
terviewed: i) eight students from Kosovo currently studying in Thessaloniki 
and Athens, aged 18-24; ii) fourteen alumni, currently living in Kosovo and/or 
abroad, aged 25-38; iii) fifteen youth-leaders/representatives of civil society 
organizations who have been participants or organizers of projects involving 
Greece, aged 18-26; iv) fifteen experts from the wider fields of politics, aca-
demia, law, journalism, literature and arts, representing different age groups; 
and v) ten young Greeks who visited Kosovo and/or conducted shared projects 
between November 2017 and December 2018, aged 18-28. Furthermore, ever 
since I joined the regional civil society as a youth leader5 and started represent-
ing a Kosovo-based NGO in fora, meetings and seminars, I had the opportunity 
to deepen my research by organizing five focus groups, overall involving ap-
proximately 40 young people, among them Kosovar youth, experts, as well as, 
family and friends of Kosovar students studying in Greece. 
I conducted interviews in Prishtina, Vushtrria/Vučitrn and Thessaloniki be-
tween June and December 2018. Alumni living in other cities or abroad were 
interviewed via Skype between August and October 2018. I conducted my in-
terviews in relatively relaxed environments. This enabled both me and my 
interviewees to engage in quite personal and detailed conversations. It also 
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provided the space for us to ask each other questions and clarify ambiguous 
points. The fact that the interviews sometimes took place at homes meant 
also sometimes unanticipated, yet interesting, turns in the discussion, such as 
family members getting involved in the conversation, providing new perspec-
tives. Of course, I am fully aware of the fact that research has its limitations 
and that people sometimes tend to provide ‘politically correct’ or ‘socially ac-
ceptable’ answers, especially when asked about issues connected with social 
values or taboos (a phenomenon described by Timur Kuran [1995] as ‘prefer-
ence falsification’). I should mention that, in most cases, my contact with the 
interviewees has not been limited only to the amount of time required for an 
interview. Portelli (2006, 157-158) stresses the importance of the interviewer 
and interviewee spending some time to get to know each other before the first 
recorded interview, so that at least they can understand each other’s ‘talk sty-
le’. I feel that investing time and energy on building a stronger interpersonal 
relationship,6 based on trust and honesty, allowed me to conduct more pro-
found, yet ethically informed interviews. My research adhered to the Code of 
Ethics7 of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki.8  
As I chose random and snowball sampling, the profile of the people interviewed 
emerged as broadly gender balanced as well as fairly balanced in terms of geo-
graphic and ethnic distribution. Interviews were conducted in English, Alba-
nian, Serbian and Turkish. For the analysis of my empirical data, I combined a 
Foucauldian discourse analytical approach and the grounded theory approach. 
According to Michel Foucault (2003; 1968 [2002]), there is a strong relationship 
between power and discourse, where the one feeds and preserves the other: 
power defines discourse and at the same time, discourse reinforces and con-
solidates power. Foucault’s (1991) approach is based on the idea that the way 
people perceive the reality around them -and therefore, they way they think, 
act and talk- is based on social norms and standards that they accept as ‘true’. 
These ‘truths’, which indirectly dictate one’s language and behavior, are actu-
ally ‘imposed’ by the dominant system of power or by societal elites. The fact 
that the ideas which we consider as true are molded and constructed through a 
system of power means that they can also be contested and challenged. 
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Grounded theory is a powerful tool for the investigation and documentation of 
phenomena and trajectories portending a potential change in societies (Morse 
2006, 1-2). I followed an abbreviated version of the grounded theory procedure 
(Bryant and Charmaz 2007; Charmaz 2006; Willig 2008).9 Methodologically 
speaking, I initially identified and grouped data by thematic categories, based 
on descriptive labels or concepts (Strauss and Corbin 1990: 61). My initial cate-
gories, which at a later stage were divided into subcategories, emerged from 
the data and referred to a characteristic attribute that defined certain groups 
and differentiated them from others (Dey 1999, 63). My category labels have 
been at a large extent ‘in vivo’ (Strauss and Corbin 1998, 70), as they answer to 
phrases or words used by the interviewees themselves.10          
Interpreting the data from a social constructivist point of view, I aimed to 
investigate how certain ideas about oneself and the ‘other’ are constructed 
vis-à-vis the expectations of the respective audience and to what effect they 
may operate as discourse which is shared beyond individual agency (includ-
ing choice and strategy). In particular, I focused on the narratives employed 
by young Kosovars to introduce (or re-introduce) their country to Greeks and 
how a pattern might be discerned which reveals this discourse as a reaction 
to feedback given by the local society and from lessons learnt and typically 
shared by my respondents during their lived experience in Greece. Lastly, by 
examining the discourse employed by both Kosovar and Greek young people 
upon return to their home country, when presenting each other’s country to 
people at home after having had a first-hand experience of the other’s cul-
ture and society, I am asking whether and how narratives of a new generation 
can challenge and eventually change the hegemonic, stereotypical discourses 
about each other which have prevailed in both societies for years.    
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KOSOVO AND GREECE:  
SO CLOSE AND YET SO FAR
Compared with those other EU member-states which have also yet to formally 
recognize Kosovo,11 Greece has been relatively open to bilateral relations with 
the new state that declared itself independent in 2008. It established a Liai-
son Office in Pristina12 which facilitated the movement of citizens, goods and 
services in lieu of a consulate or embassy (Kursani et. al. 2014, 43-44). A good 
will to facilitate movement, however, is often counterbalanced by long, timely 
and costly bureaucratic processes, which at times discourage individuals from 
traveling to Greece or inaugurate any kind of partnerships.   
Greece has supported Kosovo’s access to some international organizations and 
the creation of links with the European Union, yet without committing itself 
to a formal recognition of state independence. The Greek foreign policy stance 
might be explained as characterized, internally, by a relative balance between 
recognizers and non-recognizers (Kursani et. al. 2014, 43). However, the fact 
of non-recognition and of occasional ambiguity13 in cultural or sociopolitical 
issues affecting Kosovo has not helped the improvement of bilateral relations. 
The two countries, which in the past had been driven apart by their different 
interpretations of major historic events, such as the Yugoslav tragedy, still re-
frain from approaching each other on international level.  
At micro-social level, it is extremely hard to find updated, reliable research on 
how the Greek and Kosovar people view each other. Qualitative data available,14 
talking about a cold and stagnant relationship between the two suggest a perpetu-
ated ‘frozen image’ and obsolete, distorted ideas projected by one nation onto the 
other, thereby preserving and replicating misinformation and misconceptions. 
Can young people’s experience, in practice, contribute to a revision of this ‘frozen 
image’ between two peoples, add novel elements and start a new discussion? 
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KOSOVAR IDENTITY AFTER THE 
INDEPENDENCE
The Declaration of Independence in 2008 marked a new era for Kosovo; 
the newborn state found itself at the heart of international attention, over-
whelmed by divergent opinions over the formation of its new identity. The 
state building period was characterized by a plethora of international and na-
tional voices suggesting different ways to rebrand Kosovo (Demjaha 2016). On 
the one hand, there was the ambition of creating a secular state, under the 
umbrella of which different ethnic and religious communities could co-exist 
peacefully as foreseen by the new constitution; on the other hand, more con-
servative voices from both inside and outside Kosovo promoted, for example, 
the factor of religion, and in particular, a new form of political Islam or ethnic 
identities built either on religious affiliation or solely on ethnic identity, the 
latter in the realm of a reinvigorated, ethno-nationalist Albanianism (Kras-
niqi 2011, 191-207). The question of how young Kosovars conceive and present 
themselves and their country inside and outside Kosovo is situated within this 
wider field of ongoing Kosovar identity negotiations still today, just a little over 
one decade after Kosovo’s independence declaration, 
PRISHTINA, THESSALONIKI AND THE WORLD 
OF ACADEMIA
During the former Yugoslavia period, there existed vibrant trade and travelling 
relations between Thessaloniki and Prishtina. Thessaloniki used to be a com-
mercial hub and tourist destination for many Kosovars, who would do business, 
buy goods and spend their holidays by the seaside (Patterson 2011, 4-5). Aca-
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demic activity was also intense between the two countries, as some of the older 
alumni interviewed recall: there was a significant number of then-Yugoslav stu-
dents in public Greek universities as well as many Greeks who would study at 
the university of Prishtina, making use of the slots available for foreign students. 
The end of the war in Kosovo in 1999 found the two nations physically de-
tached from each other. In the following years, collective Kosovar memory 
re-evoked a myth of Greece as the ‘enemy’ in cahoots with the equally Chris-
tian-Orthodox Serbs, while the Greek public opinion remained attached to an 
obsolete image of Kosovo as ‘ex-Yugoslavia’ and a place of ongoing war and 
conflict. News coming from both sides via the media have since been usually 
negative and fragmented, projecting a distorted view of one’s reality on the 
other based partly on nationalistic discourses (Maliqi 2014, 49). 
As soon as Kosovo declared its independence in 2008, the Kosovar govern-
ment signed an agreement with educational institutions based in Greece and 
started providing scholarships for young Kosovars to study in the neighboring 
country.15 Today, there are dozens of young Kosovars studying in Greece, the 
majority of them being in Thessaloniki,16 due to its geographic proximity to 
Kosovo. The distance between Thessaloniki and Prishtina is 330km approxi-
mately, meaning a 4-hour drive by car, or a 5-hour journey by coach via Sko-
pje.17 The provision of scholarships has enabled people coming also from lower 
income families to study in Greece. Therefore, approximately 60 percent of 
my respondents came from such families. This has widened the profile of stu-
dents, which, as many respondents said, used to be representative of a more 
affluent social elite, coming almost exclusively from the capital, Prishtina. Old-
er alumni recall that in the years of Yugoslavia, studying in Thessaloniki was 
a privilege that mainly somebody coming from the capital - namely a ‘qytet-
ar’ or ‘Prishtinali’- could enjoy.18 As younger respondents also shared, during 
the first years that the scholarship program ran, it obtained the reputation of 
a project favoring only the ones who ‘knew somebody in the government’. 
From my interviews with both Greek and Kosovar partners directly involved in 
the participant selection process, I understood, however, that the organizers 
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made systematic efforts to be as transparent and inclusive as possible, in order 
to lift any suspicion of nepotism or favoritism in the system.
The widening of the profile of Kosovar students able to come to Greece is sig-
nificant for one more reason: the interviews suggest that, studying in Greece 
is not a topic of contestation within their families for students who come from 
relatively wealthy and more cosmopolitan or liberal families. It is usually the 
students living in rural areas who need to convince their social environment 
about their decision and also disperse the skepticism and fears expressed by 
relatives and friends. Consequently, it is particularly people from these more 
marginalized regions who are likely to have a greater impact on reversing neg-
ative stereotypes than their colleagues in the capital city: their positive ex-
perience serves as a counter-narrative to scaremongering, in settings where 
the eradication of prejudice can be made possible only through the personal 
rhetoric of a member of the community.     
HOW DO KOSOVAR STUDENTS PRESENT 
THEIR COUNTRY IN GREECE?
During their first weeks in Greece, Kosovar students generally realize that 
Greeks have a very limited or distorted view of Kosovo. Most of them are sur-
prised to see that a large part of the Greek population is quite ignorant about 
Kosovo and confused about the dominant language, religion and population. 
A very simple question, such as ‘where are you from?’, which in other coun-
tries could be answered in one word, in Greece provokes more questions and 
usually leads to a wider conversation. These questions, however, are not trig-
gered by suspicion or malevolence, as students say; quite the opposite: the 
overwhelming majority of my respondents reported that Greeks are usually 
thrilled to meet someone from a country they know so little about albeit so 
near, and which had been stigmatized in history by a tragedy: 
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Most Greeks are quite sympathetic and want to know whether things have been 
improved after the war. They ask us if we are safe now. 
Blerta, 22, Albanian speaking student of rural background 
Greeks know nothing about Kosovo. And when they know something, then this 
is negative. They associate Kosovo either with war or with crime. I guess this is 
the information they get from the media. 
Arta, 19-year old self-defined Bosniak student of rural background 
When asked about how they introduce themselves to Greeks, interestingly 
enough, answers among Kosovars from the same ethnic group are clearly dif-
ferentiated according to gender. A significant number of Albanian speaking 
female interviewees - although not representative for Albanian students at 
large - mentioned that they present themselves as ‘Kosovars’ and then, usually 
move on to clarifying that they are ‘Kosovar Albanians’. This clarification, they 
said, is essential due to the fact that many Greeks still identify Kosovo with ei-
ther Serbia or Yugoslavia. Putting Albanianness forward is a way of presenting 
modern Kosovo by introducing to the world the now dominant language and 
ethnicity: 
In the beginning, when people asked me where I am from, I used to say: ‘I’m from 
Kosovo’. Greeks, however, know nothing about us; some of them remember hav-
ing crossed Kosovo by car during the times of Yugoslavia on their way to Europe 
and that’s the only image they have. They know nothing about our ethnicity or 
the language that we speak. So, I started introducing myself as ‘Albanian’. 
Besa, 25, alumna 
In contrast, the majority of Albanian speaking male interviewees introduce 
themselves from the beginning as ‘Albanians’ and can then specify that they 
are ‘Albanians from Kosovo’. 
Why do I introduce myself firstly as an Albanian and then as a Kosovar? I’ll tell 
you why. My father was imprisoned for being a political activist; he wanted to 
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be able to speak Albanian. He wanted his children to study in Albanian. I pay a 
tribute to him by introducing myself firstly as an Albanian.
  Albert, 24, alumnus, now living outside Kosovo
Still, clarifying the country of origin can make a big difference for the local 
society, as an interviewee, representative for many respondents explained: 
Greek society associates Albanians with migrant workers or with criminals. I 
very soon understood that I have better status as an Albanian from Kosovo than 
as an Albanian from Albania. 
Artan, 24 
The same opinion is shared by another interviewee:
I followed the advice of a Greek friend of mine who told me: “when you present 
yourself, please say that you are from Kosovo, because Albanians from Kosovo 
and Albanians from Albania are different. 
Besim, 21
In contrast to the experience of Albanians from Albania, however, the stere-
types about Kosovar students in Greece rarely related to the trope of crime. 
Yet, claiming a better status within the host society than assigned at first, is 
one of the factors that seems to have driven also some Kosovar students to 
resort to identity mimicry as described for those earlier migrants (Schwand-
ner-Sievers 2008). I found evidence that some Kosovars present themselves 
through other ethnic minority identities in reaction to local Greek perceptions. 
Dalia, for example, who revealed herself as a Muslim Bosniak student to me, 
shared that, by presenting herself as Serbian (and obviously, Christian), this 
made Greeks trusting her more easily and helped her find a flat to rent much 
sooner than her peers. On the other hand, when she wanted to participate in 
an educational program in the United States, she applied as a Kosovar. For 
Dalia, shifting identities pragmatically means projecting each time different 
aspects of herself towards the respective audience, in order to make best use 
of the opportunity on offer towards a better life. 
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My interview with Dalia started in English: 
Mary: How do you present yourself in Greece? When people ask you ‘where 
are you from’, what do you say?
Dalia: When I first came to Greece, I used to say that I am from Kosovo. One 
of the biggest challenges I had back then was finding an apartment. Then, 
a Greek friend of mine, who wanted to help me, told me that I would stand 
a better chance of finding a place to stay if I told landlords that I am Ser-
bian. If I say that I am Kosovar, then people will think that I am Albanian. 
Greeks don’t like Albanians. My friend said that it is easier for Greeks to 
trust a Serbian. So, I did. I followed this advice and I found an apartment 
much faster than the rest of my peers.   
At hearing this statement, I switched my discourse into Serbian: 
Mary (in Serbian): So, you prefer to present yourself as Serbian. 
Dalia (in Serbian): In Greece, yes. I mean, I have a Serbian passport, after 
all. When I got accepted to a training course in the United States, however, 
I represented Kosovo.  
While I was talking to Dalia, her mother, a lady in her middle 50s, was 
going in and out the room, carrying a large tepsi, a frying pan. 
Dalia: Please excuse my mum, she is preparing for Bayram, so she is cook-
ing all these desserts. 
Mary: Wait, you got me confused. You said that you are Serbian and I er-
roneously jumped into the stereotypical conclusion that you are an Ortho-
dox, too. 
Dalia’s mom, who could not understand us when we were speaking in 
English, as soon as we switched to a familiar linguistic code, she spon-
taneously popped into the conversation and answered my inquiry by 
giving another twist to the story:
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Mother (in Serbian): We are not Serbian; we are Bosniak!   
For the next few minutes, Dalia’s mother dominated the conversation. 
She explained the difference between Bosniaks19 and Bosnians and talks 
about the challenges that young people in her community face. Having 
interviewed quite a few people from the region, representing different 
ethnic communities, I should say that they all mentioned the same ad-
versities, regardless of language or religion. They all spoke of ‘a lack of 
opportunities’, of poverty, corruption and unemployment. Dalia’s mom 
said that although Dalia got a half scholarship, meaning that the rest of 
the expenses would have to be covered by the family, she was keen to 
support her daughter for studying in Greece, so that she could obtain 
a better education. Ovde nema perspektive! (‘There is no perspective 
here!’), she sighed.
Dalia: I don’t want to live here, in the Balkans. I travel a lot. I don’t feel 
Balkan. I feel a citizen of the world. 
In general, many interviewees noticed that it is quite challenging to present 
your country to an audience which has a very vague and fragmented image of 
who you are and where you come from. Just like actors performing on a social 
stage, Kosovar students have come up with original monologues to introduce 
themselves. Blerta, a 24-year-old alumna recalled: “I tell people that I come 
from the youngest country in Europe. They find this quite exciting”. Ardian, 
a 25-year old student, uses a similar narrative to present his homeland and 
explains why he chooses to do so:
I say that I come from the newest country in the world. Think about how 
positive and promising this sounds: the newest country in the world! 
When I tell people that I am from Kosovo, their first reaction is sadness. 
Kosovo is associated with war and trauma. But I don’t want to be associ-
ated anymore with sad things. So, I use something positive to present my 
country.  
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Those last two items are indicative of a formulaic discourse which was intro-
duced during The Young Europeans branding campaign, an endeavor launched 
by the Government of Kosovo after the Declaration of Independence in 2008, 
aiming to putting Kosovo on the map by projecting a positive image of Europe-
an orientation and youth potential (Meçaj 2018, 28). 
KOSOVAR STEREOTYPES ABOUT GREECE
When transcribing my interviews, one word regularly caught my attention as 
it was present in almost all interviews. This was the word ‘home’ and it was 
often included in responses to the question ‘How did you feel when living in 
Greece?’. Spending time with Kosovar students and their families, I heard their 
personal stories and observed their social realities. I realized that for many of 
them, their decision to study in Greece brought them in disagreement with 
people from their direct social environment. 
It is usually the elderly in a community who speak against Greeks. When I said 
that I got a scholarship to study in Greece, my grandfather told me: ‘They don’t 
like us over there, Greeks are like Serbians. Greece is our enemy’. I said: ‘I don’t 
think about Greece, all I think about is the College’. When I came to Thessaloniki, 
however, it was a different story. Everyone was helpful. I felt at home.
Naim, alumnus 
This statement also reflects the fact that at least a part of Kosovar youth has 
been raised with a negative rhetoric about Greece, which is often depicted as 
‘the enemy’ or as a ‘Mediterranean Serbia’, as some said. As evidence shows, 
however, the myth of a country which is ‘unfriendly’ and ‘unsafe’ for Koso-
vars is challenged once Kosovars start living in Greece and interacting with the 
local population. Kosovars discover that Greeks have a very similar culture 
when it comes to hospitality, gastronomy and attitude towards life. There is 
also sometimes some critical and sad self-reflection, which might partly be ex-
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plained with the difficult situation in Kosovo as well as with a specific kindness 
extended to me, as a Greek interviewer.20 
Kosovo is like Greece some years ago. People were hospitable, welcoming. Then, 
we passed through a transition. The trauma changed us. It made us go back, turn 
in upon ourselves. 
Burim, 24-year old alumnus of rural background
Kosovars and Greeks, we used to be the same thing, but we went through differ-
ent experiences and this changed us. But, if we spend more time together, we will 
find again common ground.
Gresa, 26-year old alumna from Prishtina
Young people recognize strong cultural convergence in each other’s discourses 
despite religious differences. Greek and Kosovar people typically express sim-
ilar values with regards to cherishing family and friendship as well as a very 
similar understanding of what the concept of ‘honor’ or ‘besa’ entails.21 Both 
Kosovars and Greeks consider themselves as ‘people of honor’ and keeping 
one’s word is regarded as an unwritten moral rule, meaning that someone can 
have ‘face’ and credibility in the community.  
During the first years of my studies, I used to be friends only with Albanians in 
Thessaloniki. We spoke the same language, so it was easier for me. Then, some 
incidents happened and I felt that I should keep a distance. I ended up having 
more Greek friends. I understood that they have ‘besa’. 
Gentjan, 25-year old alumnus from a rural area
There were cases, however, where respondents expressed diverging feelings 
towards Greece and Greeks, respectively. Some respondents from different 
ethnic backgrounds claimed that although they cherish the country for its his-
tory, culture, climate and lifestyle, they have either ‘unclear’ or ‘negative’ feel-
ings towards Greeks. This impression had been molded, as they said, mainly 
throughout their daily interactions with locals. 
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Furthermore, there are certain ideas which are rooted in historical, nationalist 
narratives and which, regardless of their young age, Kosovar students defend 
as ardently as the older generation. Before analyzing these, we should men-
tion that previous research (Gallup Balkan Monitor 2010; 2011; Kosovo Cen-
ter for Security Studies 2012) had shown that one of the main reasons why 
Kosovars face Greece with suspicion, if not hostility, is the fact that the latter 
is seen as the main opponent to Kosovo’s ambition of EU accession. Kosovars 
are highly aware of the fact that Greece has not recognized Kosovo’s indepen-
dence (Maliqi 2014, 42), with all the implications that this can have on the rela-
tionship of the two countries. Another factor, of course, is Greece’s diplomatic 
relationship and lasting bonds with Serbia. 
Hence, quite surprisingly, my respondents when asked about the reasons of 
the ongoing polarization between Kosovo and Greece, spontaneously provid-
ed an answer which is neither connected with recognition nor with Serbia. 
It has little to do with this present situation but is rooted in ethno-national, 
historical grievances. The historical narrative literally provides the template 
of understanding the present situation. The ubiquitously first reaction was 
that Kosovo still sees Greece as an enemy because of various issues and dis-
putes between Greece and Albania, starting from the Albanian complaints 
over Chameria.22 Almost all interviewees who identified themselves as ethnic 
Albanians, stated that any political disagreement of Greece as a nation with 
Albania as a nation-state, would affect its relations with Kosovo, too. In this, an 
ethno-nationalist construction of Kosovo as part of the greater ethnic Albanian 
community is evident: “We are one nation; the enemy of Albania is our enemy, 
too”, said Andi, 26-year old youth-worker. Arben, aged 24, talked about ‘soli-
darity’: “whatever happens in Albania affects Kosovo, too, so we feel solidarity 
for Albania”. 
This nationalist sensitivity on the specific topic is, to a large extent, one-sided, 
considering that few Greeks (and even fewer among young population) have 
a clear understanding of the issue of Chameria even in the context of Greece’s 
and Albania’s history and relationship. Even if they did, it would not easily 
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occur to them to understand this as a matter of dispute between Greece and 
Kosovo. The fact that, for years, Greeks have associated Kosovo with Yugosla-
via, naturally prevents them from directly identifying Kosovo with Albania. 
Last but not least, to Greeks, Kosovars represent a relatively unknown ethnic 
group compared to Albanians from Albania, who migrated into Greece in large 
numbers during recent decades and are now broadly considered integrated in 
Greek society.23     
It is important to mention that for the majority of the Kosovar respondents, 
Greeks are considered nationalists; this is seen by Kosovar youth as problemat-
ic and as an obstacle in the improvement of the relations of the two countries. 
When asked about how they would describe Greeks, the majority of respon-
dents used the word ‘patriot’ or ‘patriotic’, but not necessarily in a positive 
context:
Greeks are very proud of their history. They are more nationalistic than we are. 
It’s good to be a patriot, but something they could learn is how to have better 
relations with their neighbors. 
Linda, 25-year old student from Prishtina 
What is interesting is that Greeks who have visited Kosovo or who have in-
teractions with Kosovar students in Thessaloniki consider Kosovars as quite 
nationalistic, too, as the following two interview excerpts exemplify. 
When I first visited Prishtina, I was overwhelmed by the huge Albanian flags 
waving in the entrance of the city. It made me feel strange. I asked if it was a na-
tional celebration, but I was told that it was an ordinary day. In Greece, you nev-
er see such huge flags waving in the city, unless it is a national holiday. 
Kostas, 27-year old participant in a youth exchange in Kosovo
To celebrate the end of the school year, we organized a party. You could see 
people from all over the Balkans. After consuming some alcohol, students 
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started asking the DJ to play certain songs and he did so. While the Serbs and 
the Romanians played mainly folklore or popular songs, the Kosovars joined 
the Albanians and asked for nationalistic songs. I could see them forming the 
‘Eagle’24 with their hands while singing. I could not understand what the songs 
were about, but one of my friends explained that the lyrics told something about 
‘Greater Albania’ and the reunification of Kosovo with Albania. I don’t under-
stand why we had to listen to this kind of songs. It was a students’ party after all. 
Maria, 22-year old college student 
My research findings suggest, furthermore, that Kosovar students, at least 
during the first years of studies, tend to socialize almost exclusively with 
people from their own ethnicity. Although this tendency might be driven 
by their need to identify themselves with a group they can ‘belong’ to, more 
than half of the alumni respondents said that they regretted not exploring 
the full potential of living in another cultural environment. Representative 
for these, an alumnus who had received a special award for his academic 
achievements some years ago, responded to my question: ‘Based on your ex-
perience, what would you advise the students who come to Greece to study?’ 
as follows:    
Most Kosovars who study in Greece make the same mistake that I did in my 
first year: during their stay in Greece, they hang out with Albanians only 
and don’t make friends with Greeks. Many of them spend their whole week 
at the School library and then, on weekends, they go back home to Kosovo. 
I would advise them to spend more time with the local population. That it 
is the only way to learn a culture. They will also understand that we have 
more similarities than differences with the Greeks. 
The findings of the research show that few Kosovars seem to consider spend-
ing their life in Greece once they have completed their study course at uni-
versity. For those who are on a quest towards more promising professional or 
academic opportunities, Greece might just serve as a transitory country on the 
way to Western Europe or America;25 a country which according to one inter-
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viewee’s words, teaches them skills such as ‘tolerance, respect to difference 
and also, the love for life’:
It’s been a month that I am living in the United States, doing a master’s degree. I 
now realize the valuable skills that I got in Greece, living in a multicultural and 
multiregional environment.
Feim, 24, alumnus
However, many others are obliged to return home after the completion of their 
studies due to visa restrictions, while yet others consciously choose to go back 
to Kosovo and enter the local job market. Very few have found Greek partners 
and started a new life in Greece. Although flirting and having occasional rela-
tionships is an aspect of everyday social interaction with locals in Greece, most 
Kosovar students say that they would choose one of their own kind for a ‘safer’ 
or a ‘serious’ relationship. The few Kosovars I interviewed who chose to marry 
their Greek partners usually originate from liberal and cosmopolitan families 
of Kosovo’s capital and seemingly feel free from traditional social obligations 
dictating their lifestyle and selection of spouse. For yet others, finding a Greek 
Orthodox life partner is an outright taboo, which can bring them in direct con-
flict with their families.26 As 25-year old Vera explained: 
Family in Kosovo comes with lots of conditions. Being a good daughter or 
a good son in our culture is about putting family first, even if this means 
putting some of your own desires aside. This defines our morality.    
In Kosovo, the family is considered the most important social institution (Kras-
niqi 2012 10). Choosing a spouse of the same ethnic background is presented as 
an Albanian tradition aimed at keeping Albanians homogeneous and of ‘pure 
blood’27 (Beka 2018; Dani 2016, 428). Beyond widely internalized ethno-na-
tionalist considerations, however, also the traumas experienced by Kosovar 
society might explain an emphasis placed on preserving collective memory, 
unity and tradition through ethnically endogamous marriage preferences. It 
also explains the acceptance by many young Kosovars, still, to adhere to their 
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families’ wishes of choosing a partner of the same background (Kostovico-
va and Prestreshi 2003). Evidently, and as true for many transnational cases 
(Anthias 2010), most Kosovar students in Thessaloniki have to negotiate their 
individual identity, aspirations and presentations of Self not just vis-à-vis ex-
ternal assumptions about their collective identity, but also in relation to ex-
pectations and assumptions emanating from home.
CONCLUSIONS
Young Kosovars’ ‘face work’, as explored for students in Thessaloniki, reveals 
how they manage their identities in relation to different audiences and their 
expectations, torn between individual aspirations and opportunities in the 
host country and often conservative family expectations and standardized 
ethnonational affirmations affecting them from home. Overall, they seem ea-
ger to introduce their country to the world by promoting a more optimistic 
narrative to substitute the one associated with war and trauma. Compared 
with their European and Balkan peers, who can travel easily, young Kosovars 
remain quite isolated. The opportunity to study in Greece is seen as an oppor-
tunity to live in a European country, which they perceive as more resilient, 
open and multicultural compared to Kosovo. 
The relation between Greece and Kosovo is characterized by mutual misinfor-
mation and misunderstandings. As soon as they start living in Greece, Kosovars 
come to realize that Greeks are either ignorant about Kosovo or they have an ob-
solete image of the country. In their attempt to make their living conditions eas-
ier, Kosovars in Greece tend to draw on different identity narratives available in 
response to the specific occasion and audience, to present themselves and their 
country in the best way possible. Young Kosovars do not seem eager to be asso-
ciated with the Yugoslav tragedy; rather, they tend to introduce their country to 
the world as a young, promising state, with European orientation. Projecting the 
Albanian language and ethnicity emerged as a priority for the ethnically Alba-
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nian Kosovars. One of the lessons they learnt, however, was that in Greece being 
a ‘Kosovar’ or being ‘an Albanian from Kosovo’ has different connotations than 
being an ‘Albanian from Albania’, meaning, thus, a more favourable treatment.  
Young Kosovars see Greeks to a large extent as nationalist. Greece’s problem-
atic relations with Albania are seen by Kosovars as a reason to feel skeptical or 
even hostile towards Greeks. On the other hand, Greek youth, which have a 
cloudy image not only of Kosovo’s history but also of its present stance in the 
regional geopolitics and future orientation, reserves similar skepticism. The 
majority of the Greek respondents pictured Kosovo as an ‘unsafe place’ and, 
hence, abstain from visiting it. Those who do visit the country, however, usu-
ally come back with mostly positive impressions about the people. Respon-
dents from both countries agree that visiting each other’s setting and having a 
personal experience of the other culture is the only way for Greeks and Koso-
vars to understand each other and change existing stereotypes.28 
Despite different understandings and divergent opinions about certain social and 
geopolitical issues, returning Kosovars use a mostly positive narrative to present 
Greece back home, perhaps mainly in order to justify their personal choice to 
study in a Greek city and quell family worries and any type of concerns or nega-
tive reactions voiced by their wider social circle. Given often conservative atti-
tudes towards difference at home, many Kosovar students expressed that life in 
Greece has offered them valuable lessons on how to be more culturally aware and 
respect diversity, values that they considered indispensable given that Kosovo 
aspires to join the European Union and other international institutions.  
An improved image of Greece carried back home by Kosovar students might 
help reverse the hegemonic rhetoric about Greece being ‘the enemy’. Like-
wise, the presence of Kosovar students in Greece and their interaction with the 
local community can provide Greeks a clearer image of who Kosovars are and 
where they aspire to go. My findings substantiate this assumption for the case 
of Kosovar students in Greece and upon return to their home country, albeit 
they also highlight where obstacles still lie.
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As a conclusive thought, it could be said that in a time of increasing radical-
ization among youth both in the EU and the Western Balkans,29 my findings 
suggest that promoting intercultural dialogue and cooperation between the 
EU and Western Balkan countries, as foreseen in several EU exchange and mo-
bility programmes,30 indeed serve the promotion of interethnic coexistence, 
long-term peace and stability in the region (Pasic 2018; RYCO 2018a; 2018b; 
Slana 2015). In this context, legal and institutional provisions that would allow 
Kosovar students to have equal access to educational, training and networking 
opportunities that their peers in other Balkan and EU countries have been en-
joying for years, would be paramount for combatting the perpetuation of rad-
ical nationalism and fostering peace consolidation in the region and beyond.  
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ENDNOTES
1 The University of Sheffield International Faculty CITY College in cooperation with 
the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology of Kosovo has been offering schol-
arships for students from Kosovo to study in Thessaloniki since 2008. Interview with Dr. 
Enver Hoxhaj, Prishtina, 27.09.2018. On 24 November 2018, Dr.Hoxhaj visited Thessa-
loniki and attended the Graduation Ceremony, which coincided with the celebration of 
ten years of bilateral cooperation between the Kosovar government and the University 
of Sheffield.   
2 The figures provided by the City College/ University of Sheffield in Thessaloniki are as 
follows: for the academic year 2018-2019, sixty-two (62) scholarships have been awarded 
to students from Kosovo for Bachelors, Masters and Executive MBA (https://masht.
rks-gov.net/uploads/2018/07/theuosinternationalfaculty-ministryofeducationscitech-
kosovo-scholarships-2018-19.pdf. In 2017-18 the number was the same: sixty-two (62) 
scholarships, while in 2015-16 fifty-five (55) scholarships were offered. The City College 
hosts the largest number of Kosovar students, followed by the American College of 
Thessaloniki (ACT). 
3 Similar findings, although with a different sample group, have emerged from the re-
search of Zana Vathi (2010) on Albanian-origin teenagers living in Thessaloniki. One of 
Vathi’s key findings is that “the type and frequency of references and choices in relation 
to ethnicity can be rational even among members of the ‘new second generations’, with 
differences between self-identification and ethnic labelling conditioned by personal 
experience and by the centrality of ethnicity in the host society’s political and social 
spheres” (2010, 2).
4 For the needs of the present research, I spent six months in Kosovo, where I volunteered 
in local NGOs through my capacity as a trainer, facilitated youth projects, traveled in the 
region and at the same time, conducted my research. As a result of this, I was offered 
the opportunity to become part of the local civil society and in June 2018, I accepted a 
position on the Board of a local NGO. The life experience in Kosovo offered a first-hand 
taste of the local culture and ideology, as well as challenges faced by local youth. I am 
also fluent in the Albanian, Serbian and Turkish languages.  
5 In May 2018, I was elected as the President of the Greek-Albanian Youth Forum in Thes-
saloniki, a platform created by local students and teachers with the purpose of promot-
ing intercultural dialogue, friendship and cooperation between Greek and Albanian 
Youth living in Thessaloniki. In June 2018, I was appointed as the International Coordi-
nator of the “Access” NGO, which is based in Kosovo; therefore, we started conducting 
local projects involving also Greek youth. Between May and November 2018, I represent-
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ed my NGO at regional initiatives such as: the EU-Western Balkans Meeting in Podgorica, 
organized by SALTO (May 2018), the Regional Youth Forum in Novi Sad (June 2018), the 
“Balkan Tour” in Skopje, Tirana and Prishtina (July 2018) conducted in the context of 
the Austrian Presidency of the EU, the Experts’ Meeting in Slovenia (November 2018) 
organized by the Partnership between the EU and the Council of Europe and the Semi-
nar for the Prevention of Radicalization in the Balkans (November 2018), organized by 
SALTO in Tirana.    
6 One of the dilemmas I faced in the beginning of the research was whether to interview 
people with whom I had a personal relationship, like close friends, roommates or col-
leagues. I consciously decided against this possibility for reasons of potential personal 
bias and subjectivity. All the interviews conducted for this paper have been with people 
I met for the purposes of the research only, although some friendship developed from 
this collaboration afterwards.   
7 https://www.lib.auth.gr/sites/default/files/docs_files/research_deontology_principles.pdf 
8 All participants were fully informed about the research aims and their right to ano-
nymity and withdrawal at any time before, during and after the conduct of interviews 
via i) an info-poster stating the background, the aim and the timeline of the research, 
ii) continuous communication and interaction with the author. All participation was 
voluntary. For in-depth interviews, involved parties signed a consent form, which was 
available in both English and Albanian. In all other cases, participants (and the organi-
zations that they represented) were informed, both orally and written (via e-mails and 
texts). The research adhered to standard equality and diversity guidelines. Anonymity 
was guaranteed through the use of pseudonyms and obscuring of all identifiable loca-
tions and dates throughout.
9 This enabled me to merge the processes of data collection and analysis (Charmaz and 
Henwood 2008, 241), to move from data to theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), to have 
greater autonomy over the sequence of steps taken during the conduct of my research 
(Pidgeon and Henwood 1997, 255), to continuously review my initial research questions, 
to add new elements and in a few cases, to even change direction (Strauss and Corbin 
1990, 37–40; Glaser and Strauss 1967, 40).
10 For instance: ‘Kosovar’, ‘Albanian’, ‘Serbian’, ‘home’, ‘Chameria’ etc.
11 The EU countries which have yet to formally recognize Kosovo’s statehood are Greece, 
Spain, Slovakia, Cyprus and Romania. 
12 See Hellenic Republic Liaison Office in Pristina at http://www.mfa.gr/missionsabroad/
en/pristina-en/ 
13 As in the case of Kosovo’s bid for UNESCO, where Greece first endorsed, but finally ab-
stained from a vote (Ker-Lindsay and Armakolas 2017, 29).  
14 See Konstantinidis, Armakolas, Maliqi and Maliqi (2014).  
15 Interview with Dr. Enver Hoxhaj, Prishtina, 27 September 2018. Dr Hoxhaj was one of the 
people who inaugurated this program, during his term as Minister of Education, Science 
and Technology (2008-2011). 
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16 Findings show that there are approximately 90 Kosovars currently in Thessaloniki. The 
vast majority of them (80% approximately) are students. The rest (20%) represents peo-
ple who are either working in Greece or married to Greek citizens. These statistics are 
based on figures provided by the City College/University of Sheffield in Thessaloniki for 
2018, the American College of Thessaloniki (ACT), the Balkan Youth Forum (non-formal 
platform based in Thessaloniki with Kosovar board members) and the informal group 
formed by Kosovar students in Thessaloniki.   
17 Until recently, there was no direct bus line connecting Thessaloniki and Prishtina. In 
2008, however, a Kosovar travel agency started organizing daily excursions from Prishti-
na to Thessaloniki, mainly for shopping and entertainment. This tour, which started as a 
pilot project, proved successful enough, as information provided by organizers suggest, 
that tours now take place every other Friday or Saturday at a relatively affordable price.  
18 According to Dafina Paca, “it has been common to hear references to those from the city 
as ‘Qytetar’, implying that they were an elite class, and to the ‘Katundar’ or ‘Katunart’, 
meaning those from the villages, implying a backward, rough and uneducated person 
(or simply the equivalent of a ‘hick). This discriminatory discourse has existed despite 
considerable mixing of individuals and families, particularly amongst those settling in 
the capital, Prishtina. It is important to draw attention to these stereotypes because the 
diaspora of Kosovo is composed of populations from a mixture of both urban and rural 
areas, cities and villages” (2015:3).
19 The Bosniaks are a south Slavic nation, usually speakers of Bosnian, a Slavonic language, 
and of Muslim faith, living in various countries of the Balkans.
20 I am aware of the fact that interviews of past experiences are always shaped by the 
present, including the interview situation itself and that answers may vary according to 
respondents’ impression of the interviewer (Portelli 2006). 
21  Μπέσα / besa. There is a saying in Albanian that goes like this: ‘Besa e shqiptarit nuk 
shitet pazarit’ (‘the honor of an Albanian cannot be sold or bought in a bazaar’). Besa is a 
pledge of honor, a cultural concept associated with Albanian cultural identity, according 
to which a man should always keep his word if to be called a man. If an Albanian tells 
you ‘bese’, then this intended to convey that he will keep his promise. The concept 
has long been formalized in the canon of Albanian ethno-national self-description as 
evident in school books and the wider national literature (Schwandner-Sievers 2008, 
52-54). The same concept exists in the Greek language, where it is also believed that 
keeping one’s word is a sign of manhood and loyalty.   
22 Chameria (Albanian: Çamëria; Greek: Τσαμουριά), refers to a geographical area in 
today’s North-Western Greece which used to be partly inhabited by Albanian Chams. Ac-
cording to Kretsi (2002b,173): “[t]he Chams are understood as members of the Albanian 
speaking Muslim minority which used to live predominantly in northwestern Greece 
(Ipeirus). The regional denomination ‘Chameria’ is primarily in use by Albanians with 
obvious irredentist undertones which refer to an ‘ethnic Albanian territory’ which today 
remains inside Greek territory”.  
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23 Haska 2017; Papageorgiou 2011. Researchers like Vathi (2010, 11) and Triandafyllidou and 
Veikou (2002, 191) argue that the Greek state focused predominantely on assimilation 
instead of integration during the periods of large immigration waves from Albania to 
Greece.
24 Forming an eagle with one’s two hands communicates the desire to publicly show one’s 
Albanian ethnicity. Albania (Shqiperia in Albanian) is referred to as ‘the land of the ea-
gles’, therefore the symbol of the eagle represents for Albanians ethnic pride. For other 
nations, however, the specific gesture is often interpreted as a nationalistic gesture, 
alluding to the idea of ‘Greater Albania’.
25 Survey conducted in 2013 (Maliqi 2014, 37) indicates that even in the case of visa liberal-
ization, Greece would not be a major migration destination for Kosovars. 
26 In the above-mentioned survey (Maliqi 2014, 38) when asked about whether they would 
accept a Greek as a member of the family, only about 1 percent of respondents have 
shown openness to doing so. Other pieces of research, too, point to the direction that, 
generally, inter-marriages in Kosovo are not popular (Kovaçi Sopa 2015; Rajkoviç-Iveta 
and Geci 2017). Kosovars’ commitment to maintaing their ethnic, religous and cultural 
homogeneity is even more evident in the case of the Kosovar diaspora. Dafina Paca, 
investigating the discursive identity of Kosovo Albanians in the UK, explains how mar-
rying a foreigner, especially one of different religion, is a taboo, especially for Kosovar 
Albanian women, who due to religious and cultural constraints, would be reprimanded 
for finding a non-Albanian spouse (Paca 2016, 98). This, however, could be more easily 
acceptable for a Kosovar man, especially if it was justified to the family and social entou-
rage as an act of obtaining an EU citizenship and having access to better living standards 
(Musliu 2010; Rajkoviç-Iveta and Geci 2017).   
27 To get a glimpse of the other side of the story, Tzanelli refers to the same notion, ‘blood 
bonds’, to describe the importance that Greeks place upon maintaining and promoting 
pure ‘Greekness’, especially when feeling ‘threatened’ by the effects of immigration or 
globalization (2006, 40, 46). 
28 See also: Drosopulos, M. 2018. ‘Rethinking Regional Youth Work within the Context of 
the Berlin Process. Follow up thoughts and projects from Kosovo and Greece’. Second 
Europe-Western Balkans Youth Meeting. SALTO South East Europe. https://www.salto-
youth.net/downloads/4-17-3854/Article%20Mary%20D%20proofread.pdf 
29 See RAN (Radicalization Awareness Network) report on the prevention of radicalization 
through education and youth work: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaf-
fairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-yf-
and-c/docs/role_of_non-formal_education_in_pcve_112018_en.pdf 
 Interesting links, good practices and lessons learnt from grassroots youth work in the EU 
and the Balkans can be found also in the Youthwork Against Radicalization blog: http://
youthcommunityresilience.eu/ 
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30 SALTO SEE 2018b. See the European Commission communication Engaging, Connecting 
and Empowering young people: a new EU Youth Strategy (COM/2018/269 final). https://
ec.europa.eu/youth/news/eu-youth-strategy-adopted_en 
 See also: Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of 
the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the role of the youth sector in an 
integrated and cross-sectoral approach to preventing and combating violent radicaliza-
tion of young people (OJ C 213, 14.6.2016). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016XG0614%2804%29 
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In an effort to build national consensus in Serbian divided society for a solution 
on Kosovo, President Aleksandar Vucic initiated public discussions, known as 
the ‘internal dialogue’, in July 2017. The chapter explores the nature of the 
internal dialogue, its inclusivity and presented proposals for Kosovo. The anal-
ysis reveals that the internal dialogue was an ad hoc process organised be-
tween October 2017 and May 2018 outside of the institutional framework in a 
form of a series of roundtables with a limited space for discussion. Also, even 
though it did include a wide range of participants, it cannot be characterised as 
inclusive since participants were intentionally targeted to take part in a con-
trolled discussion. The framework of the EU integration was largely ignored 
or dismissed, and the two dominant proposals were ones that go against the 
Brussels agreement calling either for a suspension of talks or changes in bor-
ders. Instead of contributing to the process of normalisation of relations with 
Pristina, the internal dialogue in Serbia rather hindered the process neglect-
ing what has been achieved so far.
I
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INTRODUCTION
Thirty years after Milosevic’s infamous Gazimestan speech, twenty years after 
the end of the war, more than ten years after Kosovo’s declaration of indepen-
dence, and eight years after the launch of the EU-facilitated dialogue, Serbia 
and Kosovo are still a long way from ‘normalising’ relations. At the same time, 
they have never been as dependent on each other as now, particularly in their 
EU integration processes. Kosovo has been recognised by some 113 countries 
and achieved membership in several international organisations (e.g. World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund), but without Serbia’s (indirect) con-
sent it cannot become a UN member, let alone be recognised by all EU member 
states. In parallel, in order to become a full EU member, Serbia’s key condition 
is to normalise relations with Kosovo, if not recognise it. 
Consequently, in an effort to build national consensus in a divided society for 
a solution on Kosovo, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic in July 2017 initiat-
ed public discussions, known as the ‘internal dialogue’ (ID). He argued that, 
“In order for our progress to be steady and sustainable, we must, if nothing 
else, at least try to resolve the Kosovo (Gordian) knot, and not hide ourselves 
and leave the burden on our children” (Vucic 2017). The announcement pro-
voked mixed reactions: while some praised it as an attempt to find ‘creative 
solutions’, others called it a ‘farce’,  when considering constant attacks on op-
position, lack of media freedom and controlling of institutions. The internal 
dialogue was coordinated by the Serbian Government’s Working Group, which 
organised a number of roundtables from October 2017 through June 2018. Yet, 
nine months later and after about thirty events, it concluded without reach-
ing its stated goal: finding a solution on Kosovo. Since June 2018, no activity 
within the ID has taken place and the announced final dialogue report has not 
been published yet.
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In the meantime, the EU-facilitated negotiations between Belgrade and Pris-
tina continued, gaining a new dynamic during 2018, though without tangible 
results.  On one hand, the call for reaching a legally binding agreement, under-
lined in the new EU Enlargement Strategy, initially intensified domestic and 
international efforts to find a compromise. However, a controversial border 
correction proposal supported by Vucic and Thaci became a key point of the 
semi-secret negotiations. This option would most likely incorporate the four 
Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo’s north—with a population of about 
50,000 and comprising about 10 percent of Kosovo’s territory— and with the 
possibility of parts of Serbia’s Albanian-majority municipalities of Bujanovac 
and Presevo given to Kosovo. The controversy about this proposal, coupled 
with other political developments, stalled the dialogue. As a result, Serbia and 
Kosovo in 2019 remain locked in a seemingly unsolvable dispute regarding 
Kosovo’s statehood and its international status. It remains unclear what the 
legacy of the internal dialogue is and whether it had any impact on Serbia’s 
negotiating position or on reaching a consensus within the Serbian society.
Specifically, this paper explores this insufficiently studied process by address-
ing the following questions: 1) What is the understanding of the internal dia-
logue by those who took part in it?, 2) How inclusive was the dialogue?, and 3) 
What were the proposals presented in the dialogue? First, the paper defines 
the structure of the ID, having in mind that it was placed outside institutional 
framework and apart from Vucic’s op-ed no specific document defining the 
principles and structure of the process was published. Second, it investigates 
the ID’s inclusiveness in the context of Serbia’s shrinking space for democratic 
deliberations, and offers an analysis of the Kosovo Serb participation. And, 
third, it explores the proposals offered during the ID and draws conclusions 
about the ID’s contribution to the normalisation process with Pristina. 
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METHODOLOGY
The research methodology includes a combination of various qualitative 
approaches. First, the paper reviews and assesses the large literature on the 
EU-facilitated dialogue, including NGO reports and academic articles and 
books. Then, it examines Serbia’s politics of the last six years —i.e. since the 
rise of Aleksandar Vucic— by reviewing numerous international and local NGO 
reports and assessments focusing on different aspects of governance and hu-
man rights issues. The methodology also includes an analytical background of 
the ID in the context of other political and social processes in the country. Be-
cause of scarce available reports, the analysis of the ID primarily relies on the 
monitoring reports of the Forum for Ethnic Relations and in-depth interviews 
conducted during July-September 2018 in Belgrade with CSO representatives 
from Serbia and Kosovo who took part in the dialogue. Members of the Work-
ing Group did not respond to the repeated request to conduct an interview. 
Given the sensitivity of the issues, conducted interviews are anonymised. 
The interviews were based on semi-structured questionnaire that followed 
the structure of the research questions (Annex). This combined approach to 
data collection ensured intersecting and comparing information and data from 
different source types (interviews and secondary sources), which ensured a 
better reliability of the research findings.
However, the research has several methodological limitations. First, due to the 
ID’s lack of transparency and absence of transcripts (they were posted and then 
removed from the Working Group website), the paper’s findings rely mostly on 
FER’s monitoring reports, thus limiting the scope of the research. Second, the 
Working Group members refused to be interviewed during the field research, 
resulting in a smaller number of conducted interviews than initially planned 
and in not having the government’s perspective on the ID. These limitations are 
partly compensated by using media sources that reported on the ID.
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The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The paper’s next section 
offers a brief overview of the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and 
Pristina, underlining its current impasse. The subsequent section provides a 
background of the political situation in Serbia in the context of the ID, em-
phasising the position and role of the Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic as 
the ID’s initiator. Then, the next three sections present the research results, 
following the order of the research questions. The findings suggest that the 
ID had more of a performative utterance, lacking substantive discussion on 
Kosovo that would take into account the reality of the situation and almost 
completely neglecting the EU negotiations framework. 
COMPREHENSIVE NORMALISATION FOR 
CREDIBLE ENLARGEMENT
This section gives a summary of the EU-facilitated negotiations between Bel-
grade and Pristina, explaining its current status and providing a framework 
for the following sections on the ID. The negotiations began in 2011 and can 
be divided into two phases: a) technical negotiations conducted from 2011 to 
2103, and b) political negotiations conducted from 2013 onwards. They were 
supposed to resolve disputes between Serbia and Kosovo using the framework 
of the EU integration as a mechanism of conditionality, having in mind that 
“mediation came ahead of the beginning of accession talks, with Serbia being 
offered the beginning of negotiations as the main reward, while Kosovo was 
offered a Stabilisation and Association Agreement” (Bieber 2015, 294).
During the first phase—the technical dialogue—a number of agreements were 
signed, regulating the so-called technical issues, such as ID cards, freedom 
of movement, and cadastre records. In 2013, after a dramatic shift in political 
leadership in Serbia and the rise of Aleksandar Vucic (Subotic 2017, 173), the 
dialogue entered into the second phase—the political dialogue—aiming to re-
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solve the most challenging issue: the sovereignty over Kosovo’s Serb dominat-
ed north and integration of the northern Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo’s system. 
(Beysoylu 2018, 208). The milestone agreement, ‘First Agreement of Principles 
Governing the Normalisation of Relations,’ also known as the “Brussels agree-
ment” was reached in July 2013. As Economides and Ker-Lindsay indicate, it 
was also a significant moment signalling that the dialogue and ensuing agree-
ment was an implicit acceptance of the existence of an autonomous Kosovo for 
Serbia, the legitimisation of its government and the acceptance that Kosovo 
would pursue its own EU accession path (2015, 1035). However, quick to sign 
the agreements, both sides proved to be reluctant in implementing them. 
Namely, the initial enthusiasm over the ‘historical’ Brussels agreement praised 
as a breakthrough in Serbia-Kosovo relations (Beha 2015, 109) was quickly re-
placed with a growing scepticism regarding the (lack of) implementation of 
what was agreed (Clark 2014, 541). Partly, it is due to the broad and ambiguous 
formulations of the agreements that left space for different interpretation and 
therefore created a need to renegotiate what was once agreed. As Burazer and 
Bojovic indicate, the principle of “constructive ambiguity” enabled reaching 
the agreements but prevented its successful implementation (2018, 9). The As-
sociation of Serb-majority Municipalities is a good example, with Serbian me-
diators seeing it as part of the formal governance structure of Kosovo, whereas 
Kosovan officials considering it as just an NGO (Bieber 2015, 306). Neverthe-
less, it is also due to the lack of political will, since “both sides are not fully 
committed to the process and are rather using it to gain political points” (BIRN 
2014, 8). These divisions are further reflected in conflicting interpretations of 
the process of normalisation by the two sides. Consequently, for Serbia ‘nor-
malisation’ is “everything but recognition,” in other words Belgrade is will-
ing to “recognise reality, but not independence” whereas for Kosovo, “inde-
pendence is everything,” normalisation without recognition is inconceivable 
(Gashi and Novakovic 2017, 4). Hence, even though Serbia engaged with the 
EU on Kosovo, the latter remained a central part of the Serbian national iden-
tity, which consequently poses a question what the boundaries of its policy on 
Kosovo are. In other words, Serbia has (formally) implemented the minimum 
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of what was agreed to ensure the continuation of the EU accession process, but 
its official stance on Kosovo has not been revisited, and neither has the public 
discourse around this issue. 
In 2018, the breaking point was a document called ‘A Credible Enlargement 
Perspective for and Enhanced EU Engagement with the Western Balkans’ 
(hereinafter EU Enlargement Strategy), which openly set the success of the di-
alogue as a prerequisite for bringing Kosovo and Serbia closer to the EU. More 
specifically, the strategy defined 2025 as a date for possible Serbia’s mem-
bership, giving a new dynamic to the Brussels dialogue, and pointed out to 
the need to find a compromise within a given timeframe. In the meantime, 
the idea of border correction (an euphemism for border changes) that would 
entail land swap or partition began to gain prominence, although no specific 
proposal has been made by any side, with negotiations currently being in un-
charted territory. In parallel, with Serbia lobbying against Kosovo’s Interpol 
membership and Kosovo imposing customs tariffs as a measure of retaliation, 
the normalisation process has touched a new low point. At present, reaching a 
legally binding agreement in 2019 seems a hardly realistic goal. Thus, having 
described the current state of the Brussels negotiations between Belgrade and 
Pristina, it is now necessary to explain the political and social situation in Ser-
bia characterised by the dominance of the President Aleksandar Vucic, setting 
the stage for understanding the internal dialogue. 
PRO-EUROPEAN AUTOCRAT 
Presently, Serbia finds itself in an almost impossible situation where, even 
though (still) does not want to recognise Kosovo, it has to find a magic formula 
for reconciling the need to solve this issue to continue with the EU integration 
process and still maintain the belief that Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia. 
This complication coupled with a political situation in the country with a com-
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plete dominance of one party, puts pressure on President Vucic, a strongman 
who has been leading the negotiations process with Pristina since 2014, to find 
a solution that will satisfy international partners and keep him in power.
President Vucic assumed the presidential position in May 2017, after serving 
three years as prime minister in two mandates (2014-2017). He has been the 
leader of the Serbian Progressive Party (SPP) since the party came to power in 
2012, replacing the party’s founder Tomislav Nikolic who resigned after being 
elected president. A former ultra-nationalist and highly positioned member 
of the Serbian Radical Party (SRP), Vucic switched sides in 2008 and joined Ni-
kolic in the newly formed Serbian Progressive Party that, unlike SRP, support-
ed Serbia’s bid for EU membership. Vucic gradually became one of the most 
prominent pro-EU politicians in Serbia, a transformation warmly welcomed 
by leaders of international community. During his leadership, Serbia started 
accession negotiations with the EU and, along with Montenegro, became a Bal-
kan front-runner in the European integration process.
However, his critics and opponents point to the unprecedented control and 
soft censorship of media (Kisic 2015, cited in Subotic 2017, 174) that Vucic ex-
ercises along with a politicisation of all segments of society and widespread 
corruption. Since 2016, the Freedom House repeatedly indicates a “growing 
hostility toward independent and critical media” (Freedom House 2017) from 
the government, with many media outlets being under influence of the ruling 
political party. Similarly, the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom 
Index also signifies the deterioration of the media freedom (2018). 
The work of a few investigative journalism agencies has revealed the extent of 
corruption, nepotism and illegal acts of the current ruling coalition members, 
which made them a target of intimidation campaigns (Civil Rights Defenders 
2016). In 2017, his control over the country was further consolidated after he 
won a first-round victory in presidential election. It also indicated a further 
erosion of Serbia’s nascent democratic institutions since the presidential po-
sition is envisaged as mostly symbolic, but with Vucic the presidency is where 
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the power lies. Also, his refusal to resign as the leader of his party while hold-
ing the presidency is specifically indicated in the House of Lords Committee 
report as an example of Western Balkans leaders who “has done much to un-
dermine healthy democratic politics, good governance, and freedom of the 
media” (2018, 31). 
As a result of this ‘strongman leadership’, the Serbian society remains deeply 
divided with very few channels to freely express opinions and criticise the gov-
ernment and its policies. The opposition is divided and almost non-existent 
and along with CSOs, they are subjects of dirty media campaigns, when dare 
to oppose and be critical of government’s policies. Thus, their role have also 
worsened in this polarising environment (Nations in Transit 2018). Therefore, 
it is not surprising that the initiative for the internal dialogue was received 
with scepticism and doubts about the sincerity of President’s intentions, as the 
next sections further elaborate. 
THE INTERNAL DIALOGUE: A DIALOGUE OR 
PUBLIC HEARING
“Above all, the initiative was good, it is something that has been missing for de-
cades.”1 
During the sworn-in ceremony in the Parliament on 31 May 2017, Aleksandar 
Vucic stated: “I want to open an internal dialogue on the issue of Kosovo and 
Metohija, with all our differences, without prejudices, while respecting the 
Constitution of our country. We must be open, free from the mythical ap-
proach, but also from the easily giving up on what we have every right. Our 
internal dialogue on this issue may be more important than the one that we 
should lead with the Albanians” (Vucic 2017). Then, shortly after, on 24 July 
2017, in an op-ed in the Serbian daily Blic, Vucic revealed his intention to lunch 
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the internal dialogue on Kosovo and consult with a wider public about the po-
tential end solution underlining a need to find a peaceful compromise, to deal 
with the past and to move away from the Serb nationalistic approach towards 
Kosovo whilst accepting the reality on the ground (Vucic 2017). This article is 
the only document that outlines some principles of the internal dialogue and 
sets the broad goals that the President wanted to achieve.
In October 2017, the Working Group was formed and the first roundtable was 
organised later that month. There have been around thirty roundtables with 
representatives of various associations and academics. Yet, today it is chal-
lenging to provide an exact definition of the ID or to specifically say what it 
entailed, since there was no official document that provides a methodology 
of the initiative, its specific aims and how its results will be used in the future 
negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina.
As a result, the ID lacked a clear goal and structure, which is evident from 
contradictory statements of participants. For some, the ID was “an attempt to 
launch a discussion on Kosovo that would facilitate achieving an agreement in 
Brussels on a comprehensive normalization of relations“2, while some indicat-
ed that it was “looking for an alibi for something already agreed“.3 In parallel, 
there is no consensus about its structure. Some participants say it was a series 
of roundtables, while for others the ID was not only the roundtables, but “also 
everything that put the topic of Kosovo in the public domain, which led to a 
slightly different narrative about the issue“.4 The latter understanding is also 
expressed by Milidrag (2018), who provided one of the scarce analysis of the 
ID, recognising two segments: institutionalised (organised or co-organised by 
the Working Group) and non-institutionalised (discussions, analyses, contri-
butions made by CSOs, political parties, experts). 
Furthermore, more than one interviewee indicated that it was unclear wheth-
er events organised by CSOs and attended by some representatives of the 
Working Group were also considered to be part of the ID. According to the last 
report of the Forum for Ethnic Relations, there is a disagreement about the ba-
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sic question “How many roundtables took place?” even among state officials. 
Though the website indicates that there were seventeen roundtables, state 
officials claimed there were twenty-six. The Forum monitored twenty-nine 
roundtables (FER 2018, 12). Milidrag (2018) underlines the same puzzlement 
in his paper. Nevertheless, at the very end of the process it was clarified by the 
Working Group that only roundtables organised by them are understood to 
be part of the ID yet, judging from the conducted interviews, this clarification 
went unnoticed.
Similarly, the key word in this process is a ‘dialogue’. For many it was a mono-
logue or, alternatively, an organised public hearing. No roundtable allowed a 
debate among its participants and no specific answer was heard to any of the 
raised questions. To quote one of the interviewees, “Civil society did not have 
interlocutors, because the government came from the position of power, and 
this was reflected in the fact that the participants’ presentations were heard 
but they could not ask questions to the president or other representatives of 
the state and get answers”.5 Moreover, during the whole time of the internal 
dialogue, there was no attempt or visible intention from the organisers to place 
discussion in the institutional framework. Until the very end, it remained an 
ad hoc process organised around roundtables, supported or initiated by the 
Working group that has never published a report on the ID thus marking its 
end.
Hence, the ID started as an informal attempt to consult with a wider public 
about the potential end solution on Kosovo and it soon turned into a series of 
roundtables with limited space for discussion. While its meaning is largely a 
subject of different interpretation, as the findings reveal, the ID was rather a 
public hearing than a dialogue. Moreover, though it started as a personal call 
from President Vucic, there were no attempts to place it in the institutional 
framework. Without a clear goal and purpose, instead of being an organised 
platform that could have indeed provided much needed democratic debate on 
Kosovo, the ID simply died out without a conclusive result.
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INCLUSIVITY OF THE INTERNAL DIALOGUE
“The internal dialogue took place in an atmosphere where everyone who thought differ-
ently from the current government had been being proclaimed as a traitor and enemy.”6
The internal dialogue was organised as an open call for all interested stakehold-
ers to take part in the discussion on Kosovo. As a result, whoever wanted could 
notify the Working Group stating their intention to participate in the ID, as con-
firmed by several interviewees. Thus, for instance, the students’ representa-
tive body (SKONUS) decided to take part informing the Working Group which 
organised the roundtable.7 Combining the information from the website of the 
Working Group and monitoring FER reports, nineteen roundtables are listed in 
a table below (Table 1). However, even though the list is incomplete, because 
the Working group claims that twenty-six roundtables were organised, it helps 
to get a picture about the profile of participants. Yet, the number of sessions 
and different profiles of their participants do not necessarily imply diversity of 
opinions or democratic and open atmosphere for a discussion.
Topic/institutions or associations  
that took part Location Date
1. Legal experts and law professors Belgrade 31 October 2017
2. Representatives of social science 
institutes and scientists Belgrade 13 November 2017
3. Matica Srpska in Novi Sad Novi Sad 17 November 2017
4. Institute of International Politics 
and Economics Belgrade 28 November 2017
5. Chamber of Commerce and Indus-
try of Serbia Belgrade 12 December 2017
6. Sport associations Belgrade 14 December 2017
7. Economic faculties, institutes and 
experts Belgrade 18 December 2017
251
KATARINA TADIĆ
8. Health institutions Belgrade 1 February 2018
9. Representatives of security and 
military experts Belgrade 7 February 2018
10. Standing Conference of Towns and 
Municipalities Nis 12 February 2018
11. Faculty for Diplomacy and Security Belgrade 19 February
12. Representatives of the Working 
Group and representatives of Koso-
vo Serbs 
Laplje selo, Koso-
vo 7 March 2018
13. Representatives of students and 
professors of the Pristina University 
with a temporary seat in Mitrovica 
Mitrovica 8 March 2018
14. Students’ organisations Belgrade 9 March 2018
15. CSOs representatives  Mitrovica 14 March 2018
16. Cultural heritage Belgrade 27 March 2018
17. National Convention for the EU Belgrade 21 March 2018
18. Serbian National Forum Belgrade 11 May 2018
19. Association of Families Kidnapped 
and Killed in KiM Belgrade 4 June 2018
Table 1:  List of round tables, compiled based on data from the Working Group website and the FER 
monitoring reports 
In other words, the ID, as an open call directed towards society as a whole, was 
inclusive in a technical sense, but it managed only to attract a narrow group of 
professionals from different fields, failing to animate citizens and wider pub-
lic.8 At the same time, the general atmosphere in the society was characterised 
by intolerance towards critical voices, which certainly did not make the process 
being more participatory.9 Government-controlled media continued with label-
ling individuals who were critical of the government policy towards Kosovo as 
“traitors” or “enemies,” thus creating doubts about the sincerity of intentions 
to include all.10 This, coupled with the fact that discussion was placed outside 
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of the Parliament, led opposition parties to refuse to take part in the ID.  Also, as 
Milidrag indicates, the used language does not reflect tolerance: the pejorative 
term “šiptari” was widely used by participants, without any reaction from the 
representatives of the Working Group (Milidrag 2018, 3-4).  
The position of the Serbian Academy for Science and Art (SANU) and Serbian 
Orthodox Church is also interesting to note. Formally, the Academy decided in 
November 2017 to accept the invitation to participate in the ID, sending a letter 
to the Working Group and the Cabinet of the President of Serbia in which it list-
ed several theories that can contribute to the dialogue, such as respect for dif-
ferent opinions and attitudes, avoidance of divisions and labelling; putting the 
problem of Kosovo “in a wider context” (FER 2018, 22). However, ultimately, 
SANU only issued a publication “Participation of the Serbian Academy of Sci-
ences and Arts in the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo and Metohija” in May 2018, 
thus at the very end of the process, which can be understood as their percep-
tion that the ID did not meet abovementioned principles. Another historically 
significant actor in resolving Kosovo issue, the Serbian Orthodox Church did 
not take part in the ID, yet it used the context of the ID to express its stance on 
Kosovo through several statements, repeating a well-known position of the 
Church that Kosovo is Serbia. 
At the very end, in March 2018, the ID arrived to Kosovo where three roundta-
bles with Kosovo Serbs were organised. The first roundtable was organised by 
the Citizens’ Association for the Political Operation of Kosovo Serbs, the ‘Serb 
National Forum’, on the 7 March 2018 in Laplje Selo. There are several char-
acteristics of this event that distinguishes it from other roundtables organ-
ised in Kosovo and Serbia. First, even though the organisers contradicted the 
claim that the event is part of the institutionalised dialogue, calling it instead 
“An assembly on Kosovo” (Serbian: Skup o Kosovu), the representatives of the 
Working Group were present, and the FER monitoring report included it in its 
analyses. Second, it is deemed to be the least controlled roundtable where or-
dinary citizens expressed their criticism not only about the ID, but more gen-
erally about the Serbian politics towards Kosovo. And third, it is indicative that 
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the most prominent opposition leaders from Kosovo were not invited (Rada 
Trajkovic) or refused to take part in this roundtable (Marko Jaksic) (KoSSev 
2018) deciding not to be part of the ID.
The second roundtable “Perspectives of high education in Kosovo and Me-
tohija” was organised in Mitrovica with students and representatives of the 
university in Mitrovica. However, this roundtable does not stand out from oth-
er roundtables organised in Belgrade in terms of having a controlled debate 
and narrative (FER 2018, 14). The similar situation is with the third roundtable 
with representatives of civil society organisations in Mitrovica. This roundta-
ble was criticised as insufficiently inclusive, because not all CSOs from Kosovo, 
particularly those critical towards the ID, were invited.11 
Overall, the internal dialogue did include a wide range of participants, but 
it cannot be characterised as inclusive. Most of the participants were inten-
tionally targeted to take part in a controlled discussion with no efforts were 
made to include opposition parties or to move the debate into the Parliament. 
Moreover, the general political situation negatively affected the ID, making 
the entire atmosphere around the dialogue hostile towards critical voices and 
opposing opinions. Furthermore, given that only two roundtables were organ-
ised in Kosovo by the Working Group, the participation of Kosovo Serbs was 
even less inclusive than in Serbia. 
PROPOSALS FOR KOSOVO
“The value of the ID is that it will show to the future generations what were the 
limitations of the Serbian society.”12 
This final section explores different narratives of the internal dialogue or, more 
specifically, proposals for solutions that could have been heard on roundtables 
organised within the ID. The Council for Inclusive Governance (CIG) (2018) 
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identifies eleven options of which three received the most support in the ID, as 
explained in CIG reports, and also identified by interviewees. In other words, 
three types of proposals were presented during the ID: 1) status quo, that is, 
not resolving the status of Kosovo at the moment; 2) partition of Kosovo or 
land swap, the most controversial proposal that has received a lot of interna-
tional attention recently; and 3) continuation of negotiations until the nor-
malisation of relations is achieved. Each of these proposals will be addressed 
separately in this section.
Yet, discussing the ID as a whole, all the interviewed participants agree about 
the perception of the ID in the context of the Brussels negotiations. The ID al-
most completely ignored the Brussels dialogue and what has been achieved so 
far, except from the roundtable with the National Convention for the EU. The 
impression was that the “Brussels dialogue does not exist” 13 even though the 
negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina were resumed during the ID.Fur-
ther, agreements reached so far were completely ignored, only the Association 
of Serb Municipalities was a part of the debates “as a condition for signing a le-
gally binding agreement”.14 Nevertheless, the ID has not tried to offer answers 
to challenges of implementation of some of the agreements. 
Status quo or a frozen conflict 
The status quo was one of two most dominant options that was discussed 
during the ID. It was essentially a proposal not to resolve the status of Kosovo 
at this moment. One line of debate was “not to rush”15 but to keep a frozen 
conflict, while others advocated for waiting for a change of geopolitical cir-
cumstances.16 Perhaps the strongest advocate of the status quo solution is the 
Serbian Orthodox Church, but also the late Oliver Ivanovic. One of the inter-
viewees who is against quick solutions further elaborated: “The ID has not de-
fined what does it mean normalisation of relations, which essentially should 
help Kosovo Serbs to get their property back and improve their life quality. 
The position of Kosovo Serbs is weak, and the question is what will happen 
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to them if and when the international community leaves. We should not aim 
to offer quick solution”.17 Hence, the status quo is recognised as a need to get 
more time to ensure a proper protection of Kosovo Serbs and their interests 
in Kosovo. It entails “not recognising independence and not signing a legally 
binding agreement”.18
Some proponents of the status quo believe that a change in power relations 
between the US and Russia could lead to a stronger role of the latter in solving 
the Kosovo issue. That would give Serbia more leverage in future negotiations. 
At the same time, those who support this option believe that the EU is pres-
suring Serbia to accept independence of Kosovo, thus Serbia should withdraw 
from the Brussels dialogue and abandon the EU accession process. The change 
in geopolitics was very much present among academic representatives, but 
it was characterised as a “shallow approach”19 and as a “complete misunder-
standing of everything that happened in the last ten years and a lack of knowl-
edge on the Brussels dialogue and process of the EU integrations”.20 Also, the 
status quo is contradictory to the key motive to lunch the ID, in other words, 
opposite to the expressed conviction that a status quo is not sustainable and 
that a solution must be found now, so as not to postpone it for the next gener-
ations (Vucic 2017). Moreover, as one of the interlocutors emphasised, “What 
does status quo mean? Today’s status quo effectively has led to integration 
of Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo political and economic system”.21 It is unclear 
whether a status quo is a carefully deliberated proposal or indicates that Serbia 
does not have a solution for Kosovo.
Border correction 
Partition (and land swap) is the most controversial idea that came out from 
the ID. It is interesting to follow development of this proposal, from being 
completely dismissed to slowly becoming the most dominant proposal that 
has started to gain international attention and support. The supporters and 
promoters of this idea were high government officials, most notably minister 
of foreign affairs Ivica Dacic and minister of defence Aleksandar Vulin. The 
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promotion of this idea can be traced through media reports and news from the 
Working Group website, and it became dominant in February/March 2018 and 
onwards, when the ID intensified and moved to Kosovo as well.
At the beginning of the ID, Ivica Dacic in an op-ed published just a few days 
after Vucic’s initial article that lunched the ID, advocated partition. He open-
ly suggested that only partition with an association of municipalities for the 
south Kosovo is a possible solution (Dacic 2017). Then, when the ID started, 
he continued to stand behind this idea, and as we read in the first FER moni-
toring report, it provoked negative reactions in public—national, regional and 
international—who all described it as impossible. Yet, the minister of defence 
was the next one to support this solution in February during the roundtable on 
security and defence, rejecting the status quo, which led to a conclusion that 
the Serbian government wants to test the reaction of public on this idea (FER 
2018,  38). 
Most of the Serbian political opposition representatives, even though not part 
of the ID, reacted to the idea and stated that they are against partition, mostly 
for two reasons. One, more nationally oriented group, is against because it 
leaves cultural heritage and majority of Kosovo Serbs out of Serbia and in a 
country that will be de facto recognised as the Republic of Kosovo. The oth-
er, more pro-European group, is against this solution because they believe it 
will further destabilise the entire region and there is a fear of domino effect 
(Bosnia-Herzegovina, North Macedonia). Civil society organisations from 
both Serbia and Kosovo that took part in the National Convention for the EU 
roundtable also rejected the proposal, considering it as “the most dangerous 
solution.” It was also emphasised that it is not a new idea, but “an old solution, 
that was present during the 1980s and after 2000s,” thus it is a continuation of 
Milosevic’s ethnic-based politics.22 
However, once rejected as obscure and impossible, the partition idea slowly 
became President Vucic’s policy. However, it is still unclear what the partition 
proposal entails. No specific proposal has been presented to the public. Yet, 
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without an analytical report by the Working Group summarizing the proposals 
of the dialogue and views of the Working Group representatives, it is not clear 
whether this idea came out as a result from the ID and its participants or it is 
President’s preferred option.
Normalisation of relations 
The insistence of the normalisation of relations was the least present option 
in the ID, which is a paradox having in mind that the ID was lunched to help 
reaching a legally binding agreement with Pristina. The most vocal proponents 
of this option were twenty-nine organisations gathered in the Working Group 
of the National Convent on the EU for Chapter 35, that participated in the 
roundtable organised on March 31, thus being one of the last events organised 
within the framework of the ID. They defined guiding principles for resolving 
the Kosovo issue based on peace and security of citizens in the region, Ser-
bia’s European integrations, finding sustainable solution, continuation of the 
normalisation process and continuation of the internal dialogue (NCEU 2018).
Normalisation of relations was emphasised as a need to continue the Brussels 
dialogue and to find a peaceful solution acceptable for both sides that will first 
and foremost allow Serbia to become an EU member. Almost all the partici-
pants underlined the importance of improving the security situation, partic-
ularly in Kosovo’s north, and ensuring the functioning of the institutions and 
the rule of law. Thus, some of the proposals are “creating functional autonomy 
for Serbs in Kosovo, fostering economic cooperation, building Kosovo society 
and state based on the rule of law, guaranteeing the freedom of movement, 
human and general security, achieving direct police and judicial cooperation, 
democratization of the political and intellectual elite in Kosovo, etc”.23 Also, 
the danger of the status quo and partition was emphasised multiple times, 
underlining the need to reach a compromise and peaceful solution that will 
satisfy both sides.
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Yet, for some this roundtable was also an attempt to “try to give the entire ID 
a different dimension than it has until then, having in mind many issues that 
have been ignored and participants who did not show support to the Brussels 
dialogue.”24 Further, as Milidrag notes (2019), during the ID it was not suffi-
ciently explained to citizens that Serbia is bound by the negotiating framework 
for Chapter 35 of the accession negotiations and that in order to join the EU, 
it has to reach an agreement on normalisation. Even though this roundtable 
was the most critical towards the government, and participants tackled issues 
concerning the implementation of the Brussels agreements and the position of 
Kosovo Serbs, it did not offer a consensus on proposals to reach normalisation. 
The findings indicate that even though the internal dialogue was initiated to 
try to reach a lasting and sustainable compromise on Kosovo, it further re-
vealed divisions that exist in the Serbian society. The framework of the EU 
integration was largely either ignored or dismissed, while the ID was not seen 
as an integral, but rather parallel process to the Brussels negotiations. As a re-
sult, two most dominant proposals were the ones that go against the Brussels 
agreement calling either for a suspension of talks or changes in borders. Sim-
ilarly, the idea of normalisations of relations was least present option and left 
to hang in the air with no tangible meaning or substance. If the goal of the ID 
was to accept the reality on the ground, after examining proposed solutions, it 
can be declared as a failure. 
CONLUSION
The internal dialogue initiative came after six years of negotiations with Pristi-
na under the EU auspices. The negotiations, nevertheless, have not solved the 
disputed status of Kosovo nor have changed Serbia’s official policy of non-rec-
ognition. Resolving the dispute is a key requirement for the EU integration 
process. Serbia’s EU accession talks are particularly conditioned by making 
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progress in negotiations with Pristina and signing a legally binding agreement 
on the normalisation of relations, as explicitly stated in the latest EU Enlarge-
ment Strategy. Hence, the internal dialogue was described as an attempt to 
find a lasting and sustainable solution for Kosovo.
However, regardless of whether it was a farce or sincere intention to try to find 
a creative solution, it only further exposed divisions in the Serbian society 
and a lack of willingness to settle the dispute with Kosovo. The general politi-
cal and social context characterised by the lack of media freedom, supressing 
of opposition and decline of institutions, with an increased hostility towards 
critical voices, cannot be an environment that stimulates discussion and par-
ticipation of citizens. As a result, the internal dialogue, as an ad hoc process 
led outside the institutional framework and in forms of roundtables, instead of 
promoting a broad and inclusive dialogue on Kosovo, turned out to be a state 
organised public hearing. A lack of clarity about its structure led to a lack of 
common understanding among participants about the basic question on what 
was the internal dialogue. Hence, as a significant initiative that dealt with one 
of the most complex and thorny question for the Serbian society, the ID ended 
inconclusively failing to bring more transparency into the process. 
Next, even though the internal dialogue was a call to different societal groups 
to engage in a discussion on Kosovo, in reality its organisers targeted a small, 
limited group of public officials and professionals, so the process was predom-
inantly controlled. The government, that is, the Working Group, also did not 
make an effort to include wider range of actors (traditionally) interested in 
Kosovo, such as the Serbin Orthodox Church and SANU. A lack of participation 
of the opposition parties and resistance to move discussion to the Parliament 
shows a lack of sincere intention to reach out to government opponents.  Thus, 
the internal dialogue had a performative character with a fundamental lack of 
inclusivity and insufficient participation of different constituencies of the Ser-
bian society. At the same time, as a process that primarily tackles the position 
of Serbs in Kosovo, their participation was inadequate with only two roundta-
bles organised by the Working Group in Kosovo. 
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Also, if we look at the proposals that were dominant during the ID, they show 
several limitations of the Serbian society. First, the intellectual and academic 
elite is not informed about Kosovo, the Brussels dialogue and the EU integra-
tion process of Serbia. These aspects were completely neglected by most par-
ticipants of the internal dialogue, as well as developments in Kosovo in the 
last ten years, resulting in proposals that were far from reality. Second, the EU 
integration process was not treated as a primary issue and strategic framework 
for resolving the issue of Kosovo. Only one roundtable emphasised the need to 
secure membership in the EU, while a large majority of participants simply dis-
regarded the accession process, hoping for a change in geopolitics. This indi-
cates deeply anti-European sentiments embedded in the Serbian society. And 
finally, if we look at the proposals that were dominant – status quo and border 
correction – it can be concluded that normalisation of relations was essentially 
rejected. In conclusion, the internal dialogue did not serve to explore different 
alternatives for normalisation; it rather demonstrated that normalisation of 
relations between present-day Serbia and Kosovo is not an option. 
In summary, if we assess the internal dialogue in terms of whether it contribut-
ed to the process of normalisation of relations with Pristina, it can be said that 
it rather hindered the process. Instead of reaching a compromise or offering 
some proposals on how the future relations between Serbia and Kosovo might 
look like, the ID for the most part neglected what has been achieved so far. It 
served as a platform for anti-European voices who called for border chang-
es and end of EU integration. A few who advocated for a continuation of the 
Brussels dialogue proved to be unable to provide a definition of what the nor-
malisation of relations might entail. Yet, without a compromise and consensus 
within the Serbian society on Kosovo, it is difficult to reach any sustainable 
and peaceful solution. And the internal dialogue showed the unreadiness of 
Serbia to deal with the reality in Kosovo and indicated its willingness not to 
normalise relations, but instead to propose and advocate dangerous solutions. 
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LIST OF INTERVIEWS
Interviewee (IW) 1, representative of CSO from Serbia and Kosovo, Participant 
in the Internal Dialogue, 19 July 2018
Interviewee (IW) 2, representative of CSO from Serbia, Participant in the Inter-
nal Dialogue, 25 July 2018
Interviewee (IW) 3, representative of CSO from Serbia, Participant in the Inter-
nal Dialogue, 3 July 2018
Interviewee (IW) 4, representative of CSO from Serbia, Participant in the Inter-
nal Dialogue, 6 July 2018
Interviewee (IW) 5, representative of CSO from Serbia, Participant in the Inter-
nal Dialogue, 3 July 2018
Interviewee (IW) 6, representative of CSO from Kosovo, Participant in the In-
ternal Dialogue, 21 July 2018
Interviewee (IW) 7, representative of CSO from Kosovo, Participant in the In-
ternal Dialogue, 29 July 2018
Interviewee (IW) 8, representative of CSO from Serbia, Participant in the Inter-
nal Dialogue, 25 July 2018
Interviewee (IW) 9, representative of CSO from Serbia, Participant in the Inter-
nal Dialogue, 26 July 2018
Interviewee (IW) 10, representative of CSO from Serbia, Participant in the In-
ternal Dialogue, 23 September 2018
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ANNEX: QUESTIONNAIRE
1.  What is your perception, what was the internal dialogue? Is there a differ-
ence between the perception of the internal dialogue at the beginning, when 
the process was announced, and later when started to be implemented? 
2.  According to your opinion, what was the aim of the internal dialogue? 
3.   Do you think that the dialogue was an integral part of the Brussels negotia-
tions or it was a separate process? In your opinion, what did president Vucic 
want to achieve by initiating the internal dialogue and did he succeed in it? 
3.  According to your opinion, was the dialogue inclusive? In other words, did 
the organisers make efforts to include all relevant segments of the society 
or the process was not inclusive and only targeted certain societal groups? 
4.  What do you think about the position of Kosovo Serbs in the dialogue? 
5.  What were the narratives in the dialogue? Did the dialogue try to solve chal-
lenges of the implementation of the Brussels agreement, or the position of 
Kosovo Serbs?
6.   According to your opinion, did participants take as relevant the framework 
of the EU accession process? 
7.  What kind of conclusions we can draw from the internal dialogue in terms 
of dominant attitudes towards Kosovo?
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Kosovo, one of the potential candidates for EU membership. It remains, how-
ever, the only country in the Western Balkans which has not yet concluded 
an agreement with the EU regarding visa-free travel in the Schengen area 
for its citizens. There was a momentum for this to happen in 2018, when the 
EU’s Council of Ministers was chaired by two enlargement-friendly member 
states, Bulgaria and Austria. The same year, the EU institutions - Commission, 
Council and Parliament - showed strong support for the Western Balkans’ EU 
perspective through the adoption of a new Enlargement Strategy. This chapter 
analyses the reasons behind the stalling of the visa liberalisation process with 
Kosovo during 2018, which convolute Kosovo domestic issues, but also the 
Council’s insistence on two remaining conditions being met: the demarcation 
of the border with Montenegro and demonstrated track-record by Kosovo in 
fighting corruption and crime. The research shows that timing was also cru-
cial. Kosovo ultimately fulfilled the two conditions, but after the Commission 
proposal and European Parliament approval to grant it visa liberalisation, the 
Council did not concur. The wide-range of EU and domestic-focused problems 
preoccupied the member states in the Council during the actual process of 
negotiating the proposal, and their concerns regarding the state of anti-cor-
ruption reforms and the large number of asylum applications from Kosovo 
affected the process. 
K
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INTRODUCTION
This chapter analyses how the inter-institutional architecture and division 
of competences between EU institutions influence the EU’s decision making 
process on Kosovo. We focus on the role of the Council, the intergovernmental 
hallmark of the Union and a forum of negotiation among member states, to 
determine the course and progress of institutional relations with Kosovo. Spe-
cifically, we investigate how the EU’s institutional set-up and member states’ 
concerns that spill over and determine the Council’s decisions influenced the 
processes of visa liberalisation for Kosovo, an issue pending on the EU’s agen-
da since at least 2016.  
Existing studies tend to approach the issue as a matter of pure conditionali-
ty, which is clearly outlined, meticulously monitored and reliably executed 
by the European Commission, the main actor and promoter of enlargement. 
Other issues that don’t fit neatly into the Commission’s outlined criteria are 
perceived as double standards, unfair and/or redundant. By contrast, we in-
vestigate the more complex institutional set-up and specific member states’ 
concerns that inform the EU’s decision making process, thus problematising 
the usually taken for granted role of the Commission, or the concept of pure 
technical conditionality. In our view, conditionality, even that related to the 
visa liberalisation process, consists of a set of technical measures specified 
by the Commission, which are randomly complemented and assessed in the 
context of broader requirements of rule of law and good neighbourly relations 
that have emerged as key priorities of EU relations with the Western Balkan 
countries. If the Commission insists on technical indicators, member states’ 
representatives in the Council are keen to assess the evolution of specific re-
quirements in the context of key required reforms, which further impacts EU 
citizens’ attitude towards enlargement in general and relations with specific 
countries in particular. 
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The analysis is based on secondary and primary sources. Secondary sources 
include the academic research on the issue. Primary sources include include 
EU documents and statements as well as 5 semi-structured interviews with 
EU officials, diplomats and Kosovo officials involved in the visa liberalisation 
and/or EU accession process. Finally, the analysis reflects author’s insider ob-
servation of the EU inter-institutional workings and Council negotiations on 
the topic of Kosovo. 
The analysis unfolds in four sections. The first section provides an overview 
of the range of EU institutions in charge of the decision-making in the area of 
enlargement, with an emphasis on the Council as the most prominent actor 
in directing and controlling the course of the process. It also highlights the 
‘constructive ambiguity’ that marks Council discussions on Kosovo, given that 
five member countries don’t recognise it as an independent state. Constructive 
ambiguity is defined here as the deliberate use of ambiguous language on a 
sensitive issue in order to advance some political purpose. The second section 
outlines the EU relations with Kosovo as a potential candidate country and 
the conflicting agendas that spill over those relations. In addition, it sets out 
the latest developments in EU’s enlargement policy that encompasses Kosovo. 
The third section illustrates the process of granting visa liberalisation to Koso-
vo, that has not yet been completed although the Western Balkans featured 
high among the priorities of EU institutions in 2018. This section also elabo-
rates on member states’ concerns in the context of the broader set of reforms 
required from Kosovo and implications for asylum and migration. The conclu-
sion summarises the main findings in terms of obstacles and expectations for 
Kosovo’s EU perspective. 
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THE EU DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND 
THE CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY ON KOSOVO
The institutional relations between the European Union and Kosovo started 
to develop when the EU launched the Stabilisation and Association Process1 
in the early 2000s, and notably after the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit that put 
Kosovo in the same category with the other Western Balkan countries (El-
basani 2013). Soon after, the EU’s institutional set-up in charge of managing 
the relations with the Western Balkans shifted from the ‘External Relations’ 
to the ‘Enlargement’ policy segment (Sedelmaier 2015), setting the stage for 
an enlargement-focused strategy but also presenting a new division of com-
petences and even divergences between the three main EU institutions – the 
Commission (the supranational level), the Council of Ministers (the intergov-
ernmental level) and the Parliament (hybrid of supranational and intergov-
ernmental levels). With this move, the Commission gained a crucial role in the 
day-to-day running of the enlargement process and the administration of rela-
tions with the Western Balkans (HGM 2014, 5). Yet, the Council, as the political 
heartbeat of member states’ interests, maintained key prerogatives in leading 
and controlling the direction of the process.
According to the Treaty on European Union (Article 49), enlargement “shall 
be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant 
state”, therefore not an area where competences are shared among Member 
States and the EU. The studies conducted so far on the topic of shared com-
petences in the policy area of enlargement show that national governments 
represented in the Council of Ministers and in the European Council clearly 
direct and ultimately control the pace of enlargement process: “Member States 
have final control over the large number of decisions required throughout the 
process, almost exclusively by unanimity. There is thus, in practice, a unanim-
ity lock at each stage of the process” (HMG 2014, 5).
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The activities of the European Commission and the normative power it exer-
cises over the accession hopefuls via a range of instruments, such as the man-
agement of the pre-accession funds, monitoring through annual ‘progress re-
ports’, setting priorities and informing the Council about countries’ progress, 
are well studied in the literature (Grabbe 2006; Elbasani 2013). So is the dy-
namic role of the European External Action Service to provide foreign policy 
guidelines, conduct political monitoring or facilitate dialogue in ongoing con-
flicts (Beysoylu 2018). However, the role of the Council and the Council Presi-
dency, and how and when they gain dominance in the process of enlargement, 
is understudied in comparison.
The position of the Council of Ministers on Kosovo is at best precautious to 
the extent it represents EU member states’ governments, of which five - Cy-
prus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain- do not recognise Kosovo’s inde-
pendence and its right to statehood to this date. As explained by Bieber (2015), 
although these non-recognisers have framed their position in the context of 
international law, their domestic political considerations often carried greater 
weight. Four of these countries that do not recognise Kosovo face real or imag-
ined secessionist conflicts internally. The non-recognisers are thus reluctant 
to open the question of who and when is entitled to independence and how 
that reflects on other cases.
Procedurally, the Council meetings at the highest level request the participa-
tion of foreign ministers from all EU member states when the Western Bal-
kans is on the agenda. The lower bodies of the Council - the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and the working groups – are com-
posed of member states’ ambassadors to the EU and lower ranking diplomats, 
respectively. The Council working group responsible for the Western Balkans 
countries (COWEB) covers those countries that have not yet started accession 
negotiations with the EU. 
COWEB reunites two times every week and is chaired by a representative of 
the European External Action Service. Its meetings enable the first instance of 
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negotiation and are most likely to compromise substantially on decisions or 
common EU positions, since its members do not bear great political responsi-
bility. Sandrino Smeets (2015) rightly emphasizes the culture of compromise 
during COWEB meetings, when the negotiations tend to settle on a common 
agreement between the participant member states, usually reflecting the low-
est common denominator where policy goals are defined so broadly that it 
would be difficult to oppose them. Given the contested nature of Kosovo’s 
status, the Council of Ministers is in a very peculiar situation when the rela-
tions with Kosovo are discussed and decided. Smeets (2015, 19) gives a tell-
ing account of a day in the Council building, where behind closed doors there 
are countless hours of debate in the COWEB on how to refer to Kosovo. The 
“EU membership of Kosovo” can not even be mentioned in any working doc-
uments, or conclusions of the Council, and therefore of the EU (Smeets 2015, 
19). Hence, the different EU structures have to find innovative solutions that 
satisfy the non-recognisers, but still keep Kosovo embedded and entrenched 
in the process of enlargement. 
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The next instance of negotiation in the Council, COREPER, meets once a week 
or biweekly to discuss only matters that have not been agreed by COWEB. Only 
if this instance does not succeed to reach an agreement, foreign ministers rep-
resented at the Council of Ministers take over that specific negotiation during 
their monthly meeting. The more a file goes to a higher instance of negotia-
tions, the more difficult it becomes to reach an agreement as the negotiators 
have more political responsibility and visibility. If the Council of the EU is, 
because of the unanimity rule and political weight, the most important actor 
of enlargement policy and therefore of EU’s relations with Kosovo, its Presi-
dency is by extension a key player in the process. The Council Presidency ro-
tates among the EU member states every 6 months and during this time it has 
the prerogative of chairing all Council meetings, thus ensuring the consistency 
and continuity of the EU’s work at the inter-governmental level. The Presi-
dency’s role includes not only planning and chairing meetings in the Council 
and its preparatory bodies, but also representing the Council in relations to 
the other EU institutions. In these circumstances, the Council Presidency is 
expected to act as an honest and neutral broker.2 Additionally, the Council 
Presidency contributes to the preparation of the agenda for the meetings of 
all instances of negotiation, and chairs the meetings of COREPER and of the 
Council of Ministers. As a result, the representative of the EU member state 
holding the Council Presidency tends to set the tone of the negotiations by be-
ing the first to express her/his country’s position on topics listed on the agenda 
of meetings. 
For Kosovo, having good bilateral relations with the holder of the Council 
Presidency is crucial to advance its bilateral relations with the EU as a whole, 
especially given the Council’s political might and its ambiguous attitude to-
wards the Kosovo status. As a clear example of this ambiguity, in 2016, after an 
EEAS-mediated agreement between Kosovo and Serbia, the Council insisted 
that all the EU institutions use a standard footnote in all official documents re-
garding Kosovo: ‘This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, 
and is in line with UNSCR 1244/19993 and the ICJ Opinion4 on the Kosovo dec-
laration of independence’. The two legal acts mentioned in the footnote can 
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be seen as contradictory on the issue of Kosovo’s status and independence, but 
the awareness that the footnote will accompany the mention of Kosovo in the 
adopted documents is now the basis of all negotiations at different levels in 
the Council – COWEB, COREPER and the ministers’ meeting. This gives all EU 
member states - those who recognise Kosovo’s independence and those who 
don’t - enough flexibility to interpret it in the way they see it fit for their own 
legal arrangements.
EU RELATIONS WITH KOSOVO: DIFFERENT 
AGENDAS AND THE DIFFICULTY OF 
‘SPEAKING WITH ONE VOICE’
The enlargement packages, which provide similar deals for various coun-
tries, are no longer an option for the EU, which now favours individual coun-
try-specific instead of region-wide approaches, in order to avoid mistakes 
from previous enlargement waves (Dérens 2015, 173; Börzel, Dimitrova and 
Schimmelfennig 2017, 157). Altogether, each country advances at its own pace 
and based on evidence of reforms (Elbasani 2019). Consequently, the EU en-
largement strategy now divides the Western Balkan countries in two general 
groups regarding their odds of membership based on progress in the acces-
sion process: candidate countries and potential candidates. Kosovo features 
among ‘potential’ candidates and stands at the very end of the cue of countries 
rallying for EU membership. Since 2016, it has a formal relationship with the 
European Commission through the conclusion of the Stabilisation and Asso-
ciation Agreement. 
Still, after the signing of this agreement, Kosovo’s complex problems – war 
legacies, statehood issues, political polarisation and ethnic tensions, coupled 
with the problem of non-recognition - have led the Council of Ministers and 
EU member states to adopt a ‘wait and see’ or ‘go slow’ approach to its EU ac-
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cession process (Balfour and Stratulat 2013, 22; Elbasani 2018, 149-164). This 
is especially relevant regarding the advancement of the process of visa liber-
alisation for Kosovo. As of now, Kosovo remains the only country in the West-
ern Balkans which has not yet concluded an agreement with the EU regarding 
visa-free travel for its citizens in the Schengen area. The stalling of the visa 
liberalisation process convolutes Kosovo internal issues but also Council’s in-
sistence in loading the process with additional conditionality.5 
The problem of EU’s ‘overloaded agenda and weak incentives’ (Elbasani 2008) 
is a general feature of evolving conditionality across the region. According to 
Anastasakis (2008, 365-366), in the context of the Balkans the EU bifurcates its 
conditionality based on normative, functional and/or realist considerations: 
the EU (a) is adding further, yet necessary, political conditions and criteria to 
weaker or more reluctant partners and emphasizes the ‘journey’ rather than 
the outcome of accession, affecting the credibility of the strategy; (b) is blend-
ing together normative, functional and realpolitik claims in the choice of its 
conditions, affecting the clarity of its intentions; (c) is pursuing, in some cases, 
a rigorous assessment of compliance and, in other cases, a more adaptable and 
pragmatic assessment, affecting the consistency of the process.
Such considerations have implications for the domestic reception of condition-
ality. Regarding the normative agenda, when the EU insists on conditions that 
don’t fit with domestic perceptions or specific benefits for Kosovo, they risk 
being perceived as loaded and as unfair external pressure, thus negatively im-
pacting the image of the EU and attitudes towards EU accession. Regarding the 
functional agenda that insists on Kosovo’s transformation via adoption of rules 
and procedures and/or the creation of institutional capacities, they might have 
more affinity with the local political concerns, but still “what is functional for 
the EU is not always perceived as functional for the countries concerned” (An-
astasakis 2008, 366). Regarding the more realpolitik considerations that shape 
EU conditionality, such concerns can further complicate and confuse the role 
of EU requirements as a useful tool of domestic change. 
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The nature of conditionality is even more complex and convoluted in the case 
of Kosovo where the Commission’s agenda can be challenged by member states’ 
particularistic agendas and concerns voiced in the Council. Quite often, mem-
ber states’ positions on enlargement in general, and Kosovo in particular, depart 
from a common EU standpoint because of domestic specific considerations.6 Var-
ious interviews with European diplomats in Brussels confirm that in the current 
political climate in Europe, where internal policies are prioritised, a more ‘politi-
cised’ conditionality that reflects member states’ concerns tend to prevail.7
In 2018, the EU institutions and member states proved able to a certain extent 
to ‘speak with one voice’ regarding the enlargement perspective for the Western 
Balkans, including Kosovo. Initially, it was the president of the European Com-
mission announcing that a new Strategy guiding EU enlargement policy for the 
Western Balkans was forthcoming.8 Indeed, when published, the strategy en-
titled A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with 
the Western Balkans confirmed ‘the European future of the region.’9 Yet, given 
the opposition of member states who do not accept its independent statehood, 
Kosovo did not receive clear promises.10 The particular reference to Kosovo’s so-
called European perspective reads: “Kosovo has an opportunity for sustainable 
progress through implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Agree-
ment and to advance on its European path once objective circumstances al-
low.”11 In April 2018, the European Commission released also its annual Enlarge-
ment Package, subsequently endorsed by the Council. The overall assessment 
of Kosovo’s progress was rather bleak: “the new ruling coalition has had limited 
success in bringing forward EU related reforms and building consensus on key 
strategic issues for Kosovo.”12 Kosovo also received a weak score regarding its 
alignment with EU standards in areas such as public administration reform, ju-
dicial system, fight against corruption and fight against organised crime, protec-
tion of human and fundamental rights, and freedom of expression. 
Still, 2018 was seen as a ‘momentum’ year for the progress of EU’s enlarge-
ment process towards the Western Balkans, including Kosovo. The release of 
a comprehensive Enlargement Strategy by the European Commission was a 
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powerful declaration of intent in this regard. What facilitated the momentum, 
and the concrete expression of intent, including Commission’s new strategy, 
was the rotating Presidency of the Council, exercised by Bulgaria during the 
first half of 2018 and Austria during the second half. Both presidencies, which 
are strongly interested in and supportive of the EU perspective, and ultimate-
ly EU membership of all countries in the region, placed the Western Balkans 
among the key priority issues of Council. Both states support and recognise 
Kosovo’s European future, and have gone a long haul to accumulate support 
in the Council for Kosovo’s progress on the ladder of institutional relations 
with the EU. However, many institutional and political obstacles remain. Poor 
evaluations on the state of reform in Kosovo itself don’t help. The wide range 
of EU and domestic-focused problems showed themselves during the actual 
process of negotiating the visa-free travel for Kosovo citizens.
EU INTER-INSTITUTIONAL DISAGREEMENTS 
ON VISA-FREE TRAVEL FOR KOSOVO
The process of granting visa-free travel to Kosovo citizens would be more than 
the immediate result of facilitating travel throughout the Schengen area and 
cultural or business links resulting out of people-to-people contacts. Since 
the process is subject of key benchmarks –specific conditions that the coun-
try needs to meet –it is widely perceived as a conditional reward (Stiks 2011, 
126). In the case of other Western Balkan countries too, the EU has granted 
visa liberalisation after targeted reforms, including general ones that would 
boost the EU accession process. In other words, the EU used the visa liber-
alisation process as a strategy of exercising the leverage of reward in return 
for reforms (Stiks 2011, 129). The strategy has been effective in encouraging 
domestic change elsewhere in the Balkans, while it offered more tangible ben-
efits for citizens than the distant EU membership perspective requiring even 
more painful reforms (Stiks 2011, 129).  
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Procedurally, granting visa-free travel to and throughout the Schengen area 
to citizens of a country requires an agreement between the EU and the respec-
tive country. The process starts with a visa liberalisation dialogue between the 
European Commission and the partner country; subsequently, a proposal is 
prepared by the European Commission that summarizes the end results; the 
proposal then requires a vote in the European Parliament and a confirmation 
by qualified majority vote in the Council in order to come to effect. The qual-
ified majority requirement means that a minority of EU member states can 
ultimately block the entire process. 
The European Commission launched a visa liberalisation dialogue with Koso-
vo in 2012 and soon after presented Kosovo authorities a Roadmap of condi-
tions for visa liberalisation.13 The roadmap entails legislative amendments, 
adoption of new laws, formation of new institutions, recruitment of new staff 
as well as training in numerous areas, such as immigration, asylum, border 
control, the fight against crime, terrorism and corruption, and the protection 
of identity.14 Since launching the visa dialogue, the Commission has present-
ed regular reports to the European Parliament and to the Council on its assess-
ment of Kosovo’s fulfilment of the requirements articulated in the roadmap. 
Regular discussions with member states in the COWEB as well as regular ex-
changes with the European Parliament on the visa liberalisation process have 
taken place ever since.15 The process itself, excessively focused on bench-
marks, and the fact that other Western Balkan countries have been granted 
visa-free travel earlier, reinforced a sense of isolation in Kosovo (Stiks 2011, 
129-130). 
 EU’s perception of the Western Balkans as a possible source of instability has 
generally shaped the visa liberalisation process across the region (Trauner 
2007). Yet, if other countries succeeded in overcoming member states’ con-
cerns, Kosovo has not been able to do so. In this case, the EU member states 
were primarily concerned with a possible influx of asylum-seekers or illegal mi-
grants as well as the odds of readmission process (Stiks 2011, 130) in a context 
where several thousand citizens from Kosovo have applied for asylum in the 
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Schengen area.16 Core EU countries have seen particularly troubling numbers of 
asylum applications during the so-called ‘migrant and refugee crisis’ of 2015.17 
To those legitimate EU concerns, one can add other region-specific threats of 
stability, of which bilateral border conflicts and rule of law problems top the 
EU agenda (Elbasani 2019; Elbasani and Sabic 2018). Hence, the EU institutions 
have doubled up the usual benchmark criteria with other requirements for 
resolutions for border conflicts and promotion of rule of law. Specifically, in 
2016, the European Commission made the proposal to grant visa-free travel 
for Kosovo citizens upon the fulfillment of two remaining benchmarks: con-
clusion and ratification of an agreement on border demarcation with Monte-
negro, and a sustained track-record in the fight of corruption and organized 
crime. EU’s insistence on these two requirements have been perceived as un-
fair by various governmental, political and civil society actors in Kosovo.18 
Instructed by the member states in the Council of Ministers, who were none-
theless reluctant to speed the process of granting visa-free travel to Kosovo, 
the Commission insisted on the two remaining benchmarks being fulfilled. 
Finally, the Kosovo authorities ratified the border demarcation agreement 
with Montenegro in spring 2018. The implementation of the other remaining 
benchmark - Kosovo’s proved track record in fighting corruption- was left to 
the European Commission to monitor, assess and report on. The Council of 
Ministers under the Bulgarian Presidency has responded positively to the fi-
nalisation of the border demarcation agreement between Kosovo and Monte-
negro. At the end of its June 2018 meeting, the Council adopted conclusions on 
the Western Balkans countries that praise Kosovo for the fulfilment of the first 
benchmark, but require more on the fulfilment of the second one: 
The Council welcomes the ratification by the Kosovo Assembly of the border/
boundary agreement with Montenegro in March 2018, which constitutes the 
fulfilment of one of the key criteria for Kosovo’s visa liberalisation and an im-
portant achievement in the spirit of good neighbourly relations. The Council 
takes note of the Commission’s intention to present an assessment of the final 
benchmark on the strengthening of the track record in the fight against organ-
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ised crime and corruption and invites the Commission to report on whether 
the other benchmarks continue to be met. 19
Throughout the beginning of 2018, many member states voiced concerns in 
the Council meetings about Kosovo not stepping up the fight against corrup-
tion even if it is an important remaining benchmark in the Roadmap for visa 
liberalisation.20 The Commission’s 2018 weak score regarding Kosovo’s prog-
ress in the fight against corruption and organised crime confirmed Council’s 
concerns.21 Despite the score, the Commission’s position on the remaining 
benchmarks for visa liberalisation suggested that Kosovo had fulfilled the nec-
essary technical requirements to jumpstart the process.22 
The European Parliament and the Council, under the Austrian Presidency, had 
the task of voting the Commission’s proposal. The European Parliament com-
pleted the debates and approved the proposal in September 2018. The Council, 
by contrast, stalled the visa liberalisation file at the level of COWEB, but also 
another working group responsible for visa and asylum policy. The Austrian 
Presidency of the Council, which in general has a friendly attitude towards EU 
enlargement and very good relations with Kosovo, has not advanced the file 
because of internal political concerns regarding migration and asylum spilled 
into its foreign policy towards Kosovo.23 Several interviews with EU diplo-
mats and officials familiar with the Austrian Presidency of the Council reiterat-
ed that the Austrian government had no interest in completing visa-free trav-
el for Kosovo at this time, given its domestic concerns. Accordingly, the first 
discussions of the Commission proposal in COWEB and other working groups 
made it clear that member states lacked the necessary consensus for approv-
ing the visa-free travel agreement with Kosovo.24 During the first COWEB 
meeting in which this proposal was discussed, member states traditionally 
supportive of Kosovo’s EU perspective, such as Italy, have been reluctant to 
take the floor and endorse visa liberalisation because migration features high 
among their domestic problems too.25 Meanwhile representatives of France 
and the Netherlands have been most sceptical about Kosovo’s fulfilment of 
the technical criteria enshrined in the visa liberalisation Roadmap, thereby 
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putting into question the European Commission’s report confirming that this 
has been done.26 
Hence, Council’s blockage in this case was not connected to the concerns of 
non-recognisers of Kosovo’s independence, as generally is the case in COWEB 
meetings. In fact, some of the non-recognisers would easily approve the agree-
ment, as suggested by the several EU diplomats and EU officials present at 
the meetings. Other countries, however, raised common concerns regarding 
the migration and security components of the Kosovo visa liberalisation and 
Kosovo being a region of origin of many unfounded asylum applications.27 
The Austrian Presidency itself shared such political concerns. Austrian top 
government officials have publicly expressed their worries about EU visa and 
asylum policy and its implications for Kosovo,28 concerns which informed the 
shelving of the visa liberalisation file.29
In sum, two factors influenced the Councils’ lack of support for a visa-free 
travel agreement with Kosovo in 2018: the lack of ambition of the Austrian 
Presidency of the Council and concerns from member states regarding the 
state of anti-corruption reforms and the large number of asylum applications. 
Interviews with both EU officials and diplomats in Brussels confirmed that 
various EU member states share common concerns that enlargement and mi-
gration remain contested issues domestically and hence, they lack political 
support to advance those issues in the Council. Such dilemmas multiply in pe-
riods of crisis, when trust between EU member states as well as trust between 
the member states and EU institutions is weakening (Algieri 2012, 23). 
CONCLUSIONS
2018 was seen as a ‘momentum’ year for the progress of EU’s enlargement 
process towards the Western Balkans. Kosovo remains the last in line for EU 
membership from among the (potential) candidate countries from this region 
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also because five EU members do not recognise its statehood. Kosovo expect-
ed nevertheless to get the green light from the EU for visa-free travel to and 
throughout the Schengen area. While in the first part of the year it lagged be-
hind in meeting the European Commission’s technical requirements, in the 
second part of the year that opportunity has been lost. Member states’ block-
age of the process despite Commission’s recommendation that Kosovo has 
fulfilled the technical benchmarks outlined in the visa liberalisation Roadmap 
puts forward the non-easy collaboration between the two institutions and the 
ultimate  power of the Council to determine the EU agenda when it comes to 
the EU relations with the Western Balkans in general, and Kosovo in particu-
lar. What has ultimately delayed visa-free travel to the EU for Kosovo citizens 
are the intricacies of EU decision making and policy making, combined with 
the politicisation of the issue of visa liberalisation and its direct connection to 
migration and asylum-related concerns of the EU members. 
In actual terms, the announced ‘momentum’ has not brought much benefit 
to Kosovo, at least not in terms of advancement of its institutional relations 
with the EU. The country doesn’t have a clear perspective or institutional path 
of joining the EU, as the 2018 Commission Enlargement Strategy ambiguous-
ly indicated.  It also lacks the prospect of breaking the visa deadlock in the 
short term. Moreover, the EU non-recognisers are not anymore the only fac-
tor in the impasse in the Council’s decisions concerning Kosovo. The current 
political climate in the EU, with numerous concerns related to immigration, 
has prompted other EU members to express sceptic attitudes towards further 
EU enlargement and hence to delay advancement of  the Western Balkans in 
the process. Thus, the EU effectively directs reforms and policies through the 
conditionality applied by the European Commission, but the member states 
represented in the Council ultimately decide on granting the rewards based 
on a unanimity principle with very uncertain outcome for the Western Balkan 
states.  
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Previous research has shown that EU political conditionality is effective 
even in situations when the prospects of membership are distant. The visa 
liberalisation of Kosovo, although based on well established approach that 
is extensively following the best practices from previous visa liberalisation 
processes with other Western Balkan countries, defers in one very important 
aspect. The peculiarity of the target country in terms of its status, due to the 
five EU non-recognizers, has prompted the European Commission to engage 
in an enhanced dialogue with the Council and member states while utilizing 
and relying extensively on the expertise of various EU agencies such as Eu-
ropol, Eurojust and the EULEX. This chapter examines the application of the 
EU conditionality policy regarding the visa liberalisation process with Kosovo. 
It explores the similarities and differences in the EU approach as well as pol-
icy instruments and tools applied in the process in comparison to the other 
Western Balkan countries. The chapter argues that even in situation where the 
EU leverage is low, the policy conditionality and reward associated with it were 
effective in motivating the country to successfully implement the criteria. 
P
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INTRODUCTION
Following the entry of Croatia in the EU family, the accession process with the 
remaining six Western Balkan countries has been overshadowed by uncertain-
ty. This is especially the case with Kosovo, the newest addition to the Western 
Balkans group of countries. Moving beyond the already signed Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement in the EU accession process is not really an op-
tion. Five EU member states still do not recognise it as a country, therefore, the 
Council cannot give a green light to the country to move forward in the process 
regardless of the fulfilment of the accession criteria. In addition to this, the 
negotiations with Serbia have reached a dead end, at least for the time being, 
although efforts are being made to overcome this impasse and unblock Koso-
vo’s EU aspirations. As a consequence, it comes as no surprise that the visa 
liberalisation process is perceived both, from Kosovo and EU side, as the only 
process that can be concluded irrespectively from the uncertain institutional 
situation in which Kosovo is at the moment.
Immediately after declaring independence in February 2008, the EU has ex-
pressed its political support and ‘willingness to assist the economic and polit-
ical development of Kosovo’ (Council of the European Union 2008, 14–16). A 
year later, the Commission Communication ‘Kosovo - Fulfilling its European 
Perspective’ laid down the foundation for visa facilitation with Kosovo (Euro-
pean Commission 2009, 6, 13). The document proposed “a visa dialogue with 
the perspective of eventual visa liberalisation” once Kosovo fulfills all the nec-
essary reforms. Even from its outset, Kosovo’s EU accession process was much 
politized because of the situation with the five non-recognizers and the am-
biguous relations with Serbia. Kosovo cannot move to the next steps of the EU 
accession process i.e. beyond the status of potential EU candidate without the 
explicit support by all the EU member states, including the 5 non-recognizers. 
Under these circumstances, Kosovo’s membership prospects remain question-
able even today. However, this is not the case with the visa liberalisation pro-
301
ZORAN NECHEV WITH IVAN NIKOLOVSKI
cess. Although the status issue complicates the implementation of the criteria, 
it does not hinder the overall process.
In order to maintain its leverage, the EU has shifted its Kosovo policy towards 
short-term policy rewards, such as the visa-free travel. In time, however, the 
EU has increased the value of the applied policy conditionality, thereby mo-
tivating Kosovo to effectively conduct the necessary reforms. Based on the 
fulfillment of performance indicators, in July 2018, the European Commission 
assessed that Kosovo has fulfilled all required criteria, thereby putting into 
effect the proposal from 2016 to the European Parliament and the Council to 
amend the Regulation (EC) No 539/2001. Since then, the European Parliament 
voted in favour of visa-free travel for Kosovo citizens although members of 
European parliament coming from some of the non-recognizers such as Spain, 
Cyprus, and Greece as well as skeptical France and the Netherlands expressed 
their reservations. The final decision that needs to be taken by the European 
Council has been postponed for a later stage. 
To better understand the conditions under which the visa policy operates 
and in analyzing the effectiveness of its tools, this chapter explores both the 
conditionality applied in the case of Kosovo and the criteria required to other 
Western Balkan countries that already underwent this process such as Serbia, 
Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Empirically, the chapter evaluates 
how the conditions surrounding the case of Kosovo -uncertain membership 
prospects and low EU leverage – shape the effectiveness of the policy condi-
tionality. The research relies on a body of research that focuses on how the EU 
impacts on the political structures and policies in the Western Balkan coun-
tries seeking accession to the EU (Elbasani 2018; Schimmelfennig 2012, 656–
669; Trauner 2009; Zhelyazkova et al. 2018). 
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HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The EU Commission officially launched the visa liberalisation dialogue in 2012 
by issuing a roadmap for Kosovo (European Commission 2012). The Visa Free 
Dialogue with the EU aims at removing а third country from the list of coun-
tries (known as the ‘black visa list’) whose citizens are required visa when 
crossing the EU external borders. This list is established with Annex 1 of the 
Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 and it represents key legislation of the 
EU’s visa policy (Trauner and Manigrassi 2014, 4).
Benchmarks were also used in order to guide Kosovo in implementing the cri-
teria required and to assess the country’s readiness in fulfilling the visa liberali-
sation criteria (Trauner and Nechev 2017). Namely, Kosovo’s visa liberalisation 
roadmap included two major requirements: 1) readmission and reintegration 
and 2) document security, border/boundary and migration management, public 
order and security, and fundamental rights related to the freedom of movement. 
The latter requirement consists of benchmarks to be fulfilled by Kosovo authori-
ties divided into two four areas (Visa Liberalisation with Kosovo Roadmap, 2012): 
Block 1 - document security (personal travel documents, ID cards, and 
breeder documents). 
Block 2 - border/boundary and migration management (border/boundary 
management, carriers’ responsibility, migration management and asylum). 
Block 3 - public order and security (preventing and combating organised 
crime, corruption, and terrorism, law enforcement co-operation, judicial 
co-operation in criminal matters, data protection). 
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Block 4 - fundamental rights related to the freedom of movement (freedom 
of movement, conditions and procedures for issuing identity documents, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities). 
The visa liberalisation requirements are mainly part of the EU acquis related to 
justice, home affairs, but also freedom and security, that needs to be adopted 
by the candidate countries before they join the Union.1  
The first report on Kosovo’s progress in fulfilling the requirements of the visa 
liberalisation roadmap was issued by the European Commission in 2013 (Eu-
ropean Commission 2013). This report comprises recommendations for all the 
benchmark areas. Namely, as a pre-condition for visa liberalisation dialogue, 
Kosovo had to duly implement the Law on Readmission, negotiate readmis-
sion treaties with the interested EU member states and other countries, but 
also reduce the number of pending readmission requests from all member 
states, readmit its own citizens, third-country nationals and stateless persons 
who no longer fulfil the conditions of entry and stay in the EU member states, 
and improve data exchange with member states’ authorities concerning the 
special needs of returnees, including victims of human trafficking (European 
Commission 2013, 20-21). In terms of reintegration, Kosovo authorities were 
called to increase the reintegration fund and programme beneficiaries as well 
as establish sustainable reintegration services and management system aimed 
at tracking returnees’ access to reintegration services (European Commission 
2013, 21). 
As for the personal documents security, the country had to amend the law 
on personal names to allow Cyrillic alphabet in the name registration, eradi-
cate  deceitful  name changes, validate the identity of all applicants for name 
changes as well as to change secondary legislation on applications for travel 
documents to secure that fingerprints are taken from all applicants above the 
age of twelve in line with the EU acquis (European Commission 2013, 21). Fur-
thermore, the European Commission demanded from Kosovo authorities to 
produce and issue biometric identity cards and enforce the new civil status 
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system by securing the reliability and integrity of the single civil status cen-
tral registry through improved data quality, cross-referencing and matching 
all data entries as well as bridging the inconsistencies between the different 
databases (European Commission 2013, 21). The country was also asked to 
improve the border/boundary management in terms of inter-agency coopera-
tion, border control, and surveillance by aligning with the EU acquis as well as 
to extend the law enforcement cooperation with the neighbours and EU mem-
ber states for the purpose of preventing and combating irregular migration 
and cross-border crime (European Commission 2013, 21). Special focus was 
put on the delineation of the Kosovo-Montenegro border. Pristina was asked 
to improve the migration and asylum management in line with the EU acquis, 
Geneva Convention and Schengen Borders Code as well. The visa liberalisa-
tion dialogue was also conditioned on combating organised crime, corrup-
tion, and terrorism through reforms in the areas of judiciary and intelligence 
services (European Commission 2013, 22-24). Lastly, Pristina had to improve 
the protection of data, extend the anti-discrimination framework for women, 
members of the LGBT community and people with disabilities, and improve 
the integration and protection of the ethnic minorities (European Commission 
2013, 24).
Much of the recommendations re-appeared in the European Commission’s 
second report from 2014 (European Commission 2014). Although Kosovo 
made progress in all priority areas, the Commission requested additional ef-
forts in protecting judicial independence and reinforcing the capacities of the 
independent bodies and agencies (European Commission 2014, 6-7). Among 
others, these recommendations aimed the justice area, public  procurement 
and  money-laundering as well as advancing the the country’s cooperation 
with EULEX, EUROPOL, INTERPOL and EUROJUST (European Commission 
2014, 6-7). 
The progress in the visa liberalization dialogue continued in 2015 and 2016 as 
well. Namely, by 2015 (European Commission 2015), Kosovo had fulfilled most 
of the remaining recommendations. In other words, Kosovo had to implement 
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requirements regarding reintegration, with a focus on offering assistance 
with employment, the establishment of small businesses, vocational train-
ing and linguistic training for children (European Commission 2015, 3,11). The 
remaining requirements also included improving data security by amending 
secondary legislation on name changes, ratification of the border/boundary 
delineation agreement with Montenegro, and increasing its recognition rate 
for asylum-seekers (European Commission 2015, 4-5). The stress was put on 
combating organised crime, corruption and terrorism (European Commission 
2015, 8). Lastly, Pristina was asked to fully comply with the requirements in 
the area of fundamental rights related to the freedom of movement by provid-
ing appropriate premises for and ensuring the full budgetary independence of 
the Office of the Ombudsperson (European Commission 2015, 9-10).
In 2016, the European Commission issued the fourth report on the implemen-
tation of the Visa Liberalisation Roadmap (European Commission 2016). Koso-
vo authorities managed to implement the remaining requirements except for 
the ratification of the Border Agreement with Montenegro. Pristina also had 
demonstrated a track-record in investigations, final court rulings and confisca-
tions in serious organised crime and corruption cases. Based on these results, 
the European Commission proposed to the Council of the European Union and 
the European Parliament to lift the visa requirements for the people of Kosovo 
by transferring Kosovo to the visa-free list for short-stays in the Schengen area 
once the remaining requirements are met (European Commission 2016). 
However, this proposal came with two conditions for Kosovo to ratify the bor-
der/boundary agreement with Montenegro and to further strengthen its track 
record in the fight against organised crime and corruption (European Com-
mission 2016). After three years of political disagreements with and blockades 
by the then opposition, Kosovo Assembly managed to ratify the agreement 
with Montenegro in March 2018. In the meantime, the authorities provided 
the needed track record of combatting serious corruption and organized crime 
cases, which was noted in the update on the implementation of the remaining 
benchmarks of the visa liberalisation roadmap by Kosovo (European Commis-
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sion 2018a). Following the adoption of the two remaining benchmarks, the 
European Commission confirmed that Kosovo has fulfilled all benchmarks of 
the visa liberalisation roadmap and recommended visa liberalisation by add-
ing, in the words of Commissioner Avramopoulos, “[i]t is now in the hands 
of the European Parliament and the Council to move forward and adopt the 
Commission’s proposal from May 2016 – and I encourage them to do so swift-
ly” (European Commission 2018b). The European Parliament approved the 
Commission’s proposal in September 2018. 
THE EVOLVING AND TAILOR-MADE 
CONDITIONALITY: SIMILAR REFORM 
CRITERIA, INCREASED SPECIFICITY
The EU approach towards liberalising the visa regime for short term stays in EU 
and Schengen countries with Kosovo follows the same pattern as it had been 
the case for all the other Western Balkan countries before. Identical policy in-
struments were used in the case of Kosovo as with the other countries (Euro-
pean Stability Initiative 2012). Most of the criteria and reforms that need to be 
implemented in this process are part of the Justice and Home affairs acquis 
or what has been known as the negotiation chapters 23 and 24 that deal with 
rule of law issues. This also signals that the visa liberalisation process follows 
the pattern of the new approach towards accession negotiations introduced 
following the entry of Croatia to the EU, i.e. in the accession negotiations with 
Montenegro. In addition, more political conditionality was introduced in the 
visa liberalisation process that helps the country progress in the overall acces-
sion process. This is especially the case following the publication of the 2018 
‘Credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the 
Western Balkans’, which clearly outlines the need of resolution of bilateral 
issues and emphasizes the importance of ‘definitive and binding solutions’ 
(European Commission 2018c, 4).
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Kosovo needed to sign a readmission agreement with the EU prior to starting 
the visa dialogue. However, because of the peculiar situation, where five EU 
members do not recognise it as an independent country, Kosovo is unable to 
sign a readmission agreement with the EU. As a result, Kosovo needed to redi-
rect its efforts towards signing such agreements on a bilateral basis with indi-
vidual or group of countries from the EU. Therefore, even prior to starting the 
dialogue with the EU, Kosovo had to find a specific way to bypass an issue that 
derives from its status. The other countries from the Western Balkans, such as 
Macedonia, Serbia, Albania, and others, have signed only an agreement with 
the European Community and this was sufficient (Council of the European 
Union 2005; 2007a; 2007b; 2007c; 2007d). Because of its specific status, Koso-
vo needed to sign bilateral agreements. 
Till the end of the assessment period, Kosovo managed to sign 22 readmis-
sion agreements with 24 countries including 18 member states (one agreement 
for the Benelux countries), two associated countries, three Western Balkan 
countries (all its immediate neighbours except Serbia), and Turkey (European 
Commission 2016). Kosovo adopted the necessary law on readmission, there-
by covering this subject issue with all the remaining EU countries with which 
Kosovo had not signed a readmission agreement at that moment in time. Ac-
cording to this legislative piece (article 6), Kosovo is required to “readmit to its 
territory a foreigner who does not fulfil or no longer fulfils the requirements 
for legal entry and stay in the requesting State […] in a situation when as il-
legally entered and stayed in the territory of the Republic of Kosovo prior to 
entry into the requesting State” (Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo 2010, 
3). In addition, the Commission in its report noted also that the country has 
made progress by “devising an Action Plan on reintegration of returnees un-
derpinned with earmarked resources” (Council of the European Union 2010, 
17). However, besides these requirements, country-specific criteria which had 
not been requested for the other Western Balkan countries were set for Koso-
vo. Additional pre-conditions for initiating visa-free dialogue was for Kosovo 
to reinforce its efforts in the area of reintegration as well as in border securi-
ty, management of civil registries and issuance of documents. This was in-
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troduced as a measure to effectively fight illegal migration and to reintegrate 
Kosovo citizens once readmitted in the country (Emini 2015).
The ‘Visa roadmap’, published in 2012, and similarly to other the roadmaps, 
was tailor-made and reflected the specificity of the country. Yet, the level of 
resemblance between the roadmaps provided to other Western Balkan coun-
tries and Kosovo is high. Although the number of benchmarks is almost dou-
ble than in the cases of the other countries from the region, content-wise, the 
reforms required are largely same or similar. For example, if one analyses the 
Macedonian Roadmap, in the segment devoted to border management, the 
Commission outlines that Macedonia should “implement the legislation gov-
erning the movement of persons at the external borders, as well as the leg-
islation on the organisation of the border authorities and their functions in 
accordance with the 2003 national Integrated Border Management strategy” 
(European Commission 2008a). The requirements under this specific bench-
mark were related to 1) progress made in implementing legal and regulatory 
aspects on movement of persons at external borders, 2) implementing the 
legislation on the organisation/functions of border authorities and its opera-
tional effectiveness, and 3) implementation of IBM strategy/actions plan and 
their results, including information on border controls – checks, surveillance, 
manuals (European Commission 2008b). In the case of Macedonia, this was 
only one benchmark, whereas similar requirements, in the case of Kosovo, are 
outlined in 5 individual benchmarks. The situation is exactly the same when 
we compare it with the Visa roadmap of Serbia. The Serbian authorities needed 
to “adopt and implement legislation governing the movement of persons at the 
external borders, as well as the law on the organisation of the border authorities 
and their functions in accordance with the Serbian National Integrated Border 
Management Strategy adopted in January 2006”. The Roadmaps with the other 
countries follow this line of reasoning (Visa Liberalisation Roadmap with Al-
bania 2008; Visa Liberalisation Roadmap with Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008)
What is different in the case of Kosovo is the level of detail and precision in con-
structing the Roadmap. This had a direct effect on the result achieved by the 
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Kosovo government and the effectiveness of the policy conditionality applied. 
This has been confirmed by Kosovo authorities. Whereas in previous cases 
with the other countries of the Western Balkans, the Commission needed to go 
through a round of explanatory meetings to clarify the requirements under each 
specific benchmarks, this was not the case with Kosovo.2 What is unique for the 
Kosovo Roadmap is the “full involvement of the Council and Member States in 
developing and, if necessary, amending this roadmap (Visa Liberalisation with 
Kosovo Roadmap 2012, 3). Although the Roadmap remained the same, the origi-
nal benchmarks were interpreted differently based on the assessment reports by 
the European Commission. This had an impact on the consistency and therefore 
determinacy in the process. In this case, the criteria for visa-free travel in the 
Roadmap changed over time. A case in point is the one related to the border/
boundary management (Block 2) “to complete the endeavor, in a coordinated 
manner with the other party, the delineation of the border/boundary with Mon-
tenegro”. This benchmark has been modified overtime to the extent that in the 
end the government in Pristina needed not only to delineate the border, but 
also to ratify the Agreement reached. Conditionality scholarship have showed 
that in situations when the criteria applied are more consistent and precise, 
the likelihood that the government will comply with it increases (Zhelyazkova 
et al. 2018). The case of Kosovo also shows that although the process has been 
loaded with some new conditions, especially in the political sphere, making the 
conditionality approach look like inconsistent, unfair and non-effective at first 
glance; the actual situation is that this is the result of an EU learning curve: the 
Union has learned that conditions need to be more specific and much more flex-
ible for the EU to make a genuine change according to the case at the hand. 
At the end of the process, Kosovo was not only requested to delineate the bor-
der with its neighbor, but also to complete the ratification of the border de-
marcation agreement in the Assembly (European Commission 2018d). It was 
exactly this benchmark that became highly contested in Kosovo’s domestic 
political arena and eventually led to the change in government. Kosovo lost 
almost three years in the visa liberalisation process because of internal po-
litical tensions and difficulties in forming a government, which resulted in 
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paralyzed state institutions unable to implement visa-free related reforms 
(Freedom House 2018, 2-3). This has not been the case with previous Road-
maps for the Western Balkan countries. Although new benchmarks were not 
explicitly mentioned in the Roadmap, the recommendations from the Com-
mission’s reports on progress made by Kosovo in fulfilling the requirements 
of the visa liberalisation roadmap and readings of various evaluation reports 
from fact-finding missions have modified some existing benchmarks or even-
tually new ones emerged. As an interviewed civil servant pointed out,  Kosovo 
was required to set up reintegration offices in all municipalities in the country 
as well as to allocate EUR 3.2 million annually for “sustainable reintegration of 
its repatriated citizens”.3 
THE INCREASING ROLE OF MEMBER STATES’ 
CONCERNS IN SHAPING THE COURSE OF 
ENLARGEMENT
Most of the explicit, and in some cases, additional, Kosovo-specific criteria, 
are deriving from 1) the particular situation of non-recognition by five member 
states and the presence of international organisation, 2) the interest of mem-
ber states to be more involved and informed in assessing the situation with 
the progress made, and finally 3) the difficulties EU member states might face 
with migration once the visa-free travel is obtained. An example from the first 
category of specific criteria can be observed in the given role to the EU Rule of 
Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). The EULEX is given a role to monitor, mentor 
and advise Kosovo authorities on adopting and implementing the reforms and 
fulfilling the necessary requirements (Visa Liberalisation with Kosovo Road-
map 2012, 5). There is also a designated role for the other EU agencies such 
as Europol, Eurojust, Frontex, and EASO in assessing the progress made by 
Kosovo in fulfilling the benchmarks. In addition, due to the status specificity, 
in each benchmarks where cooperation with relevant EU agency is envisaged, 
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Kosovo is recommended to be creative and to “explore possible avenues of 
cooperation” (Visa Liberalisation with Kosovo Roadmap 2012, 7) such as in the 
situation with the International Civil Aviation Organisation; whereas in situ-
ations where it needed to report to an agency like Interpol, Kosovo communi-
cation channel went through EULEX (Visa Liberalisation with Kosovo Road-
map 2012, 7). The same goes for issues related to readmission because of the 
fact that Kosovo cannot sign such an agreement with EU. The visa facilitation 
agreement too was different from those that other countries in the region have 
concluded and implemented. The reporting on many issues, such as for exam-
ple detailed statistics on border/boundary control measures, on the number of 
personal travel documents and ID cards, or the detailed statistics on asylum, 
needed to be made not only to the Commission, as it had been the case with 
other Western Balkan countries, but also to EULEX and member states. 
The second group of specific criteria originates from the expressed interest of 
member states to get involved in the entire process. This has been introduced 
by the Commission in the Roadmap as ‘reinforced consultation’, thereby out-
lining the essential need for an intensified dialogue with the Council and the 
member states (Visa Liberalisation with Kosovo Roadmap 2012, 3). Although 
this exercise is more of an internal EU institutional issue and matter of politi-
cal nature, it showcases the interest of, especially some, member states to be 
involved and informed about the assessment of the situation regarding the 
progress made. While the Commission is still in charge of assessing the ful-
fillment of the criteria, which remain the same as with the other Western Bal-
kan countries, the member states would like to explicitly acknowledge their 
role and interest in the whole visa endeavour with Kosovo. The possibility of 
“amending the roadmap” if deemed necessary by the Council and the member 
states and “utilising the expertise” of EU and EU-related agencies and insti-
tutions in assessing the progress made are cases in point (Visa Liberalisation 
with Kosovo Roadmap 2012, 3). What the discussion in the Council will entail 
is very precisely detailed, in addition to the explicit note that “the Commission 
will take into utmost consideration the political conclusions of discussion in 
the Council” (Visa Liberalisation with Kosovo Roadmap 2012, 4).
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The third category of specific criteria is associated with the difficulties that 
the EU member states might face with migration once Kosovo citizens obtain 
visa-free travel to the EU. Thereby, the Commission is tasked to evaluate “the 
expected migratory and security impacts of liberalisation of the visa regime 
with Kosovo” and to report to Council and the Member States based on a num-
ber of performance indicators (Visa Liberalisation with Kosovo Roadmap 2012, 
4). Whereas the evaluation reports are a novelty in the case of Kosovo, the per-
formance indicators were applied also for the other Western Balkan countries. 
These indicators include visa refusal rate for Kosovo applicants, refusal rates, 
the number of Kosovo citizens found to be illegally staying EU, submitted 
asylum applications and rejected readmission applications. The evaluation 
reports, in this case, were justified by the fear in some member states for a po-
tential increase of asylum seekers based on previously high number of seekers 
from Kosovo (9,870 in 2011, 14,310 in 2010 and 14,275 in 2009).4 In this regard, 
one needs to be aware of the extraordinary migration crisis from Kosovo in the 
years from 2014-2016, which had its peak in 2015. According to the Commis-
sion’s third progress report on visa liberalisation “between September 2014 
and April 2015, 87,495 Kosovo citizens sought asylum in the EU Member States 
and the Schengen Associated States” (European Commission 2015). However, 
this trend is decreasing dramatically. The 2018 annual EU Commission coun-
try report reveals that there is a significant decrease in the number of asylum 
seekers from Kosovo from 73,235 in 2015, to 11,965 in 2016 and an estimated 
7,575 in 2017. This is very relevant for the positive assessment made by the 
Commission because of the fact that according to the Roadmap a “substantial 
decrease in these performance indicators will be used as an indicative refer-
ence” in the Commission evaluation reports (Visa Liberalisation with Kosovo 
Roadmap 2012, 15). 
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CONCLUSIONS
At present, Kosovo’s EU path is paved with uncertainty. Because of the un-
resolved status and the five EU non-recognizers – Spain, Romania, Slovakia, 
Cyprus, and Greece – Kosovo has reached its limits in the accession process. 
However, while the status issue remains a huge burden for Kosovo’s relations 
with the EU, at least with regards to visa-free travel, the outcomes are positive. 
The results of the government reforms and action in the 4 blocks of priority re-
forms are assessed by the European Commission as fulfilled and the European 
Parliament has voted in favour of visa-free travel for Kosovo citizens.    
The policy conditionality applied and the mechanisms used in the case of Koso-
vo, in general, follow the pattern of previous rounds of visa liberalisation with 
the other countries of the region. The tailor-made Roadmap for Kosovo needed 
to take into account the specificities of the country and the shared obligations 
and responsibilities between international organisations and the authorities. 
This also reflects the reality associated with the current status of Kosovo vis-à-
vis the European Union. The complexity of relations between the two parties 
and the complex situation within Kosovo, related to the status, resulted in ful-
filling the visa liberalisation criteria in around six years; in contrast, the other 
countries from the region needed only approximately 2-3 years.  
The number of criteria given to Kosovo exceeds by double the number of re-
quirement provided to the other Western Balkan countries, however, this is 
due to the increased level of precision and detailness of the documents itself 
and is not associated with the reforms that need to be implemented. Therefore, 
content-wise, Kosovo is required to implement the same reforms as the others. 
The single issue that directly influenced the precision and credibility of the EU 
approach in Kosovo towards the visa liberalisation process is the possibility to 
amend the criteria in the Roadmap provided to Kosovo at the beginning of the 
process. This has not been the case in previous rounds of visa liberalisation. 
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This chapter traces the political relations between Kosovo and Spain. Specif-
ically, we review the reasons behind the non-recognition of Kosovo by Spain 
and the role Kosovo independence played in Catalonia’s quest for self-de-
termination. The empirical analysis identifies the internal power struggle of 
Spain as the most important reason for the non-recognition of Kosovo, albeit 
other reasons, such as the adherence to international law and the internal 
dynamics of the governing Spanish Socialist party also played a decisive role. 
Likewise, we argue that the Spanish government’s position of the last eleven 
years has resulted in an unintentional comparison of Kosovo with the internal 
situation in Spain. However, the study suggests that Kosovo played an active 
and significant role in the Catalan process of self-determination. This argu-
ment is made in two sections. Section one reviews the Spanish government’s 
position towards Kosovo, from the prelude of Kosovo’s declaration of indepen-
dence, to the arrival of power of the then-new socialist Prime Minister, Pedro 
Sanchez. Section two examines the support of Catalan separatists for the in-
dependence of Kosovo and explains the role that the case of Kosovo played in 
the Catalan process of independence. The study is based on historical narra-
tive, analysis of key official documents and seven semi-structured interviews 
conducted in Pristina, Brussels, Madrid and Barcelona. 
P
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INTRODUCTION
Eleven years after Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the stance of the 
Spanish government concerning the newest state in Europe remains un-
changed. The position of the different governments – the Popular Party (PP) 
and the Socialist Party (PSOE) – has always been marked by not only the 
non-recognition approach, but also by the lack of political engagement with 
Kosovo. Spain, together with EU member states Cyprus, Slovakia, Greece 
and Romania, continues to reject the recognition of Kosovo. This position is 
unlikely to change in the near future, especially in the absence of an official 
agreement for the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina.
Although the official government approach states that Spain does not recog-
nise Kosovo, because the declaration of independence was a breach of inter-
national law, political analysts and media outlets have explained this decision 
as motivated by the internal dynamics of Spain; in other words: the quest for 
independence in the Basque Country and Catalonia. In fact, the approach tak-
en by the PP government in recent years, when the Catalan crisis has been at its 
highest peak, has reinforced the approach that the non-recognition of Kosovo 
stems from the internal situation in Spain. Unequivocally, this argument was 
enhanced by Catalan separatist parties which repeatedly made reference to 
Kosovo’s process of independence as a legitimate path to achieve self-deter-
mination.  
The first section introduces the main question of the paper: what is the role of 
the Kosovo question in Catalonia’s quest for independence? Previous works 
have looked at the examples of Scotland and Quebec as potential self-deter-
mination models to be followed by Catalonia. Using an innovative approach, 
and driven by the political crisis in Catalonia, this paper tests whether or not 
Kosovo played a role in constituting the Catalan process of independence. 
Hence, the goal is not to address the differences between Catalonia and Koso-
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vo’s path for self-determination, nor to see whether Catalonia does or does not 
have a right to secede, but to explain the role that the case of Kosovo played in 
processes of legitimisation of the Catalan quest for independence. The main 
hypothesis is that the case of Kosovo played a significant role in the unilateral 
declaration of independence of Catalonia on 27 October 2017.
Before going into the core of the analysis and in order to establish the con-
text, the paper provides a thorough historical background, including inter 
alia, the various reasons behind the non-recognition of Kosovo by Spain. This 
part of the paper provides a comprehensive overview of the Spanish approach 
towards Kosovo, from before the latter’s declaration of independence, to the 
present. In this vein, the paper explains how Spain paid —and continues to 
pay— very little attention to the developments in the Western Balkans (WB), 
despite overall following the EU’s foreign policy agenda in the region. Spanish 
foreign policy only dissociated from the EU’s position on the WB when Spain 
decided not to recognise Kosovo on 18 February 2008. It was only then that 
the Spanish authorities raised concerns about the case of Kosovo as a poten-
tial precedent if recognition was granted. The paper continues by looking into 
the reception of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion on 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence in Spain, the effects of the change of 
government in Spain and the escalation of the crisis in Catalonia with regards 
to Kosovo.
The second part of the paper focuses on explaining how and why Catalan sep-
aratists used the case of Kosovo to further their demands for independence. 
The paper argues that Catalan separatist parties instrumentalized two events: 
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence and the ICJ advisory opin-
ion on Kosovo’s declaration of independence, thereby ignoring, however, the 
events that led to the independence of Kosovo. Ultimately, the last section of 
the paper provides the concluding remarks on the approach of the Spanish 
governments towards Kosovo in recent years. By the same token, the conclu-
sions claim that Catalan separatists persistently used Kosovo to further their 
goal for independence. 
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METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
The methodology of the research is based on a qualitative approach. The 
data has been gathered through two different sources: desk research and 
semi-structured interviews. The research has also utilized the historical nar-
rative on how the issue of Kosovo has been dealt with by Spanish politicians 
and the Catalan separatists over the last ten years. 
In the desk research, the paper focused on analysing policy papers, political 
statements and motions presented in the Senate and the Congress of Spain by 
Catalan and Spanish political representatives. The timeframe of the research 
comprises nine years, from the unilateral declaration of independence of 
Kosovo on 17 February 2008 to the unilateral declaration of independence of 
Catalonia on 27 October 2017. Additionally, the paper devotes a small section 
to the position of Spain prior to Kosovo’s independence. 
The core of the research is based on data gathered through semi-structured in-
terviews with politicians in Spain, Kosovo and Belgium. The first phase involved 
interviews in Madrid, Barcelona and Brussels with Representatives of the PSOE 
– currently heading the government – and representatives of Catalan separat-
ist parties. This includes, leaders of the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) and 
the Catalan European Democratic Party (PDeCAT).1 The aim was to understand 
their personal and the overarching party position on Kosovo’s statehood and the 
role Kosovo played in Catalonia’s process for independence. The second phase 
focused on semi-structured interviews in Kosovo with representatives of two 
political parties: Vetëvendosje and The Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK). This 
aimed to understand the channel of communication between Kosovar, Catalan 
and Spanish authorities over the last ten years and the approach Kosovar leaders 
have used to foster institutional cooperation with Spain.
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The semi-structured interviews with Kosovar and Spanish authorities were con-
ducted in their capacity as representatives of their political parties. Hence, the 
content of the interviews does not only reflect the position of the interviewees 
per se, but also, and fundamentally, the political approach of the political party 
they represent. The content of these interviews, together with the different po-
litical statements analysed, have supported the claim of this paper that asserts 
that Kosovo played an important role in Catalonia’s path for self-determination.
THE KOSOVO QUESTION IN SPAIN 
Kosovo in Spanish politics: a  
remote and uninteresting issue
Spanish relations with Western Balkan states have historically been very limit-
ed. Prior to the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, the cooperation between Spain and 
WB states was limited to diplomatic relations and the presence of Yugoslav vol-
unteer soldiers in the Spanish Civil War (Ferrero 2017). The arrival of Yugoslav 
brigadistas belonged to a contingent of fighters from the Kingdom of Yugosla-
via, linked with the Communist Party, who sided with the Republicans during 
the war. The lack of Spanish engagement in the development of the region can 
be explained by the limited trade and economic relations between Spain and 
the states of the WB. This impacted on the interest that Spanish authorities had 
in the area, which meant the absence of a foreign policy agenda in the region. 
The eruption of violence in the former Yugoslavia in 1991, however, turned Span-
ish attention to the events of the region; not only because of the bloodshed and 
the cruelty of certain military actions, but also because of the fear of drawing par-
allels between the fragmentation of Yugoslavia and the territorial dynamics of 
Spain. In other words: the political situation in the Basque country and Catalonia. 
Although Spain was, at first, reluctant to accept the formation of new states in the 
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prelude of the conflict, and thus, to recognise Slovenia and Croatia, the position of 
a ‘newcomer’ in the EU foreign policy sphere made Spain recognize these states, 
in 1992, after the recognition by most of the EU partners – headed by Germany 
(El País 16 Jan. 1992). Nevertheless, the Spanish role in the region showed a lower 
degree of involvement compared to other European partners, such as Germany 
or Austria. Due to the limited national interest in the WB, Spain has traditionally 
been following the overarching EU foreign policy in the region. Kosovo’s declara-
tion of independence in 2008, nonetheless, marked a turning point. 
Spanish governments based their position of not recognizing Kosovo on in-
ternational legal parameters, arguing that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of 
independence did not comply with international law. Media and political an-
alysts, in comparison, explained the government’s decision with territorial is-
sues within Spanish borders. This research has proven, however, that Spanish 
authorities have rarely officially pointed to Catalonia and the Basque Country 
as the reasons behind the non-recognition of Kosovo. 
Nevertheless, the (non)recognition of Kosovo has mainly remained an echo 
in Spanish foreign policy concerning the political development of the WB in 
the last ten years. Consequently, the reasons behind the non-recognition of 
Kosovo by Spain have sporadically arisen in the Congress and the Senate of 
Spain, through motions, in official statements of political leaders and in media 
outlets. Similarly, since the start of the crisis in Catalonia in recent years, the 
question of Kosovo’s independence has moved into the spotlight as the fears 
of drawing an analogy between the two cases increased.
The position of Spain before the declaration of 
independence
The Spanish government’s decision not to recognise Kosovo broke with ten 
years of Spanish cooperation in the region. Significant Spanish personalities, 
like Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General during the NATO bombing of Yu-
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goslavia in 1999, and Lieutenant General Juan Ortuño, head of KFOR (NATO 
Kosovo Force) from April to October 2000, were important actors in the recon-
struction of Kosovo, during and after the conflict. Under the umbrella of the 
Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council, almost 22,000 Spanish soldiers 
served in Kosovo with KFOR in the ten-years period between June 1999 and 
September 2009 (Spanish Ministry of Defence 2018). 
Contrary to the significant military added power, the influence of Spain in the 
negotiation of the political status of Kosovo after the war was very limited; 
most notably, when compared to the role played by key actors, such as the 
members of the Contact Group – the informal grouping of prominent powers 
(US, Russia, France, Great Britain, Germany and Italy)- that had been created 
during the wars in Bosnia and Croatia. Nevertheless, Madrid supported the 
UN-backed talks in Vienna between Kosovo and Serbia in July 2006, albeit 
with a very cautious and distant role. The Spanish government at the time, 
headed by PSOE, asserted that they were going to accept the outcome of the 
negotiations, although they raised some concerns regarding the Ahtisaari Plan 
proposal.2 This, the government feared, could set a precedent and create terri-
torial political difficulties for Spain (International Crisis Group 2007, 10).
In this context, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, Miguel Angel 
Moratinos, asked the authorities in Pristina to postpone the declaration of in-
dependence after the Spanish general elections, on 9 March 2008 (Reuters 18 
Feb. 2008). This indicates that the flawed analogy between Kosovo and the 
territorial situation in Spain was already present in the Spanish foreign policy, 
prior to Kosovo’s declaration of independence. However, this analogy would 
not come to light officially until the day of the declaration on 18 February 2008. 
Dissecting Spanish reasons behind non-recognition
One day after Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, the Socialist 
government of PM Zapatero announced that Spain was not going to recog-
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nise Kosovo, arguing that the unilateral declaration of independence was a 
breach of international law. Simultaneously, Moratinos rushed to express that 
the Spanish decision had no possible parallels with the internal dynamics in 
Spain, referring essentially to the situation in the Basque Country and Catalo-
nia (El Confidencial 18 Feb. 2008). The government of Spain, however, lost an 
excellent opportunity to dissociate the foreign policy applied to the WB from 
the internal politics of Spain. In this way, instead of recognising Kosovo and 
dissipating the doubts between the internal situation in Spain and Kosovo, the 
Socialist government chose not to recognize Kosovo and, additionally, exacer-
bated the flawed analogy between the two cases. 
The Spanish government – together with the Greek, Cypriot, Romanian and 
Slovakian governments – thus, broke with years of common European foreign 
policy in the WB, moving from a passive and critical role in the negotiation of 
the political status of Kosovo to a leader in the denial of Kosovo’s statehood. 
Spain aligned with countries such as Russia, China, India and Brazil in the 
non-recognition of Kosovo and did not follow the position of countries such as 
Turkey and the United Kingdom – both with self-determination issues within 
their borders – in recognising Kosovo.
When referring to the breach of international law, the government of PM Zapa-
tero argued that the declaration of independence was an infringement of the 
UN Security Council Resolution 1244. This resolution guarded the principal 
of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
This vehement defence of international law corresponded to the main tenets 
of the Socialist party policy at the time. It is worth noting that the Socialists 
had come to power in 2004 as big advocates of international law, denouncing 
the engagement of the previous PP government in the invasion of Iraq (Vaquer 
2012). The arrival of the Socialist party to power, thus, was considered to be “a 
return to international legality” (Vaquer 2012). Moratinos went as far as com-
paring Kosovo’s independence with the war in Iraq, stating that the two cases 
were clear examples of a breach of international law (El Mundo 18 Feb. 2008).
329
POL VILA SARRIÁ
The position of the Spanish government nevertheless cannot only be ex-
plained by its continuous and official references to international law, as the 
doubts concerning the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence would 
have been diluted by the ICJ advisory opinion of 22 July 2010, which ruled 
that Kosovo’s declaration of independence was not a breach of international 
law. Hence, further explanations ought to be analysed to better understand 
the complex stance of the Spanish government. 
Despite Moratinos frequent reiterations that the decision on Kosovo had little 
to do with the internal situation in Spain, it is doubtful that the Spanish gov-
ernment stance is not influenced by domestic issues. Most of the international 
and national media outlets suggested the day after Kosovo’s independence 
that the decision of the Spanish government was based on the complex situ-
ation with Basque and Catalan separatism. The public’s understanding of the 
government’s position was exacerbated by Popular Party’s effort to exploit the 
Kosovo question as a sign of weakness of PSOE concerning Catalan and Basque 
separatism (Vaquer 2012). The PP used the Kosovo question systematically as a 
weapon to create internal fragility within the PSOE before the Spanish general 
elections. In fact, Basque and Catalan separatists vigorously supported and 
celebrated the process of independence of Kosovo, which prompted Moratinos 
to demand the delay of Kosovo’s declaration. 
It is also possible that the personal connections of Moratinos played a significant 
role in the decision not to recognise Kosovo. Moratinos, a diplomat by profes-
sion, had served in the Spanish Embassy in Belgrade between 1980 and 1984 and 
was awarded with the distinction of Honorary Citizen of Belgrade in 2009 for 
his support to Serbia “in all fields” (B92 13 Dec. 2009). The former Serbian pres-
ident, Boris Tadic, stressed that “he had never met a minister in the world that 
had advocated so much for Belgrade and Serbia”, describing him as the “angel 
protector of Belgrade and Serbia” (El Mundo, 12 Dec. 2009). This image of Mor-
atinos’ commitment to and personal connections with Serbia is shared by some 
politicians in Spain and Kosovo. For instance, the former Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Kosovo and current Deputy Prime Minister, Enver Hoxhaj, remarked 
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that Moratinos was very close to Belgrade, promoting a Serb policy towards the 
Western Balkans, and thus, he created the perception that the declaration of 
independence of Kosovo was a problem for Spanish foreign policy makers.3 
To what extent Moratinos’ personal circle played a role or influenced the deci-
sion of the Spanish government not to recognise Kosovo, remains uncertain. It 
is most likely, however, that his own approach was not a decisive factor in the 
decision not to recognize Kosovo, as the position of Spain would have changed 
when he left the position of Minister in October 2010. What is clear, however, is 
that the Spanish decision was taken rapidly and under high pressure from dif-
ferent sides. This, together with the fear of setting a precedent for Catalonia and 
the Basque Country, provoked the prompt decision not to recognise Kosovo on 
18 February 2008. As a result, instead of recognizing Kosovo and separating the 
question from the internal situation of Spain, the Madrid government gave cre-
dence to the analogy between the two cases. This signalled to the Spanish pop-
ulation and to European partners that the Spanish government was quite fragile.
The period after independence  
The time between Kosovo’s declaration of independence and the change of 
government in Spain in December 2011 did not show an improvement in rela-
tions with the newly created state. Instead, the former Spanish Minister of De-
fence, Carme Chacón (PSOE), announced during her visit to the Spanish base 
in Istok in March 2009, the controversial decision to gradually withdraw the 
620 Spanish KFOR peacekeeping troops from Kosovo (El País 20 Mar. 2009). 
This announcement was not only criticised internally by the PP and by Catalan 
and Basque nationalist parties, but also by the international allies, especially 
NATO and the US (Reuters 22 Mar. 2009). 
Additionally, two weeks after this decision, the Spanish government an-
nounced the withdrawal of its small contingent from the European Union 
Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) (ABC 30 Mar. 2008). Six months later, 
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by September 2010, all Spanish military personnel had left Kosovo (Vaquer 
2012, 20). The Spanish government justified these controversial decisions by 
arguing that EULEX’s and KFOR’s mandate after independence could jeopar-
dize the enforcement of the UNSC Resolution 1244 and, therefore, strengthen 
Kosovo’s institutions to act as a state. The position of Spain alienated them-
selves from the position of other non-recognizers, such as Greece or Romania, 
who decided to maintain their troops on the ground. 
Despite the worsening relationship, however, there was communication be-
tween Moratinos and the authorities in Kosovo, resulting in different talks un-
der the Spanish EU Presidency, such as the Sarajevo Summit in June 2010. But 
the 2010 ICJ advisory opinion and the subsequent escalation of the separatist 
movement in Catalonia broke with the rapprochement of the two countries, 
leaving the relations colder than before. In fact, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Spain presented long written statements during ICJ proceedings in defence 
of its position about the illegality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence.
In the aftermath of the ICJ decision, the Spanish approach became inconsis-
tent; the government thought that the declaration of Kosovo could set a prec-
edent for other nations’ independence, but at the same time it labelled the 
Kosovo case as a ‘sui generis’ one (Mangas Martin 2011, 108) Therefore, one 
must pose the following question: if it is a sui generis case why did Spain not 
recognize Kosovo? The answer to this question should have been to differenti-
ate the internal situation of Spain from the one in Kosovo, and thus, recognize 
Kosovo and reassert once and for all that the situation of Kosovo has very little 
in common with the one in Catalonia and the Basque country. The Spanish 
government, however, did not follow that line.
Politically speaking, the diplomatic relations between the representatives of 
the Spanish and the Kosovar governments became very poor in the aftermath 
of the ICJ decision; they were limited to informal conversations in multilateral 
organisations, which were usually not made public. Spain feared that any of-
ficial meeting or encounter with Kosovo’s government representatives could 
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enhance Kosovo’s statehood. The Spanish approach was taken to the extreme, 
compared to other non-recognizers. For instance, formal and informal meet-
ings between Kosovo officials and Greek, Slovakian, Romanian and Cypriot 
authorities have taken place throughout the last ten years, including visits to 
these countries. However, visits to Spain have been almost impossible, be-
cause Spain one of only two EU member states - the other being Cyprus - that 
do not accept Kosovo’s passport. The Spanish approach towards Kosovo was 
also sometimes more extreme than the one followed by Belgrade or Moscow. 
In fact, it is quite paradoxical that Kosovar citizens can enter Serbia today with 
a simple ID, while their entrance to Spain is hardly ever granted. The ‘harden-
ing’ of Spain’s position towards Kosovo was certainly influenced by the awak-
ening of the separatist movement in Catalonia.
The election of Popular Party Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy on 20 November 
2011 was an opportunity to soften the approach towards the recognition of 
Kosovo. Although, the PP had supported the previous government in its policy 
of non-recognition of Kosovo, the former Kosovar Minister for Foreign Affaris, 
Enver Hoxhaj, confirmed that 2012- 2013 were periods of openness with the 
initiation of the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, which 
Spain fully supported (B92 8 Jan. 2010). Moreover, Spain softened its position 
on Kosovo’s relations with the EU, refraining from blocking the Stabilization 
and Association Agreement that was signed on 27 October 2015. However, this 
was not translated into recognition or institutional cooperation, as Spanish 
representatives clearly stated that “the agreement did not prejudge the Span-
ish position on the international status of Kosovo” (The Diplomat in Spain 
31 Jul. 2017). This had previously been confirmed in 2012 by Rajoy during an 
intense discussion in the Congress of Spain with the then Convergence and 
Union (CiU) spokesman, Duran i Lleida; in that Rahoy vocally asserted that 
Spain would not recognise Kosovo because it was what best suited the general 
interests of the whole country (La Vanguardia 14 Mar. 2012). 
However, with the escalation of the political crisis in Catalonia in recent years 
and the continuous flawed analogy between the two cases, the stance of the 
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Spanish government towards Kosovo’s statehood worsened. Rajoy’s govern-
ment did not only continue to deny Kosovo’s statehood, including Madrid’s 
rigid visa policy and refusing to meet Kosovar officials, but his administration 
also voted against the prospective accession of Kosovo into international or-
ganisations, such as UNESCO or UEFA. In January 2018, Rajoy’s administration 
took a step forward, submitting a letter in the form of a non-paper in which 
they questioned the presence of Kosovo in the EU Enlargement Plan (Europa-
press, 30 Jan. 2018). The last chapter of this story took place in the EU-Western 
Balkans Summit in Sofia in May 2018. Rajoy opted not to attend the summit 
in which all other EU leaders were present due to the presence of the highest 
Kosovar official, President Hashim Thaçi. This was noteworthy also because 
the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, was present in the Summit. 
These latest policies delivered two important developments: firstly, that the 
actions of the Spanish government denoted once again little interest in the 
future development of the WB; and, secondly, that these acts reinforced the 
misleading analogy between Catalonia and Kosovo by worsening the relations 
with Kosovo, while the crisis in Catalonia was unfolding. Thus, the Spanish 
approach developed from a passive involvement in the recognition of Kosovo 
to a more rigid approach. Against the intended aim of the government, this 
approach helped reinforce the analogy between the cases of Kosovo and Cat-
alonia. 
Future perspectives: no change if there is  
no move from Belgrade
On 1 June 2018, Pedro Sanchez of PSOE toppled Mariano Rajoy from power, be-
coming the first prime minister in the history of Spain to access power through 
a no confidence vote. The new tenure of Sanchez represents the first time that 
a PM in Spain has extensive knowledge and experience in the WB. Sanchez 
gained these skills working in the cabinet of the UN High Representative in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Carlos Westendorp, during the war in Kosovo. His exper-
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tise in the region, however, has so far did not bring any change in the stance of 
Madrid towards the recognition of Kosovo. In fact, Sanchez had already before 
shown his disagreement with the independence of Kosovo when in 2010, and 
as a representative of PSOE in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Congress 
of Spain, he voted voting against a motion – presented by ERC – to recognise 
Kosovo (Foreign Affairs Committee of the Congress of Spain 2010, 3-8). 
The Socialist MP, José Zaragoza, confirmed that the approach of the Sanchez 
government is not likely to change, unless Serbia recognises Kosovo.4  Zarago-
za reiterated that the position of the government would follow the previous 
administration’s position. This is to say, that Spain will not recognise Koso-
vo’s independence, re-affirming the position that Kosovo’s unilateral declara-
tion did not respect international law, despite the 2010 ICJ advisory opinion. 
Likewise, Zaragoza, used the rhetoric of previous governments, denying any 
linkage to Catalonia and the Basque Country as reasons behind the non-recog-
nition of Kosovo.5 
Although the Sanchez government did not consider Kosovo as a priority, pol-
iticians in Kosovo regard the election of Sanchez as a window of opportunity 
to change the stance towards Kosovo, not necessarily in terms of recognition, 
but of institutional cooperation between the two countries. Both Vetëvendosje 
leader Albin Kurti and Deputy President of the Democratic Party of Kosovo 
Enver Hoxhaj stated their belief that there are hopes for a new and different 
approach, where a new channel of communication can commence.6 But Koso-
vo was not among the main topics in the Spanish foreign policy agenda during 
the short-lived tenure of PM Sanchez and until the Spanish general elections 
that were held in April 2019.7
The possibility remains, nonetheless, that the position of Spain could change, 
should an agreement to normalize the relations between Belgrade and Pristina 
be signed. Although for years this option seemed unattainable, the conten-
tious plan to exchange territories between the two countries brought forward 
in the summer 2018, could lead to the recognition of Kosovo by Serbia. Hence, 
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Spain and many other countries could follow. Although Spain has been one of 
the states to openly oppose this exchange of territories, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Josep Borrell, stressed that should the agreement be signed between 
Kosovo and Serbia, Spain would certainly have no objections to recognizing 
Kosovo (La Vanguardia, 31 Aug. 2018). 
The stance of the different political parties in Spain
Together with the PP and PSOE, only the Spanish centred-right political party, 
Ciudadanos (Citizens) (32/350 seats in 2018), follows the line of openly refusing 
to recognize Kosovo’s independence. This position was perfectly illustrated by 
the Ciudadanos MP, Melisa Rodriguez, in response to a motion presented by 
ERC, in the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Congress of Spain in April 2016. 
In a very similar manner, her colleague, Fernando Moura, showed the discon-
tent of its party with the participation of Kosovo in the Mediterranean games 
in Tarragona – Spain – in June 2018, where the flag of Kosovo was finally not 
waved (El Español 29 Sept. 2017); this constituted another example of the ex-
treme policy followed by the Spanish government in rejecting Kosovo’s state-
hood.
While over the course of the last ten years the constitutional parties have de-
nied the recognition of Kosovo, the other political parties with a seat in the 
Congress of Spain have taken very different approaches.8 The left-wing po-
litical party, Podemos (67/350 seats in 2018), was the most ambiguous of all 
the Spanish parties concerning the recognition of Kosovo. Its leader, Pablo 
Iglesias, voted against an EU Parliament resolution to foster the integration 
of Kosovo into the EU in 2015, arguing that “Kosovo was a kind of narco-state 
backed by the US, whose recognition was contrary to international law” (Euro-
pean Parliament debate 2015); but his colleague, Raimundo Viejo, voted in fa-
vour of recognising Kosovo in a motion in the Congress of Spain, in April 2016. 
The supportive position was confirmed by the Podemos Senator, Sara Vilà, who 
voted in favour of a motion to recognize Kosovo in the Senate of Spain in April 
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2017 (Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate of Spain 17 Apr. 2017). This in-
ner party division is explained by the tenets of the party: on the one hand, the 
position against foreign interventions, such as the NATO bombing in 1999, and 
on the other, the support of self-determination movements, such as that of the 
Albanians in Kosovo in the 1990s. 
The Basque and Catalan nationalist parties – PDeCAT (8/350 seats in 2018), 
ERC (9/350 seats in 2018), EH Bildu (2/350 seats in 2018) and the Basque Na-
tionalist Party (PNV) (5/350 seats in 2018) – have been by far the most vocally 
open to the recognition of Kosovo since the day after the declaration of inde-
pendence. This support has not only been expressed through motions in the 
Congress and the Senate of Spain, but also through official statements, letters 
and unofficial meetings with Kosovo’s representatives. Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence was celebrated by Catalan and Basque nationalist parties in 
an interesting manner, because it opened the door to new states in Europe. It 
has therefore kept alive the will of independence for Catalonia and the Basque 
country. This first case is further analysed in the following section of the paper.
KOSOVO IN CATALAN POLITICS 
The Kosovo question in Catalan separatism 
Contrary to the refusal of the Socialist and Popular governments to recognise 
Kosovo over the last ten years, Catalan separatist parties have been the biggest 
advocates of Kosovo’s independence, since its declaration in February 2008. 
The form of support has varied, from official statements to symbolic recogni-
tions by Catalan towns. Likewise, the two prominent Catalan secessionist par-
ties – ERC and PDeCAT – have approached the question in a different manner, 
depending on the state of play of Catalan separatism.
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The general Catalan political support of Kosovo’s statehood overlaps with the 
escalation of the will for independence in Catalonia in the last few years. It was 
not until 2011 and 2012, after the Spanish Constitutional Court’s 2010-decision 
to overthrow parts of the 2006 Catalan Statute of Autonomy, that Catalan au-
thorities openly started to advocate for a referendum for self-determination. 
Prior to this event, there was also only limited Catalan support for Kosovo’s in-
dependence, as the Kosovo case reflected the possibility of the creation of new 
states in Europe. However, at the end of 2014, when the Catalan secessionist 
leaders realized that they were unable to agree upon a Catalan referendum for 
self-determination with the central government, the unilateral path started to 
gain momentum. In this regard, Catalan leaders used the Kosovo case as the 
latest example of country to achieve self-determination and orientated them-
selves to the path chosen by Kosovo eight years earlier.
Public statements and policy papers published by Catalan secessionist leaders 
started to make references to the unilateral path followed by Kosovo as a right-
ful and legitimate road for Catalan independence (El Periódico 4 May. 2016; 
Levrat et. al. 2017). The response of the central government in Madrid was cat-
egorical, accusing the autonomous government in Catalonia of trying to create 
a similar situation to the one in Kosovo in 1998 (El Español 10 Jun. 2018). Thus, 
the Kosovo question and the flawed analogy with the Catalan case emerged in 
the Spanish media. Catalan secessionist leaders were accused by the central 
government and political analysts of using Kosovo’s process of independence 
as a model to be followed by Catalonia. Catalan separatists focused on instru-
mentalising the July 2010 ICJ Advisory Opinion to legitimise Catalan indepen-
dence. This usage was, however, extremely partisan, as it ignored the events 
that had led to the independence of Kosovo a decade before.
Starting from these accusations, the main conundrum in this section is 
whether or not Kosovo played a significant role in the Catalan process for in-
dependence that culminated with the Catalan unilateral declaration of inde-
pendence on 27 October 2017. In other words: was Kosovo’s decision taken 
as model by Catalan leaders when they declared independence unilaterally 
THE KOSOVO QUESTION IN SPANISH DOMESTIC POLITICS: A VIEW FROM CATALONIA
338
in October 2017? And if so, how did Catalan leaders conceive Kosovo’s path 
for independence? To answer these questions, two events that served as an 
important precedent for Catalan separatism are analysed: Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration of independence in 2008 and the July 2010 ICJ Advisory Opinion 
on the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence. 
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence
Unlike the Socialist government of Zapatero, the Catalan separatist movement 
highly welcomed Kosovo’s independence. One day after the declaration, the 
secretary general of ERC and vice president of Catalonia at the time, Carod-Ro-
vira, sent a congratulatory letter to Hashim Thaçi (El Punt Avui 21 Feb. 2008). 
This was criticized by the Socialist President of Catalonia, José Montilla. How-
ever, Carod-Rovira – rather in his function as leader of ERC than vice president 
of Catalonia9 – called for the Spanish government to recognise Kosovo (El Mun-
do 17 Feb. 2008). Nonetheless, ERC’s board was certainly more ambiguous in 
this regard; while some representatives of ERC regarded Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence as an important precedent in Europe, others rejected any 
comparisons between Catalonia and Kosovo (La Vanguardia 18 Feb. 2008). The 
same message was sent by the President of the Catalan nationalist party, CiU, 
Artur Mas, despite being more cautious in his message. Whilst he applauded 
the declaration and called for the Spanish government to recognise Kosovo, 
he openly admitted that there were no parallels between Kosovo and Catalo-
nia (Público 18 Feb. 2008). The precedent case had already been put forward 
before the declaration of independence in the Congress of Spain, when Agusti 
Cerdá, ERC MP, argued that Kosovo’s independence would be a “historical un-
questionable precedent” (20 Minutos 19 Dec. 2007).
The differences in the approach of ERC and CiU concerning Kosovo result from 
their different views on the territorial spectrum of Catalonia. Whilst ERC is 
openly pro-independence, CiU had divergent opinions within the party at the 
time. The inner CiU split is caused by the party’s nature of a federation of two 
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constituent parties, the Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (CDC) – predeces-
sor of PDeCAT – and the Democratic Union of Catalonia (UDC). While the CDC 
was rather pro-independence – but with autonomist leaders within the party 
–, the UDC itself had opposing views regarding the independence of Catalonia. 
Furthermore, pro-independence leaders within CiU focused on the Scotland 
or Quebec example in organising a referendum on self-determination agreed 
upon by the central government, rather than Kosovo. Although ERC leaders 
also preferred the Scotland and Quebec models, they did not exclude the pos-
sibility of declaring independence unilaterally – following the Kosovo model 
– should no agreement be met with the central government. Due to these am-
biguities within the parties, the Kosovo roadmap was not taken genuinely into 
consideration until after the 2010 ICJ decision. 
The months after Kosovo’s independence were characterised by intense Cata-
lan institutional support for the newly established republic in Europe. In July 
2008, the Parliament of Catalonia adopted a resolution, supporting “the will 
of the Assembly of Kosovo of becoming a new independent state” (Official Ga-
zette of the Parliament of Catalonia Feb. 2008). This support was also raised in 
the Congress of Spain, where Joan Tardà, an ERC MP, presented a motion on 
April 2008, urging the central government to recognize Kosovo (Official Ga-
zette of the Congress of Spain 7 May 2008). CiU and ERC insisted on this uncon-
ditional support, as they considered Kosovo as the perfect European example 
on how self-determination movements can not only achieve independence, 
but also (partial) international recognition.
ICJ advisory opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence
The 22 July 2010 ICJ advisory opinion took place during the escalation of the 
separatist movement in Catalonia. Hence, it is considered to be a watershed 
event for Catalan separatism. The judgment, ruling that Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence was not in breach of international law, arrived in a very heat-
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ed atmosphere where the will for the independence of Catalonia was growing 
significantly in the population. The 28 June 2010 Constitutional Court decision 
to annul and reinterpret parts of the 2006 Catalan Statute of Autonomy that 
inter alia, considered without legal effect the reference of the preamble that 
underlined Catalonia as a nation, boosted Catalan separatism (Official State 
Gazette 16 Jul. 2010). The response of the Catalan society was immediate; days 
later, on 10 July a large demonstration covered the streets of Barcelona with 
the slogan “We are a nation. We decide”. 
Given this tense situation, the Catalan separatist parties – ERC and CiU – start-
ed to mirror other self-determination movements in Europe and elsewhere to 
achieve, no longer just greater autonomy, but independence. The Kosovo path 
gained more popularity after the ICJ decision, albeit with different approaches 
in Catalan separatism; ERC continued to support Kosovo’s independence, cel-
ebrating the ICJ decision and linking it to the Catalan cause. They argued that 
after the judgment, Catalonia “would have international legal basis” to declare 
independence (El País 23 Jul. 2010). The then MEP, and today President of ERC, 
Oriol Junqueras, reiterated that Catalonia and Kosovo’s process for indepen-
dence were comparable (Público 22 Jul. 2010). This stance was immediately 
reflected days later in the demand of ERC to recognise Kosovo, presenting, 
again, a motion in the Congress of Spain (Official Gazette of the Congress of 
Spain Sept. 2010). Although CiU voted in favour of that resolution and congrat-
ulated the Kosovar people for the ICJ judgment, the director of international 
relations of the party, Carles Llorens, stressed that the situations of Catalonia 
and Kosovo were disparate, as they departed from different political and social 
contexts (Público 22 Jul. 2010). The constitutional parties rejected the motion, 
as they considered Kosovo’s declaration a breach of international law. 
The divergence in opinion between the two Catalan separatist parties was due 
to the fact that CiU put trust in the negotiations with the central government 
to find a solution on the political fate of Catalonia within Spain, while ERC 
considered the example of Kosovo as the most successful path to follow. For-
mer CiU MP – and today PDeCAT MP – Jordi Xucla, confirmed that while “Cat-
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alonia and Kosovo are unlike situations, CiU politicians and jurists affiliated 
to the political formation studied the ICJ Decision in depth”.10 Moreover, the 
current President of Catalonia and PDeCAT member, Quim Torra, went even 
further, expressing in his book “The Last 100 Meters: The Road Map to Winning 
the Catalan Republic” (2016), that after the ICJ Decision “nothing could be the 
same again” (Torra i Pla 2016), referring to the possibility of the creation of 
new states after declaring independence unilaterally. This shows the import-
ant role of the ICJ Decision on Kosovo in the Catalan separatist movement and 
it further confirms the active role of the Kosovo question in the Catalan path 
for self-determination. 
In the already highly charged political climate in Catalonia, on 11 September 
2012 – National day of Catalonia – an enormous Catalan independence protest 
march took place under the motto, “Catalonia, new state in Europe”. Within 
two weeks, the President of Catalonia, Artur Mas (CiU), announced snap elec-
tions consolidating the roadmap for a Catalan self-determination referendum, 
arguing that the will of the people had to be moved to the polls (Europa Press 
25 Sept. 2012). The November 2012-elections kept Artur Mas in power, but 
with fewer seats in the Catalan Parliament, due to an increase in the number 
of ERC seats. For the first time, the two Catalan separatist par excellence parties 
agreed on a non-binding Catalan self-determination referendum to be held in 
November 2014. However, the negotiations with the central government on 
this referendum were, yet again, futile. 
In this turbulent environment, CiU showed internal discrepancies between its 
two constituent parties concerning Catalonia’s roadmap; UDC’s leader, Duran 
i Lleida, was an autonomist rather than a separatist, while Artur Mas, leader of 
CDC and president of CiU, became openly pro-independence after the Novem-
ber 2012 elections. This led eventually to the divorce of the two parties in June 
2015 and the transformation of CDC into the PDeCAT. The new party followed 
the path of the Scottish “struggle” for independence. However, Kosovo’s pro-
cess for self-determination continued to be in the back of their minds. For the 
first time, representatives of CiU, openly instrumentalized the ICJ decision 
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and used it for their own case.  In late 2012 and early 2013, Representatives 
of CDC, such as Francesc Homs, former spokesperson of the government of 
Catalonia, referred to the ICJ decision, stressing that an alleged Catalan unilat-
eral declaration of independence would not be in breach of international law 
(La Vanguardia 2 Nov. 2012). Similarly, in June 2013, ERC openly spoke about 
following the Kosovo path and declare independence unilaterally should the 
negotiations to hold a self-determination referendum with the central gov-
ernment in Madrid fail and provided that the Catalan Parliament was formed 
by a pro-independence majority (ERC National Conference, 13 Jul. 2013). Four 
years later, these acts would take place in the Parliament of Catalonia.
Catalan separatists’ usage of Kosovo’s independence, and especially the 2010 
ICJ decision, was also stressed by the intent of the Foreign Affairs Committee 
of the Catalan Parliament to recognise Kosovo in July 2013 through a motion. 
This motion, very similar to other ones presented in the Congress of Spain and 
the Parliament of Catalonia, was worthy of interest. Besides the support of the 
separatist parties, the Catalan Socialist Party (PSC) – referent of the PSOE in 
Catalonia – voted in favour of that motion (Diari de Girona 13 Jul. 2013). This 
vote does not mean that the central Socialist Party (PSOE) supported Kosovo’s 
independence, nor Catalan independence, but it revealed that within the PSC 
there was not (and there is not) a clear stance concerning Kosovo’s recognition, 
unlike in the PSOE. This event captured, once again, the lack of a comprehen-
sive foreign policy agenda in the WB.
Nonetheless, it was not until the derogation by the Constitutional Court of the 
November 2014 non-binding self-determination referendum held in Septem-
ber 2014 that the Kosovo path turned to be the main model to achieve indepen-
dence. From there on, the study of Kosovo’s constituent process by Catalan 
separatist parties was fierce. In June 2016, Marta Rovira, ERC’s Secretary Gen-
eral argued that Catalonia’s process for independence should mirror Kosovo’s 
constituent process, stressing that “Catalonia should copy Kosovo’s system” 
(La Vanguardia 28 Jun. 2016). Meanwhile, there were attempts by Catalan 
leaders to meet Kosovar representative in Pristina; however, the latter refused 
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to do so. Despite this refusal, Catalan separatist parties continued to support 
Kosovo’s independence. In April and September 2016, ERC called again for the 
recognition of Kosovo in the Congress and the Senate of Spain through differ-
ent motions; this time without the support of the PSOE and with an identical 
result of the 2010 and 2008 initiatives. 
The postscript of the Kosovo question in the Catalan path for independence 
finalised on 27 October 2017. The president of Catalonia and PDeCAT leader, 
Carles Puigdemont, declared independence unilaterally with a pro-separatist 
majority in the Catalan Parliament and with the opposition of the constitu-
tional parties, in a very similar way of Kosovo’s declaration; however, with a 
very different result. Unlike the Kosovo case, no state in the world recognised 
the independence of Catalonia. Even the authorities in Kosovo – the state that 
Catalan separatists had fervently defended – refused to recognise Catalonia. 
Clearly positioning itself on the side of Madrid, Pristina argued that Catalonia 
and Kosovo had very little in common.
CONCLUSIONS
The non-recognition of Kosovo by Spain continues to have domestic conse-
quences for the people in the youngest state in Europe. In order for the reader 
to better understand the Spanish context before going into the core of the re-
search question, the paper provided a recapitulation of the Spanish approach 
towards Kosovo in the last ten years. The paper argued that the Spanish po-
sition concerning the (non)recognition of Kosovo cannot be exclusively ex-
plained through its argument on the breach of international law, showing there 
were other grounds not to recognise Kosovo behind the official governmen-
tal approach; from the internal dynamics of Spain (Catalonia and the Basque 
Country), to the endogenous and exogenous circumstances of the Socialist 
party in the beginning of 2008. In other words: the role of Moratinos and the 
pressure of the opposition before the general elections.
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In addition, the paper sustained that the lack of involvement and a foreign 
policy agenda in the WB caused the prompted decision not to recognise Koso-
vo. This decision was highly – and wrongly – influenced by the situation in the 
Basque Country and Catalonia, as it was thought to potentially create a prece-
dent for said Spanish Autonomous Communities. Furthermore, the paper has 
also shown that the Spanish approach developed from a passive involvement 
in the recognition of Kosovo, to a more rigid approach, maintaining a bellig-
erent position towards Kosovo’s statehood while the crisis in Catalonia erupt-
ed. Against the intended aim of the government, this approach, undoubtedly, 
helped to reinforce the analogy between the two cases. To date, eleven years 
after Kosovo’s independence, there is no hope for change. Only a final agree-
ment between Belgrade and Pristina would open a new channel of communi-
cation between the parties, that would eventually trigger the recognition of 
Kosovo.  
The second section of the paper sustained that Catalan separatists used Koso-
vo’s process for independence as a model to be followed by Catalonia. Al-
though the paper argued that the ‘Kosovo path’ only came into light after the 
refusal of the Spanish central government to agree upon a self-determination 
referendum, the arguments presented throughout the paper show that the 
Kosovo case was exploited by Catalan separatism prior to this event. Hence, 
the paper revealed how the Kosovo case started to play a significant role in Cat-
alan politics since Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, as it left the 
door open to the creation of new states in Europe. Two major events shape the 
Catalan interest in Kosovo: the declaration of independence and most impor-
tantly, the ICJ Decision, as it signalled to Catalan separatists that declarations 
of independence were no longer considered a breach of international law, and 
therefore, could potentially be replicated elsewhere. However, the Catalan 
separatist movement instrumentalized this decision, ignoring the singulari-
ties of the Kosovar case. The role of Kosovo in the Catalan constituent process 
for independence has also been demonstrated through recurrent motions – in 
the Congress and Senate of Spain as well as in the Catalan parliament –, po-
litical statements and other policy papers, where Catalan separatist leaders 
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energetically supported the independence of Kosovo and use it conveniently 
for their own. 
The preceding analysis shows how Catalan separatists and the different gov-
ernments in Spain have taken erroneous policy decisions, which are nonethe-
less reversible. Thus, both approaches shall be reviewed. Firstly, Spain must 
consider enhancing institutional cooperation with Kosovo before establishing 
recognition. In the long run, recognising Kosovo would also reinforce the ap-
proach, once and for all, that no analogy is possible between Catalonia and 
Kosovo and it would broaden the knowledge of the country by establishing a 
liaison office. Lastly, Catalonia should refrain from using Kosovo’s roadmap 
for independence as the singularities of the Kosovo case – as any other – are 
genuinely unique. 
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ENDNOTES
1 PDeCAT is the successor party of the Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (CDC) that 
for 37 years integrated the Convergence and Union (CiU) coalition, formed also by the 
Democratic Union of Catalonia (UDC). This is further explained in the second section of 
the paper.
2 The Ahtisaari Plan, also known as the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status 
Settlement (CSP), was a status settlement proposed by the UN special envoy, Marti Ahti-
saari, covering a wide range of issues related to the Kosovo status process for Kosovo.
3 Interview with Enver Hoxhaj, Pristina, 26 September 2018.
4 Interview with José Zaragoza, Madrid, 27 July 2018
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7 The paper was finalised before these elections and therefore does not include any analy-
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8 The regionalist political party Canarian Coalition (1/350 seats) is the only party with a 
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The Socialists’ Party of Catalonia (PSC), Initiative for Catalonia Greens (ICV) and the Cata-
lan nationalist parties, ERC. 
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Romania’s position of not formally recognizing Kosovo has remained unchanged 
and largely unchallenged since 2008. It is endorsed by all political parties, with the 
exception of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania. The reasoning 
behind this position embraces a legalist approach as Romania views in Kosovar 
independence a breach of international law. However, in the public sphere, alterna-
tive narratives have been promoted, portraying Kosovo as a purported dangerous 
precedent. A parallel was drawn between Kosovo’s independence and the fear of 
secession in Székely Land - a Romanian region inhabited mainly by ethnic Hungar-
ians, the status of the breakaway region of Transnistria in Moldova, and, after 2014, 
the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia. While these narratives have been an im-
portant parameter in shaping the attitude of Romanian political parties, there is an 
additional factor explaining the non-recognition policy and the quasi non-existent 
pressure from within to change it: the traditionally good relations between Roma-
nia and Serbia favoured by the almost mythologized relationship with Yugoslavia 
during Communist times. With Kosovo receiving little to no attention prior to the 
conflict, any substantive debate have been hindered by several interspersed factors: 
low awareness among the political parties and general public, close to non-existent 
interest in the topic and limited formal or informal interactions between Romania 
and Kosovo, whether people-to-people, non-governmental or political interactions. 
Political parties have been at the center of this debate and have shaped the public 
agenda, dismissing any dialogue on Kosovo almost instantly. From the very begin-
ning, they positioned themselves unequivocally against recognition. The emergence 
of new political parties in the recent years – which at least in theory are more open to 
dialogue and more professionalized – creates an opportunity for an in-depth analy-
sis of Romania’s relationship to the Western Balkans, and Kosovo in particular. 
R
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THE ATTITUDE OF ROMANIAN POLITICAL 
PARTIES TOWARDS KOSOVO: A SHORT 
INTRODUCTION
Kosovo’s quest for international recognition is far from over despite its 11th 
celebration of unilateral independence in February 2019.  To date, 23 out of 
28 European Union member states and more than 50% of the United Nations 
member states recognize Kosovo. Kosovo also managed to join more than 60 
international organizations, mostly sport or cultural organizations, but yet to 
join any of the major political or security ones (Visoka 2018, 3). While admis-
sion to the United Nations seems unfeasible due to the strong opposition ex-
pressed by both Russia and China, Kosovo took small steps in its relations with 
the European Union. However, despite strong support by the United States 
and European countries, Kosovo’s diplomatic recognition remains highly de-
pendent on reaching out an agreement with Serbia for normalizing their rela-
tion. Five EU member states also oppose the recognition, with Romania among 
them, in a largely accepted stance by all relevant national actors, including the 
political parties.  
‘What influences the attitude of the political parties?’ This question remains a 
focal point when trying to analyze the position adopted by political parties 
concerning crucial topics (Goodin 2013). The most influential political science 
theories portray political parties as rational actors, controlled or dominated 
by election-minded politicians, focused solely on winning the elections and 
on voter preferences. When discussing and analyzing the position adopted by 
political parties in Romania with a view to Kosovo’s status, after a decade-long 
unchallenged policy of non-recognition, one may easily divert the debate 
towards a realist approach, dominated by a perceived self-interest. It would 
be rather unsustainable and against the self-interest of the parties to change 
such well-established position, one that is supported by the entire political 
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spectrum - even if that would not automatically mean “recognition”, but rath-
er enhanced cooperation and dialogue. It would require a significant break-
through or a major event that could bring potential considerable political or 
public gains.
Supporting such desideratum is critical. Prior to the beginning of the conflict, 
Kosovo received marginal attention in Romania. The lack of awareness and 
knowledge both among the parties and the general public has made it pos-
sible not only to portray Kosovo as a dangerous precedent, overshadowing 
the country’s official position on Kosovo1, but also to refer to Kosovo only in 
strict correlation with Székely Land2, the breakaway region of Transnistria, or 
the illegal annexation of Crimea. Romania’s current national context is rigid, 
more fueled by populism and nationalistic approaches, with little appetite for 
sudden changes concerning sensitive topics such as Kosovo’s status. Against 
this background, the alternative narratives created a snowball effect and, at 
this point, dominate the public agenda. After a decade-long policy of non-rec-
ognition and almost no substantive debate on the reasoning behind this, the 
attitude of the political parties remains in the paradigm of maximizing their 
self-interest, which gravitates around the current state of affairs.   
From the very beginning, the political parties positioned themselves unequiv-
ocally against the recognition. Having this in mind, the research paper will 
examine how this position has evolved over time and will try to respond to the 
main issues which hinder any real debate on Kosovo in Romania – What is the 
current position and which narratives are dominating the views of Romanian 
political parties when it comes to the Romania-Kosovo relations? 
The paper will work with a number of assumptions – notably that there 
are alternative narratives, overshadowing Romania’s official legalist ap-
proach, dominating the public agenda and hindering any substantive de-
bate. These narratives include fears over potential ethnic secessionist acts 
in Romania (Zsuzsa 2013, 889-911), false correlations with the illegal annex-
ation of Crimea, or the potential threat to the territorial integrity of the Re-
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public of Moldova (i.e. the status of the breakaway region of Transnistria). 
Aside from these alternative narratives, the public agenda is also set by the ex-
istence of an historically good relationship between Romania and the former 
Yugoslavia and, now, Serbia. Romanians tend to perceive this relation as high-
ly positive and are probably the most pro-Serbian country among the Eastern 
countries.  
This paper will try to fill in a gap in understanding the attitude of the Roma-
nian political parties concerning Kosovo and, in particular, to assess how re-
cently established parties3 position themselves with regard to this topic, but 
without neglecting the older mainstream parties. The paper argues that that, 
although the new parties are more sensitive to the common response of the 
EU to the situation in Kosovo and tend to want to follow it, while dismissing 
the current alternative narratives, it is unlikely that any of these parties would 
move towards recognition. It is more likely for them to watch the relations be-
tween Pristina and Belgrade and to adapt their position accordingly.
UNDERSTANDING ROMANIA’S  
POSITION ON KOSOVO
Since 2008, Romania’s position of non-recognition has remained unchanged 
and largely unchallenged internally. Following the unilateral declaration of in-
dependence that the Parliament of Kosovo enacted on 17 February 2008, Ro-
mania positioned itself as one of the five non-recognizing EU Member States, 
alongside Spain, Greece, Slovakia and Cyprus. This non-recognition policy be-
came visible prior to Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, as the Romanian 
Parliament adopted a Declaration on the future Kosovo on 20 December 2007, 
with a large majority, expressing its concerns regarding the failed negotiations 
between Pristina and Belgrade. Romania’s former President, Traian Băsescu, 
stated that “Kosovo’s declaration is illegal and Romania will not recognize it” 
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(Hotnews.ro 2008) following a meeting with the leaders of the political par-
ties the day after Kosovo’s unilateral declaration. This position was further 
strengthened the following day by a Declaration of the Romanian Parliament, 
voted with a large majority, confirming once again Romania’s position.
The official explanation of this position is a mixture between strict interpre-
tation of international law, self-interest and internal and external concerns 
(Ivan 2017, 41-46). Although Romania claimed that the unilateral declaration 
of independence was issued in breach of international law, this is only one 
side of the story that dominates the Romanian public discourse concerning the 
status of Kosovo. In a public statement following the unilateral declaration, 
Romania’s President at the time stated that it was “a dangerous precedent. The 
failure to observe Serbia’s territorial integrity and to comply with the principle 
of territorial integrity, the absence of an UN Security Council Resolution reg-
ulating the declaration or granting collective rights to minorities, these are all 
sufficient reasons not to recognize it.” (Presidency.ro 2008)
In the years that followed, Romania’s official position remained firm, official-
ly based on a legalist approach, and was rarely challenged by any national 
actor. Neither the European Council’s position of 18 February 2008, stating 
that “Kosovo is a sui generis case and does not jeopardize UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244/1999 or the UN Charter” (European Council 2008), nor the 
ruling by the International Court of Justice in 2010 that “the adoption of the 
declaration of independence had not violated any applicable rule of interna-
tional law” were able to divert it. Noteworthy, during the hearing before the 
International Court of Justice, Romania de facto supported Serbia’s position 
and relying on a breach of international law as main argument. Romania’s rep-
resentatives argued that “ (...) elements of territorial integrity (…). This would 
have severe consequences for international legal order.” (Request for advisory 
opinion, International Court of Justice 2009) Following the decision of the ICJ, 
Romania’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a statement emphasizing that 
the Court’s approach was too narrow, as it did not evaluate if international law 
allows or forbids the creation of a new state through unilateral secession in the 
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respective case, but only examined if the declaration of independence com-
plied with international law. Therefore, as the question raised before the Court 
by the UN General Assembly did not allow the Court to carry out an extensive 
analysis of the respective case, Romania reiterated its position of non-recog-
nition (mae.ro 2010).
During the last decade, there was a single occasion when Romania’s position 
on Kosovo was challenged internally. It was back in 2013, a year that could be 
considered a landmark year for the Kosovo-Romania relationship. Following 
another European Parliament resolution request for recognition, voted by a 
majority of Romanian MEPs4, former Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta 
stated that “I am rather in favor of a rapid process of recognition, [though] the 
President is more cautious than I am” (Ziare.com 2013). Later that year, Ponta 
went further and stated that “Romania should join the European family and 
2015 might be the year to recognize Kosovo, if there is coordination among the 
five non-recognizers” (Fazliu 2016). This was the only time when Romania’s 
position of non-recognition was challenged from within. Following the fall of 
the Ponta government and the election of Klaus Iohannis as President in De-
cember 2014, the debate on Kosovo faded. 
A recent analysis concerning Romania’s public communications on Kosovo 
underlines that “between 2015 and 2017 no Romanian high ranking official – 
Neither the Presidency, the Government nor the Legislative – made any refer-
ence to Kosovo’s status” (Troncotă and Ioniţă 2018, 228). With the exception 
of the usual messages issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in support of 
the enlargement process in the Balkans, the topic of Kosovo was quasi absent 
from Romania’s agenda.  This was due to a decrease in internal pressure, as the 
temptation to use Kosovo as a bargaining chip between the Presidency and the 
Executive disappeared, but, more importantly, due to fading of the external 
pressure towards Romania to recognize Kosovo, following the illegal annex-
ation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. This conflict in its vicinity created 
an incentive for Bucharest to be even more cautious in bringing up Kosovo in 
public debates. 
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Nowadays, Kosovo is neglected on the public agenda. There was one minor 
episode resembling the clash between Victor Ponta and President Traian 
Băsescu. It occurred when the leader of the Social Democrats, Liviu Dragnea, 
accused the President of having “stood at the same table with an entity that 
Romanian does not yet recognize - Kosovo”. This was, once again, an internal 
clash between an Executive dominated by a left-wing party and a President 
supported by right-wing parties. In March 2018, following a meeting between 
Aleksandar Vučić and Klaus Iohannis in Bucharest, Romania expressed its sup-
port for a solution on Kosovo, “a step ahead in the EU path of the Western Bal-
kans”, a solution acceptable for both Kosovo and Serbia as “Serbia’s accession 
to the Union will be possible only provided that the relation between Serbia 
and Kosovo is settled and clarified.” (Presidency.ro 2018)
SHAPING THE PUBLIC AGENDA - WHAT IS 
BEHIND ROMANIA’S POSITION?
Although officially Romania bases its non-recognition on a legalist approach, 
as it maintains that the secession of Kosovo was carried out in breach of inter-
national law, this reasoning was soon forgotten, as other narratives emerged in 
the public space. The agenda shifted rapidly to: fears over creating grounds for 
potential ethnic secessionist acts in Romania (Székely Land) or the territorial 
integrity of the Republic of Moldova - the controversial status of the breakaway 
region of Transnistria, all of which remain topics of critical influence. More re-
cently, the Kosovo precedent was used also in connection with the illegal an-
nexation of Crimea and continues to be referred to by other actors in Romania. 
These fears were placed high on the agenda even before Kosovo’s unilateral 
independence declaration and were restated immediately after. The most in-
fluential political player at that time, former President Traian Băsescu, an overt 
opponent of Kosovo, was the first to give special status to these narratives.5
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This determination to find similarities to Kosovo created a problem where there 
was none to begin with. The analogy between the case of Kosovo and a hypo-
thetical positioning of Hungarian groups in Romania in attempt to replicate 
the self-determination declaration managed to fuel minor radical movements, 
both in Hungary and in Romania. It was partially this position adopted by radi-
cal groups, which are often extremely vocal and visible, that hindered any real 
debate on the status of Kosovo. As mentioned before, there is also a second 
narrative present in the public discourse in Romania: the status of breakaway 
region of Transnistria. It was used as an argument by former Romanian Presi-
dent Traian Băsescu to justify not recognizing Kosovo, who often used this top-
ic rhetorically “If we recognize Kosovo, should we then recognize Transnistria 
as well?”(Radio Free Europe 2013), thus drawing a parallel between the two. 
As they appeal, once again, to a more emotional rather than rational reasoning 
– as in the case of Székely Land - these issues impede a more detached political 
approach to the topic of Kosovo. Both narratives were based on false premises 
and have been largely supported internally. The radical discourse concerning 
Kosovo put forward by influential public actors was not counterbalanced in 
any way, as both of these comparisons appealed to emotions and national sen-
sitivities, rather than rational arguments. In time, they generated a snowball 
effect and were also fueled by external radical discourses: such as those of 
the Hungarian Government6, and in particular, the extremist Hungarian Job-
bik Party, when discussing about Székely Land; or like the public discourse 
promoted by the Russian Federation when referring to Transnistria. A third 
narrative emerged more recently and attempts to link the illegal annexation 
of Crimea to Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. The annexation 
of Crimea fueled the nationalist and radical movements in Romania, within 
or outside mainstream political parties, and re-strengthened their position 
against any interaction with Kosovo. 
While these narratives are an important argument in shaping the position ad-
opted by political parties, there is also one more factor explaining this non-rec-
ognition policy and the almost non-existent internal pressure for change: the 
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Romanian foreign policy environment and its collective memory. Romania’s tra-
ditionally good relationship with the former Yugoslavia - the richer neighbor in 
communist times, and one with more liberal policies - and the unpleasant mem-
ories about the NATO bombing of Belgrade are still influential factors. Collective 
memory and the influence of the past are critical factors in this debate. Political 
actors in Romania frequently make use of mythologized understandings of the 
past to mobilize memory as an instrument of politics in the present. Romanians 
often quote that their country has had only two real friends: Yugoslavia and the 
Black Sea. Transylvania and the Republic of Moldova are also part of this con-
text, reminding Romanians of one of the consequences of the First World War 
and the unification of all Romanian provinces into Greater Romania. 
As behavioral sciences suggest (Verovšek 2016, 20), how we “pack and deliv-
er” the past and how we make use of collective emotions both have an impact 
on identities and understandings even in the present. Building on the rather 
mythologized relationship between Romania and former Yugoslavia, the re-
lations with Serbia are also seen as highly positive, not only by influent public 
figures, but by a large number of Romanian citizens. Thus, in a context that 
favors a strong relationship with Serbia, these three narratives have managed 
to set the agenda and dominate the public debate. Romania’s position as a cau-
tious non-recognizer is based rather on its internal and external concerns and 
fears, overshadowing its official position in support of international law. What’s 
more, the country remains trapped in an ambiguous public discourse on Koso-
vo, somewhere between the hardline and the moderate non-recognizers. 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE POSITIONS OF 
ROMANIAN POLITICAL PARTIES
Romanian political parties expressed a clear refusal to recognize Kosovo’s uni-
lateral declaration of independence. On 18 February 2008, with a large major-
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ity - 357 in favor and only 27 against - the Romanian Parliament adopted a dec-
laration against this recognition, stating that the “conditions to recognize the 
new entity are not fulfilled”(cdep.ro, 2008). This declaration also underlined 
that potential recognition by other states of the unilaterally declared indepen-
dence cannot be construed as a precedent. The vote showed wide acceptance 
among all political parties, despite mixed composition of the Parliament, with 
similar number of seats for the right-wing and left-wing parties, in addition to 
a far-right party.7 The only party to dismiss this position was the Democratic 
Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), which voted against the declara-
tion and, thus, for the recognition of Kosovo. The leaders of the party, which 
was part of the ruling coalition at that time, used the opportunity to strongly 
criticize the Romanian Parliament for failing to pass more favorable laws to-
wards national minorities, especially the Hungarians. The parallel between 
Kosovo and Székely Land was already drawn and was used by both sides to 
make accusations. At the time, UDMR was asked to step down from the gov-
erning coalition.
Prior to the vote, there was extreme tension in the Romanian Parliament. The 
topic of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration was used in internal political clashes, 
for accusations of national treason and it managed to stir radical and nation-
alist discourses in most parties. It completely overshadowed the legalist ap-
proach, to gravitate around the status of Székely Land, the breakaway region 
of Transnistria, or the Romanian communities living abroad. The debate was 
not about a breach of international law, but it was used internally as each party 
tried to capitalize on the Kosovo topic.8 Unchallenged from within and with 
wide consensus among the mainstream parties, these narratives over time de-
veloped and grew stronger. High on the public agenda, and fueled by radical 
groups, they grew based on extensive lack of knowledge and awareness, with 
regard to the Western Balkans, and Kosovo in particular. There have been few 
quantitative or qualitative analyses in Romania concerning the trends, posi-
tions and perceptions of political decision-makers on developments in the 
Western Balkans and in Kosovo.
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Up until 2013, when Victor Ponta, leader of the Social Democrats - the largest 
political party in Romania - questioned the country’s non-recognition of Koso-
vo, there had been no clear messages from any political party that such move 
would even be taken into consideration. This debate on Kosovo lasted up until 
2015 and with the resignation of Victor Ponta and a new elected president in 
Romania, Klaus Iohannis, the debate ended as abrupt as it started. 
The wide acceptance of the non-recognition policy impacted all parties, re-
gardless of their position in the political spectrum. However, the decision to 
put Kosovo on the agenda was rather part of the internal clash between the 
Prime Minister, representing the Social Democrats, and the President at that 
time, supported by right-wing parties – it was not a genuine shift in Romania’s 
position. The scenario repeated in 2018, when the leader of the Social Demo-
crats used the same approach in a clash with the President, showing that the 
attitude of the Social Democrats towards Kosovo are not party-specific, but in-
fluenced by political gains, and he simply used the debate as a bargaining chip. 
In 2016, the Romanian Center for European Policies carried out one of the few 
quantitative analyses on Kosovo. First, the study showed large discrepancies 
between Romania’s public positions and their enforcement: Although 85 per-
cent of the respondents believe that Romania’s role in EU’s enlargement policy 
in the Balkans is important, only half of them believe they are were informed 
or well-informed about Kosovo’s political situation. Taken individually, the 
situation in each party was as follows: 60 percent of the members of the So-
cial Democrats considered themselves informed or well-informed, as did 80 
percent of the members of UDMR, 26 percent of the members of Liberal Dem-
ocrats (now part of the National Liberal Party) and 56 percent of the members 
of the National Liberal Party. Also, in terms of the awareness on the position 
of the other four EU Member States that do not recognize Kosovo (Cyprus, 
Greece, Slovakia and Spain), 74 percent of the respondents believed that they 
did not possess enough information, while 26 percent believed that they pos-
sessed sufficient information.
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The most relevant part of the analysis referred to the reasoning behind 
non-recognition. Data shows that 39 percent of the respondents believed that 
Romania should recognize Kosovo, 35 percent were against recognition, and 
26 percent did not respond to this question. The reasoning was in line with the 
narratives that dominated the public agenda: most participants indicated that 
“it created a precedent for Russia and Hungary” or that “impacted the territo-
rial integrity of Serbia”, while the pro-recognition side argued that “Romania 
should follow EU partners and the US and recognize Kosovo”. Taken individu-
ally, the situation per party presented as follows: 36 percent of the members of 
the Social Democrats agreed that Romania should recognize Kosovo, as did 34 
percent of the members of the National Liberal Party, 42 percent of the mem-
bers of the Liberal Democrats and 90 percent of the members of UDMR. These 
pro-recognition figures are not negligible and, at a first glance, they do not 
necessary reflect the strong mainstream position against recognition. They 
are also quite surprising, having in mind the national context and the gener-
ally low level of knowledge and reduced interaction with Kosovo. The level of 
people-to-people exchanges (at academic or cultural level) remains low, while 
political contacts at party level are rather non-existent.9   
There are two explanations for this. Romanian political parties follow a top-
down approach, with major decisions being taken by core members of the par-
ty, that are rarely challenged from within. Secondly, despite the fact that the 
political parties stick to the non-recognition policy and use alternative narra-
tives to base their opinion, there is also distress among them for being on the 
same side as a handful of countries in the EU, and not sharing the opinion of 
their European political families and of Romania’s most important partners. 
The decreased external pressure following the illegal annexation of Crimea 
has eased this sentiment among the parties and has almost put a stop on any 
further debate on Kosovo. 
The 2016 research study remains relevant to this date. During the research for 
this paper, the conclusions of the study were discussed with members of both 
the mainstream parties and the newly formed ones, concluding that there have 
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been only relatively minor gains in terms of more interactions, awareness or 
knowledge on Kosovo. “There is no shift and there will be no change in our 
position if an agreement will not be reached between Kosovo and Serbia” mem-
bers of the National Liberal Party and Social Democratic Party explained.10
The topic is even more marginal on the public agenda, despite public claims 
that the Western Balkans is a priority for Romania’s Presidency of the Council 
of the European Union, which begun on 1 January 2019. With all the attention 
given to the internal political clashes and with Romania on a collision course 
with the European Commission due to the changes operated in the Justice sec-
tor, it is hard to assess how realistic this public claim is. There is still a wide gap 
between public statements and Romania’s actions.  
The snowball effect of the three narratives has had such a significant impact 
on the political parties also due to another issue: Romania’s external agenda 
remains focused around the Eastern Partnership, especially the Republic of 
Moldova - a country that receives 86 percent of Romania’s official foreign as-
sistance program compared to less than 5 percent for the entire Western Bal-
kans region. This approach also influences Romania’s attitude, which is better 
positioned on the topic of Republic Moldova, but with limited expertise on 
Western Balkans and Kosovo, in particular. EU enlargement in the Western 
Balkans is also not able to produce emotions in Romania, but it is rather used 
as terms of comparison with the Eastern Partnership. 
The Romanian context of 2018 is fairly fueled by radical discourses, populism 
and nationalist approaches. Romania does not currently have a parliamenta-
ry far-right populist force. In fact, such party completely failed to reach the 
minimum threshold during the 2016 parliamentary elections, but some of the 
language and topics associated with far-right have long been mainstream in 
other political parties. Among the topics used by far-right populists we also 
have stronger national identity, which is used by these movements to promote 
a more nationalist, pro-traditions and pro-Orthodox approach. Subsequently, 
Serbia is in a favorable position as opposed to Kosovo, as a direct connection is 
THE ROMANIA-KOSOVO RELATIONS AND THE PERSPECTIVE OF ROMANIAN POLITICAL PARTIES
364
made between Orthodox and nationalist Serbia versus non-Orthodox Kosovo. 
External factors are also influential. The radical discourse promoted by main-
stream parties, such as Fidesz or the radical party Jobbik towards Transylvania 
and  Székely Land are directly impacting the debate on Kosovo. 
Overall, all political parties, except UDMR, continue to support Romanian’s 
position of non-recognition, although the reasons are a mixture of support for 
international law and the parties’ perception of Romania’s self-interest. There 
are very few public references to Kosovo, as the topic remains marginal and 
substantive debates are absent. References are made rather when discussing 
about the long lasting relationship between Romania and Serbia or the three 
alternative narratives: Crimea, Székely Land and Transnistria. 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE PERSPECTIVES OF 
NEW POLITICAL PARTIES ON THE WESTERN 
BALKANS AND KOSOVO
The Romanian political environment underwent significant changes in recent 
years, as new political parties emerged. One of these new political parties, the 
Save Romania Union - Uniunea Salvati Romania (USR) managed to become the 
3rd parliamentary party following the 2016 parliamentary elections. More re-
cently, the Party of Liberty, Unity and Solidarity - Partidul Libertăţii, Unităţii 
şi Solidarităţii (PLUS), organized around former Romanian Prime Minister, 
Dacian Ciolos, was registered as a political party and is about to take part for 
the first time in the EU elections of 2019.11 A left-wing party, Demos, was also 
registered in 2018. While it is unlikely that any of these new parties will pro-
mote a policy of recognition, their emergence might provide a fresh start for a 
more substantive debate on Kosovo. Better professionalized in terms of EU af-
fairs and in general aligning their messages with the positions of the European 
Commission and of the so-called core states of the EU - France and Germany 
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- we could expect, at least, improved dialogue on this topic, both at national 
level, but also with Romania’s key partners. 
However, at this stage, their position is somewhat unclear and difficult to as-
sess. During the past two years, when the first of these parties emerged and 
took part in the elections, Kosovo was a marginal actor on the public agenda, 
thus there was no incentive for any debate on their position. In fact, to this 
date, none of these parties has a clear agenda concerning the Western Balkans 
or Kosovo, with the sole exception of having conveyed a general message of 
support for EU enlargement in the Balkans. With Romania on a collision course 
with the European Union due to the so-called “Judicial Reform”, there was 
little room on the public agenda for this topic. 
What’s more, being in an incipient stage, these political parties have access to lim-
ited resources that need to be diverted towards topics that can provide maximum 
gains for them. In terms of European Affairs or EU Enlargement, the Western Bal-
kans is overshadowed by the Eastern Partnership and, especially, the Republic of 
Moldova. What we can safely conclude is that the new political parties tend to an-
alyze Western Balkans and Kosovo through a more EU-affair oriented approach, 
partially dismissing the alternative narratives dominating the public agenda.12  
The non-recognition policy is also considered non-negotiable by representa-
tives of the new parties. Although they tend to partially dismiss the alternative 
narratives that shaped the public debate, they also understand that a sudden 
shift of position would be counterproductive and not beneficial to their inter-
est. In an interview with an MP from USR, he stated that “There is no need for 
speed on this debate. I see no advantages changing our position in the current 
national and international climate”.13 A key member of the PLUS party adopted 
a similar approach “You have a position of realpolitik: You just don’t give it up 
after one night, you need something in return”.14  The interviews with mem-
bers of the two parties also revealed similar patterns and explanations as those 
previously described. Despite the fact that Romania is in a rather uncomfort-
able position in the EU concerning this topic, fears of Kosovo being used as 
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precedent for secessionist movements remain high. These fears, also driven by 
minor groups within the parties, are used particularly in connection with the 
breakaway region of Transnistria. 
Not jeopardizing Romania’s good relationship with Serbia or avoiding to fuel the 
provocative discourse used by Russia or Hungary in relation with the “danger-
ous Kosovo precedent” are also among the explanations provided by members 
of the newer parties, when discussing their position on Kosovo. What differs is 
the intensity of these ‘fears’ among the members of the new parties: they are 
less used, they are not adopted in public positions, but rather in informal dis-
cussions and debates within the parties, being challenged from within and not 
imposed on the public agenda. The prevalence of a common Belgrade-Pristina 
position was also raised, which is considered essential and an a priori condition 
by all parties, before any changes to Romania’s position. It was emphasized that 
Belgrade and Pristina are the main actors in need of seeking common ground, 
rather than Romania taking a first step on this matter. The representatives of the 
newer parties underlined that, although they would be more open to dialogue 
to better understand the regional context, a sudden change of position would be 
in nobody’s interest. Romania’s political scene has not been generous in making 
public statements or taking public positions concerning the Western Balkans 
and, particularly, concerning Kosovo. During recent years, when these parties 
emerged, there was a lack of any significant debate on this topic. 
Thus, overall, parties like USR and PLUS can bring to the table more substan-
tive debates on Kosovo, by dismissing some of the alternative narratives and 
fake news surrounding the debate. But a change of position remains highly 
unlikely and would require a more favorable national and regional political 
climate. The success of the two parties in the next European Elections of 2019 
would also create incentives for more debates within the parties on critical EU 
topics, placing them in connection to the positions of their future European 
families and making the broader topic of enlargement in the Western Balkans 
more present in national debates. The topic of Kosovo cannot be separated 
from such debate. 
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CONCLUSIONS
The entire political spectrum in Romania - whether it is the mainstream par-
ties or the new political parties - shares a common view regarding the policy 
of non-recognition towards Kosovo. After a decade-long unchallenged posi-
tion, there won’t be any sudden shift from within. Romania’s official position 
is widely supported by its political parties, and, in the absence of an agreement 
between Belgrade and Pristina, it is highly unlikely that Kosovo’s recognition 
will be debated internally.
While documenting this paper and interviewing members of both the main-
stream parties and political newcomers, a similar discourse was enforced by 
all parties:15 a consensus between Belgrade and Pristina must precede the ac-
tions of the non-recognizers. Acting after a consensus is a win-win situation 
for the parties: they maintain a predictable behavior – which is important in 
the international arena. It does not require creating new narratives to explain 
their change of position to the public and, subsequently, they don’t get caught 
in the crossfire from other actors opposing the recognition. Continuous pres-
sure and lobby in favor of recognition by Romania’s Western partners have 
been unable to change this unyielding position (Ivan 2017, 41-46). 
This position should be understood through the lenses of the political envi-
ronment and public agenda in Romania: the snowball effect of having drawn a 
parallel between Kosovo and Székely Land, Transnistria and Crimea, managed 
to dominate the public agenda and to undermine any significant dialogue. 
These narratives are brought up quite frequently in parliamentary debates 
and have been underlined also during the interviews with party members that 
were conducted to document this paper. What’s more, the almost mytholo-
gized relationship between Romania and Serbia created an environment with 
very few opportunities for any in-depth debates on Kosovo. 
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As things stand, even an enhanced dialogue that would support a more con-
structive position is quite difficult to obtain. Externally, it would require a 
more favorable climate and, after the illegal annexation of Crimea or the re-
cent secessionist movement in Catalonia, a situation largely broadcasted in 
Romania due to the important Romanian community living in the region, this 
is even less plausible. Internally, the emergence of the new parties might pro-
vide the required incentives for a more articulated discussion on Kosovo and 
on the wider Western Balkans area, as the current dialogue seems stuck on 
some predefined narratives. 
Romania has maintained its position of non-recognition in the last ten years 
and change cannot come easily. There is no critical mass within the political 
parties, nor is there any will to put this topic on the table, as there is no polit-
ical gain from it. In the absence of wide consensus among the parties - which 
could probably happen only following an agreement between Pristina and Bel-
grade, the policy of non-recognition remains non-negotiable.  
Under these circumstances, Kosovo will remain a minor topic on Romania’s 
agenda, outshined by the aforementioned narratives and the EU’s Eastern 
Partnership policy, which is a topic able to touch more emotional strings and to 
generate more electoral gains for the parties. Back to our pragmatic approach, 
the parties are well-aware that any sudden change regarding non-recognition 
is not in their best interest and would only cause reverse effects. 
Lastly, the new political parties or certain groups within mainstream parties 
could take small steps towards enhancing and better understanding the West-
ern Balkans and Kosovo, but no sudden changes will occur from within. Dis-
missing the alternative narratives could give the new political parties an op-
portunity to discuss and better acknowledge the region and, in the medium to 
long term, might even bring about political gains. However, in the absence of 
a major external event, these are the limits within which the political parties - 
even the new ones - can act. 
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APPENDIX: NOTES ON  
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
1. This paper is based on a mix of quantitative and qualitative research data, 
using primarily data from 12 in-depth interviews with representatives of 
Romanian parliamentary parties, representatives of new political parties 
that will join the electoral competition in 2019, or academics and experts 
on the Western Balkans. 
2. All interviews were conducted in confidentiality and the names of inter-
viewees are withheld by mutual agreement. 
3. Between August and December 2018, 12 interviews were conducted with 
representatives of the Social Democratic Party, National Liberal Party, Dem-
ocratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania, Plus Party (former Romania To-
gether Movement), Union Save Romania Party, other relevant stakeholders 
(civil society, NGOs, academia). 
4. Seven interviews were conducted with party members. One interview was 
conducted with a member of the Social Democrats, one interview with a 
member of the National Liberal Party, two interviews with representatives 
of the Union Save Romania, two interviews with representatives of Plus 
Party, one interview with a representative of the Democratic Alliance of 
Hungarians in Romania. Except Plus Party, a non parliamentary party, all 
other interviews were conducted with members of the Parliament from the 
four mentioned parties.
5. Five interviews were conducted with other relevant stakeholders: repre-
sentatives from three NGOs (Romanian NGOs or international organiza-
tion) and two members of the academia. 
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6. In addition, it includes existing analysis and cross tabulations from a quan-
titative analysis carried out by the Romanian Center for European Policies 
in 2016 on the attitude of political parties concerning Kosovo. With a target 
group of 202 members of the Parliament, 51 senators and 151 deputies, a 
sample structure in line with the structure of the research population per 
party and per Chamber of Parliament at that time. In total, 506 MPs were 
contacted by CRPE, 401 answered and 202 agreed to take part in the survey. 
More information on this analysis can be found at www.crpe.ro/en
7. I have used the data from the survey to make cross tabulation between the 
levels of awareness and knowledge on Kosovo, respectively, their position 
towards the recognition policy. Statistically, the survey was based on 80 
answers from MPs from the Social and Democrats, 63 from the National 
Liberal Party, 26 from the Liberal Democratic Party and 10 answers from the 
Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania.
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LIST OF INTERVIEWS
Representative of the National Liberal Party, August 2018, Bucharest
Representative of the Union Save Romania Party, Member of the Romanian 
Senate, August 2018, Bucharest 
Representative of the Union Save Romania Party, EU Affairs Counsellor, Sep-
tember 2018, Bucharest 
Representative of the PLUS Party (at that date Romania Together Movement), 
August 2018, Bucharest
Representative of the PLUS Party (at that date Romania Together Movement), 
November 2018, Bucharest
Representative of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania, Novem-
ber 2018, Bucharest
Representative of the Minorities Group in the Romanian Chamber of Deputies, 
September 2018, Bucharest
Representative of the Minorities Group in the Romanian Chamber of Deputies, 
October 2018, Bucharest
Representative of the Social Democratic Party, October 2018, Bucharest
Former State Official, Member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 2018, 
Bucharest
Paul Ivan, European Policy Centre, September 2018
Miruna Troncota, National University of Political Studies and Public Adminis-
tration, September 2018, Bucharest
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ENDNOTES
1  Romania argues that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence breached inter-
national law and that the conditions for such declaration were not fulfilled. A more 
detailed explanation is provided below.
2 Székely Land is a Romanian region in Transylvania inhabited mainly by ethnic Hungarians. 
3 The political newcomers are Uniunea Salvaţi România (Union Save Romania) - 3rd parlia-
mentary party in Romania following the 2016 elections, PLUS Party, organized by former 
Prime Minister Dacian Cioloş and Demos, a left wing party. 
4 17 Romanian MEPs, out of a total of 33 Romanian MEPs, voted for the resolution calling 
for Kosovo’s recognition. 
5 In 2011, Traian Băsescu even refused to take part in a Summit held in Warsaw, reunit-
ing all Central and Eastern European states, alongside the then President of the United 
States, Barack Obama, due to an invitation sent also to Kosovo. Romania and Serbia 
declined to participate, with Traian Băsescu stating that next time he may be forced to 
sit near Igor Smirnov, leader of the Transnistria breakaway region at that time.  
6 Most recently, during a summer school supported by the Hungarian Government in Baile 
Tusnad, within the territory of what is called Székely Land, Viktor Orban re-expressed 
his position “Romania’s 100 years anniversary is no festive moment for us. For 100 
years, Romania does not know what do to with the 1.5 million Hungarians living here 
and still pretends that Székely Land does not exist”. (Digi24.ro, 2018)
7 The Parliament’s structure in 2008 was divided between left-wing and right-wing 
parties, controlling similar number of seats (40 percent), a far-right party of around 13 
percent and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians with 6 percent. 
8 A transcript of the debates that took place in the Romanian Parliament and parties’ 
positioning with regards to Kosovo is available here: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/
steno.stenograma?ids=6438&idl=1&fbclid=IwAR3-H-OLM_827aVOXiQN_h27pyjAEfIS-
Ar_8i_VmIHy3b3APkjhc6KcIps0
9 Except a small number of visits coordinated mainly by NGOs, there are no contacts 
between members of parties from Kosovo and their Romanian counterparts. 
10 Interview with representative of the Social Democratic Party, Bucharest, October 2018; 
Interview with representative of the National Liberal Party, August 2018.
11 Recent latest electoral surveys, dated October 2018, indicate that an alliance between 
USR and Dacian Ciolos’s party would gain a minimum of 22-25 percent of total votes, 
making them key players in the next elections. (IMAS General Survey 2018) 
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12 Union Save Romania portrays itself as the most pro European Romania party, while the 
leader of the PLUS Party, Dacian Ciolos, is one of the supporters of Macron’s political 
movement at EU level.
13 Interview with representative of the Union Save Romania, September 2018,  Bucharest. 
14 Interview with representative of the PLUS Party, August 2018. 
15 With the exception of UDMR, the only party which voted in favor of recognition in 2008, 
which has maintained its position ever since.  
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